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AUTHOR: 


LONG,  GEORGE 

1780-1868 


TITLE: 


ESSAY  ON  THE 
MORAL  NATURE 


PLA  CE: 


LONDON 


DA  TE : 


1841 


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MRNUFRCTURED   TO   flllM   STflNDRRDS 
BY   nPPLIED   IMfiGE,     INC. 


iir'iillitifiriii'  i^hf  i^fn  i'  Miirii'aiiiiiSiiMai 


Columbia  (Hnitiertfftj) 

THE  LIBRARIES 


AN    ESSAY 


ON    THE 


MORAL   NATURE  OF   MAN. 


AN  ESSAY 


■ 


ON  THE 


MORAL  NATURE  OF  MAN. 


BY 


GEORGE  LONG, 

BARRISTER-AT  LAW. 


\ 


LONDON: 

JOHN  MURRAY,  ALBEMARLE  STREET. 


1841. 


1 


u- 


> 


PRINTED  BY  RICHARD  AND  JOHN  E.  TAYLOR, 
RED  LION  COURT,  FLEET  STREET. 


"^ 


iX 

V 


PREFACE. 


'*The  proper  study  of  mankind  is  man:" 
so  said  the  first  poet  of  the  age  more  than  a 
hundred  years  ago.  At  the  time  when  the 
'  Essay  on  Man'  was  pubhshed,  and  for  a 
period  extending  somewhat  beyond  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  many  of 
the  deepest  thinkers  and  ablest  writers  of 
this  country  devoted  much  time  and  atten- 
tion to  metaphysical  and  ethical  inquiries. 
Many  excellent  disquisitions  on  moral  sub- 
jects may  be  found  in  the  works  of  some  of 
the  divines  and  philosophers  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  ;  and  it  has  been  said  of 
Barrow's  '  Sermons  on  the  Government  of 


•  » 


VI 


the  Tongue/  by  a  most  competent  judge*, 
that  **  they  are,  in  moral  preaching,  what 
the  best  parts  of  Aristotle  are  in  ethical 
philosophy,  with  more  of  development  and 
a  more  extensive  observation."  Moral  phi- 
losophy was,  however,  most  assiduously  and 
most  successfully  cultivated  in  this  country 
in  the  early  and  middle  periods  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  To  the  works  which 
then  appeared  the  author  of  the  following 
Essay  feels  deeply  indebted,  and  especially 
to  the  writings  of  Hartley  and  Butler,  to 
both  of  whom  he  has  sometimes  referred  in 
the  following  pages.  These  two  authors  he 
has  long  esteemed  the  best  ethical  writers 
in  our  language. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury the  selfish  theory  of  morals  found  a 
powerful  advocate  in  Dr.  Paley,  whose  work 
on   Moral   Philosophy   obtained,    and   still 

*  Hallam's  Literature  of  Europe,  vol.  iv.  p.  175. 


vn 


enjoys  an  extraordinary  degree  of  popu- 
larity. Believing  that  theory  to  be  utterly 
false  in  principle,  and  degrading  to  human 
nature,  the  author  has  endeavoured,  in  the 
following  Essay,  to  refute  it,  and  to  set 
forth  and  defend  what  he  conceives  to  be 
the  true  principles  of  morals.  He  feels 
fully  convinced,  that  the  low  tone  of  mo- 
rality which  unhappily  prevails  in  the  pre- 
sent  day,  is  to  be  attributed  in  a  consider- 
able degree  to  the  very  general  reception  of 
the  selfish  theory  of  morals.  The  attempt 
to  contribute  something  towards  the  ad- 
vancement of  ethical  science  which  is  now 
presented  to  the  pubHc,  is  certainly  not 
likely  to  excite  much  interest  or  to  engage 
much  attention.  The  taste  of  the  day  is 
very  unfavourable  to  speculations  of  this 
sort.  The  author,  however,  is  aware  that 
the  estimation  in  which  Paley's  '  Moral  Phi- 
losophy '  has  long  been  held  has  been  con- 


Vlll 


siderably  shaken,  and  he  entertains  some 
hope  that  a  better  system  will  in  time  be 
adopted.  It  is  an  encouraging  circum- 
stance, that  the  system  of  Paley  has  been 
within  a  few  years  ably  attacked,  and  the 
erroneousness  of  its  principles  exposed,  by 
a  late  distinguished  philosopher,  orator,  and 
statesman,  and  by  two  living  authors  who 
are  justly  considered  two  of  the  brightest 
ornaments  of  the  University  of  Cambridge, 
and  whose  eminence  in  physical  science  has 
probably  attracted  a  larger  share  of  public 
attention  to  their  ethical  disquisitions  than 
would  have  been  bestowed  upon  them  if 
they  had  been  known  to  the  world  as  moral 
philosophers  only*. 

♦  See  Sir  James  Mackintosh's  Dissertation  on  Ethical 
Philosophy,  ^ith  Mr.  Whewell's  Preface ;  Mr.  Sedg- 
wick's  Discourse  on  the  Studies  of  the  University  of 
Cambridge,  and  Mr.  WheweU's  Four  Sermons  on  the 
Foundation  of  Morals. 

Wimpole  Street,  October,  1841. 


AN  ESSAY 


ON  THE 


MORAL  NATURE  OF  MAN. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  THE  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALS. 

1 .  In  all  ages,  and  among  all  nations,  the 
actions  of  men  have  been  regarded  with 
feelings  and  sentiments  derived  from  their 
real  or  supposed  moral  qualities.  While 
some  actions  have  been  looked  upon  with 
approbation  and  esteem,  others  have  met 
with  disapprobation  and  censure.  Every 
language  has  terms  denoting  approbation 
and  disapprobation,  praise  and  blame,  ap- 
plied to  different  actions.  Though  a  few 
individuals  may  have  professed  to  deny  all 

B 


moral  distinctions,  the  number  of  such  per- 
sons has  been  so  small,  and  their  professed 
opinions  are  so  inconsistent  with  the  gene- 
ral sentiments  of  mankind,  unequivocally 
expressed  in  their  language,  as  to  excite 
a  suspicion  that  they  are  rather  to  be  attri- 
buted to  a  love  of  singularity  and  paradox 
than  to  be  regarded  as  the  real  sentiments 
of  those  who  have  professed  them. 

2.  Those  who  direct  their  thoughts  to  the 
subject  of  our  moral  sentiments  will  soon 
observe  that  they  greatly  vary  in  degree  as 
applied  to  different  actions.  The  temperate 
man,  who  restrains  his  desire  of  present  en- 
joyment for  the  sake  of  his  health,  thereby 
gains  some  share  of  our  approbation ;  but 
we  view  with  far  stronger  feelings  of  esteem 
the  act  of  him  who  freely  forgives  one  from 
whom  he  has  received  a  serious  injury  ;  and 
our  regard  rises  still  higher  for  the  man 
who  exposes  himself  to  trouble  and  to  dan- 
ger for  the  purpose  of  doing  good  to  others. 

3.  The  virtues, — in  other  words,  those 
qualities  which  command  our  esteem, — may, 


i-'l 


I  think,  be  conveniently  divided  into  three 
classes:  1.  Those  which  have  for  their  ob- 
ject our  own  greatest  good ;  as  temperance, 
by  which  we  preserve  our  health  ;  prudence, 
which  enables  us,  in  the  management  of  our 
affairs,  to  provide  for  our  future  wants; 
courage,  by  which  we  meet  danger  with  the 
best  chance  of  surmounting  it ;  and  forti- 
tude, which  alleviates  the  sufferings  which 
we  are  obliged  to  endure.     2.  Those  actions 
which  have  for  their  object   the  good  of 
others  ;  justice,  which  accords  to  every  man 
his  due;  mercy,  which  forgives  injuries; 
benevolence,  which  displays  itself  in  acts  of 
kindness ;   and  that  high  degree  of  those 
qualities  which  is  termed  generosity,  which 
induces  us  to  confer  favours  on  others  above 
their  deserts,  to  relinquish  our  right  of  re- 
dress for  injuries  received,  and  to  encounter 
inconvenience  and  peril  in  our  exertions  for 
the  attainment  of  benevolent  objects.     3. 
The  third  class  consists  of  certain  senti- 
ments which  are  considered  good  in  them- 
selves,  without    regard    to    consequences. 

b2 


'  A- 


Some  of  these  arise  from  our  relation  to 
other  beings,  to  whom  they  are  considered 
to  be  due,  and  a  failure  in  which  always  ex- 
poses us  to  censure.  Among  these  senti- 
ments, are  gratitude  to  benefactors,  and 
especially  to  the  great  Author  of  our  being, 
and  all  the  other  feelings  of  which  he  is  the 
object ;  as  trust  and  confidence  in  his  good- 
ness and  mercy,  reliance  on  his  promises, 
adoration  and  awe  of  his  unspeakable  per- 
fections, and  resignation  to  his  holy  will. 
To  the  same  category  belong  personal  pu- 
rity and  humility. 

4.  Let  us  now  consider  the  principle  of 
these  three  classes  of  virtues.  That  of  the 
first  is  self-interest,  or  a  regard  to  our  own 
greatest  happiness.  The  second  class  has 
benevolence,  or  a  regard  to  the  well-being 
of  others  for  its  principle.  The  principle  of 
the  third  class  we  have  stated  to  be  its  in- 
trinsic excellence.  If  any  one  should  doubt 
the  existence  in  human  nature  of  moral  sen- 
timents of  the  third  class,  I  must  beg  to  call 
his  serious  attention  to  the  actual  state  and 


•I 


^ 


feelings  of  his  own  mind  respecting  one  par- 
ticular virtue,  concerning  which  there  is  per- 
haps an  agreement  as  nearly  universal  as  can 
be  found  on  any  moral  subject  whatever ;  in- 
deed it  may,  I  think,  be  truly  asserted  that 
it  is  quite  universal :  the  virtue  in  question 
is   gratitude.      The  general  sentiments   of 
mankind  have  severely,  and  I  beheve  uni- 
versally, stigmatized  the  vice  of  ingratitude. 
Let  us  then  ask  for  the  reason  why  it  is  our 
duty  to  be  grateful  to  our  benefactors.     It  is 
clear  that  the  principle  of  the  first  class  of 
virtues  above  enumerated  has  no  application 
here.     The  man  who  should  defend  his  want 
of  gratitude  to  one  from  whom  he  has  re- 
ceived benefits,  on  the  ground  that  his  being 
grateful  would  in  no  way  tend  to  forward 
his  own  interest,  would  be  universally  con- 
demned.    Neither  is  the  principle  of  the 
second  class  appUcable  in  all  cases ;  for  the 
relative  situation  of  the  benefactor  and  of 
the  party  obUged  may  be  such  as  to  prevent 
the  latter  from  being  able  in  any  way  to  ad- 
vance the  well-being  of  the  former ;  and  this 


r 


must  always  be  the  case  as  to  Him  to  whom 
our  highest  gratitude  is  due.  Man  cannot, 
by  any  sentiment  or  any  act  of  his,  increase 
the  happiness  of  his  Maker ;  yet  a  defect  in 
gratitude  towards  a  human  benefactor  is 
uniformly  held  a  matter  of  serious  reproach ; 
and  ingratitude  to  the  Author  of  all  good  is 
felt  to  be  deserving  of  still  severer  reprehen- 
sion by  all  who  have  not  unhappily  thrown 
aside  all  regard  to  religion  in  any  shape. 
So  deeply  is  this  sentiment  implanted  in  our 
nature,  and  so  difficult  is  it  to  conceive  any 
intelligent  being  who  does  not  recognise  it, 
that  Milton  gives  it  a  place  even  in  the  bo- 
som of  Satan  himself: — 

" he  deserved  no  such  return 

From  me,  whom  he  created  what  I  was. 
In  that  bright  eminence,  and  with  his  good 
Upbraided  none ;  nor  was  his  service  hard. 
What  could  be  less,  than  to  afford  him  praise. 
The  easiest  recompense,  and  pay  him  thanks. 
How  due !     Yet  all  his  good  proved  ill  in  me. 
And  wrought  but  malice ;  lifted  up  so  high, 
I  *sdeign'd  subjection,  and  thought  one  step  higher 
Would  set  me  highest,  and  in  a  moment  quit 
The  debt  immense  of  endless  gratitude. 


A 


f 


ir,* 


'1 


So  burdensome,  still  paying,  still  to  owe. 
Forgetful  what  from  him  I  still  receive ; 
And  understood  not  that  a  grateful  mind 
By  owing  owes  not,  but  still  pays,  at  once 
Indebted  and  discharged." 

5.  It  may  be  proper  to  observe  here,  that 
many  of  those  qualities  which  are  usually 
considered  virtuous  may  be  derived  from 
more  than  one  of  the  above-mentioned  prin- 
ciples. Thus  prudence  in  the  management 
of  our  affairs  may  result  from  a  regard  to 
our  own  future  interests ;  but  its  object  is 
also  often  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  those 
who  are  dependent  on  us,  or  of  others,  or  to 
forward  public  objects  of  beneficence.  Tem- 
perance is  not  only  favorable  to  our  health, 
but  also  makes  us  more  useful  and  agree- 
able to  others.  Everv  modification  of  bene- 
volence  is  accompanied  by  feelings  of  sym- 
pathy for  others,  and  of  self-approbation, 
which  are  highly  conducive  to  our  own  hap- 
piness. A  rational,  sober,  and  fervent  piety 
is  eminently  favorable  to  our  own  happi- 
ness, and  cannot  fail  to  dispose  us  to  pursue 


k^l 


8 


all  the  means  in  our  power  to  promote  the 
well-being  of  others. 

6.  The  following  seem  to  be  the  principal 
questions  in  dispute  among  ethical  writers. 
— 1.  Whether  a  regard  to  our  own  greatest 
interest  be  the  only  real  principle  of  morals. 
2.  Whether  moral  sentiments  form  a  part 
of  our  nature,  or  are  mere  deductions  of 
reason.  3.  Wliether  any  moral  sentiments, 
distinct  from  a  desire  to  advance  our  own 
happiness  or  that  of  others,  exist  in  the  hu- 
man mind,  and  are  to  be  accounted  original 
moral  principles  of  our  nature.  Among  the 
ethical  writers  of  our  own  country,  Dr.  Paley 
is  one  of  the  most  strenuous  defenders  of 
the  affirmative  side  of  the  first  question. 
According  to  his  definition  of  virtue,  it  con- 
sists in  '*  doing  good  to  mankind,  in  obe- 
I  dience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  for  the  sake 
'  of  everlasting  happiness."  The  third  branch 
of  this  definition  evidently  excludes  all  dis- 
interested actions  from  Paley 's  idea  of  virtue ; 
and  he  must  have  thought,  either  that  such 
actions  did  not  exist,  or,  if  they  did  exist. 


I 


that  they  were  not  entitled  to  be  called  vir- 
tuous. Bishop  Butler  in  former  times.  Sir 
James  Mackintosh  in  our  own,  and  manv 
others,  have  taken  the  opposite  side,  and 
contended  with  great  ability,  and  (as  it  seems 
to  me)  with  complete  success,  for  the  exist- 
ence of  disinterested  virtue.  Paley,  Ben- 
tham,  and  many  others,  have  taken  the  ne- 
gative side  of  the  second  and  third  ques- 
tions. 

7.  Let  us  consider  each  of  these  questions 
in  their  order.  And  first  as  to  disinterested 
benevolence ;  it  must  be  conceded  by  the 
supporters  of  the  selfish  system  that  the  or- 
dinary language  in  use  respecting  moral 
subjects  supposes  the  existence  of  disinter- 
ested affections  and  actions.  Thus  we  hear 
every  day  of  the  disinterested  conduct  of 
such  an  individual ;  of  his  having  given  up 
his  own  interest  for  the  good  of  others  ;  and 
of  his  having  devoted  his  time,  and  exercised 
his  talents,  for  their  benefit.  The  words 
benevolence,  mercy,  generosity,  kindness, 
and  the  like,  are  in  every  one's  mouth ;  and 

B  5 


10 

it  has  never  been  shown  that  terms  corre- 
sponding to  these  are  wanting  in  any  lan- 
guage. But  if  the  doctrine,  that  the  only  end 
of  virtue  is  our  own  greatest  happiness,  and 
that  we  are  incapable  of  performing  disinter- 
ested actions,  be  true,  these  words  have  no 
real  meaning.  My  doing  good  to  another 
for  the  sake  of  a  reward  to  myself,  undoubt- 
edly ought  not  to  be  called  benevolence,  but 
rather  prudence,  or  a  regard  to  my  own 
well-being.  If  I  forgive  a  man  who  has 
injured  me  from  a  kindly  regard  to  him,  the 
action  is  properly  called  mercy  ;  but  if  it  be 
done  merely  with  a  view  to  a  future  rew^ard 
to  myself,  it  loses  its  character,  and  becomes 
merely  an  act  of  prudence.  Indeed,  the 
selfish  theory  altogether  excludes  all  those 
actions  w^hich  have  been  alwavs  considered 
by  the  great  mass  ot  mankind  entitled  to 
the  highest  applause  and  veneration.  The 
pretended  patriot  loses  his  title  to  our 
esteem  from  the  moment  when  we  discover 
that  his  zeal  to  advance  the  welfare  of  his 
country  was  merely  the  result  of  a  desire  to 


H 


II 

forward  his  own  interests.  We  honor  the 
man  w^ho  exerts  himself  to  repay  the  bene- 
fits which  he  has  received ;  but  when  we 
find  that  what  we  had  mistaken  for  a  grate- 
ful return  for  former  favors  was  in  truth 
only  prompted  by  a  desire  to  procure  other 
favors,  we  withdraw  our  esteem  altogether. 
It  is  no  answer  to  these  observations  to 
draw  a  distinction  between  our  well-being 
in  this  world  and  in  that  which  is  to  come. 
If  the  motive  of  our  conduct  be  merely  to 
secure  our  own  happiness,  its  moral  charac- 
ter must  be  the  same,  whether  the  happiness 
of  this  or  of  the  next  world  be  in  view\ 
Considered  in  relation  to  our  own  prudence 
or  wisdom,  indeed,  the  difference  is  immea- 
surably great  between  a  regard  to  the  hap- 
piness which  we  can  enjoy  in  the  few  fleet- 
ing years  given  to  us  in  this  world,  and  that 
of  the  eternal  state  to  which  we  are  all  hast- 
ening; but  as  far  as  others  are  concerned, 
there  is  no  difierence.  The  kind  acts  which 
I  do  for  another  deserve  the  name  of  bene- 
volence, if  their  real  object  be  his  happiness ; 


:| 


12 

but  ought  to  be  called  by  another  name, 
when  my  only  purpose  in  serving  him  is  to 
secure  my  own  happiness,  whether  here  or 
hereafter.  If  then  the  selfish  theory  be  true, 
all  nations  have  agreed  in  the  use  of  lan- 
guage which  has  no  proper  signification. 
In  fact,  this  theory  has  never  been  adopted 
by  the  generality  of  mankind :  it  is  the 
opinion  of  speculative  persons  only,  and  is 
utterly  opposed  to  the  ordinary  mode  of 
thinking  and  speaking  on  these  subjects. 
What  man,  unsophisticated  by  philosophi- 
cal subtleties,  observing  an  aflfectionate  mo- 
ther watching  over  the  couch  of  her  sick 
child,  imputes  her  solicitude  to  the  hope  of 
a  reward  in  heaven ;  or  who,  that  sees  an 
amiable  daughter  in  the  bloom  of  youth  and 
beauty  abstaining  from  the  ordinary  enjoy- 
ments of  life  for  the  purpose  of  devoting 
herself  wholly  to  attendance  on  her  aged  and 
infirm  parents,  attributes  her  conduct  to  any 
regard  whatever  to  a  reward  here  or  here- 
after, or  considers  that  she  is  actuated  by 
any  thing  but  that  moral  principle  which 


13 


the  Author  of  our  being  has  implanted  in 
the  human  heart  ? 

8.  The  charge  of  selfishness  is  resented 
and  repelled  with  indignation  by  every  one. 
Why  is  this,  and  how  could  this  feeling  have 
arisen,  if  we  had  been  so  formed  as  to  be  ca- 
pable of  nothing  beyond  a  regard  to  our  own 
interests,  in  other  words,  had  been  alto- 
gether without  feelings  of  disinterested  be- 
nevolence ?  The  indirect  mode  of  getting  at 
men's  real  opinions  and  sentiments  is  often 
preferable  to  the  direct  one.  We  often 
greatly  deceive  ourselves  as  to  our  own 
feelings  and  sentiments,  and  are  only  made 
acquainted  with  the  real  state  of  our  own 
hearts  by  the  occurrence  of  some  unexpected 
incident.  A  kind  and  affectionate  father 
will  sometimes  fancy  that  all  his  parental 
love  for  a  child  has  been  utterly  eradicated 
by  his  disobedient  and  vicious  conduct ;  but 
let  any  real  calamity  befall  him,  and  how 
soon  is  the  face  of  things  changed !  how 
quickly  does  the  relenting  father  turn  to  his 
child,  and  the  tender  overflowings  of  the 


I 


14 

parental  heart  take  their  natural   course! 
and  if  the  misery  which  the  child  has  en- 
dured have  led  him  to  a  better  state  of  mind, 
and  brought  him  to  repentance,  then  is  the 
heart  of  the  parent  filled  with  joy ;  then  he 
sees  him  at  a  distance,  and  runs  and  kisses 
him,  and  brings  the  best  garment,  and  kills 
the  fatted  calf  and  makes  merry  for  his  son's 
return.     So  much  deception  is  to  be  found 
in  men,  so  often  do  they  attempt  to  deceive 
others,  and  so  often  do  they  actually  deceive 
themselves,  as  to  make  persons  of  reflection 
very  sceptical  in  receiving  the  evidence  of 
their  real  sentiments  from  their  own  ex- 
pressions, and  their  own  conduct  in  matters 
intended  to  be  seen  by  the  world :    but  we 
may  confidently   rely  on  the  undesigning 
and  casual  expressions  of  feelings  and  opi- 
nions which  appear  from  time  to  time,  and 
under  such  circumstances  as  leave  no  room 
to  suspect  premeditated  deception.    These 
testify  the  real  turn  of  thought  and  feeling  of 
the  party  using  them.     Now  the  strong  sen- 
timent of  indignation  with  which  the  charge 


1.1 


15 

of  selfishness  is  universally  repelled,  afibrds 
proofs  of  the  kind  just  referred  to  of  the  ge- 
neral opinions  of  mankind  on  this  subject. 
It  may,  indeed,  be  contended  that  the  ex- 
pression  of  resentment  at  such  a  charge  may 
arise  from  the  desire  which  every  one  feels 
to  be  esteemed  by  others  ;  but  whence  does 
it  arise  that  esteem  follows  those  particular 
actions  which  appear  to  be  of  a  disinterested 
character,  but  from  a  belief  in  the  actual  ex- 
istence of  such  actions  ?  Is  it  possible  that 
those  who  really  believe  that  all  these  ac- 
tions, which  are  esteemed  virtuous,  are 
based  on  a  regard  to  our  interest,  should  en- 
tertain these  strong  sentiments  in  favour  of 
that  pretended  disinterested  benevolence, 
which  they  believe  to  have  no  real  existence  ? 
What  is  the  feeling  of  a  benefactor  whose 
kindness  has  met  with  a  return  of  ingrati- 
tude? Does  he  view  the  conduct  of  the 
obUged  person  as  a  mere  error  in  judgment, 
and  blame  him  because  his  ingratitude  will 
ultimately  prove  injurious  to  himself;  or  is 
not  his  feeling  that  of  indignation  at  the 


H 


l! 


16 

conduct  of  him  who  has  violated  one  of  the 
strongest  moral  principles  of  our  nature? 
This  is  the  universal  sentiment  in  such 
cases,  and  it  affords  a  powerful  argument  in 
favour  of  the  moral  nature  of  man. 

9.  Though  the  selfish  theorv  of  morals 
deprives  human  nature  of  all  that  is  most 
amiable,  respectable  and  dignified  ;  of  *'  all 
generous  joys  and  generous  cares  beyond 
ourselves;"  yet  many  are  so  taken  with 
it  as  to  embrace  the  most  extravagant  doc- 
trines rather  than  to  part  with  it.  The 
common  feeUngs  of  mankind  have  esta- 
bhshed  so  broad  a  distinction  between  the 
beneficent  sovereign  and  the  cruel  tyrant ; 
between  him  who  dehvers  his  country  from 
the  yoke  of  oppression  and  him  who  en- 
slaves it ;  between  the  man  whose  life  is 
marked  by  piety,  benevolence,  and  temper- 
ance, and  him  who  lives  without  God  in  the 
world,  abandoned  to  vice  and  wickedness, 
as  to  render  it  impossible  to  deny  the  real- 
ity of  these  distinctions.  What  then  has 
been  the  course  of  the  supporters  of  the 


t< 


I 


17 

selfish  theory  ?  Unable  to  deny  that  Cato 
is  to  be  preferred  to  Catiline,  and  Washing- 
ton to  Robespierre,  they  have  made  the 
distinction  between  these  characters  to  con- 
sist merely  in  this ; — that  the  self-love  of 
Cato  and  Washington  took  a  better  direc- 
tion than  that  of  Catiline  and  Robespierre, 
and  was  better  fitted  to  advance  their  own 
happiness.  According  to  these  philoso- 
phers, the  former  are  to  be  preferred  to  the 
latter  merely  because  they  were  better  cal- 
culators, and  had  formed  a  just  estimate  of 
the  means  fitted  to  secure  their  own  great- 
est happiness.  Because  doing  good  is  al-  \ 
ways  attended  by  a  pleasure  to  the  agent ; 
because  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  be  at 
the  same  time  desirous  of  making  efforts 
for  the  good  of  others,  and  unconcerned 
whether  those  effbrts  succeed  or  not ;  be- 
cause having  willed  the  happiness  of  an- 
other, we  must  of  necessity  rejoice  at  find- 
ing that  the  end  in  view  has  been  accom- 
plished ; — it  has  been  contended,  that  our 
sole  object  in   doing  good  is  to  enjoy  the 


/ 


18 

pleasure  attendant  on  our  acts  of  benefi- 
cence.    But  surely  this  is  an  extravagant 
view  of  the  subject ;  and  if  the  train  of  rea- 
soning  from  which  it  results  be  followed  up 
to  its  legitimate  consequences  it  seems  fatal 
to  the  selfish  theory  itself.     There  are  two 
things  here  to  be  considered ;  the  object  of 
the  agent,   and  the  pleasure  attendant  on 
the  act.     The  general  way  of  viewing  the 
subject  is,  that  the  good  to  be  done  is  the 
object  of  the  agent,  and  the  pleasure  ac- 
companying the  act  is  merely  an  incident : 
otherwise  such  language  as  that  a  man  in- 
tends to  serve  his  friend  or  to  advance  the 
interests  of  his  country,  could  never  have 
been  used.     How  is  it  to  be  made  out  that 
this  way  of  representing  things  is  not  con- 
sistent  with  the  real  state  of  mind  of  the 
agent  ?     I  can  perceive  only  one  mode, 
that  of  assuming  that  human  nature  cannot 
look  beyond  the  immediate  gratification  of 
its  desires.     No  other  answer  will  serve  the 
turn.     If  it  be  said  that  we  are  incapable 
of  disinterested  feelings,  that  assertion  as- 


'\\ 


19 

sumes  the  matter  in  dispute ;  and,  not 
being  self-evident,  requires  to  be  proved. 
What  proof  then  can  be  offered  ?  It  may 
be  said  that  all  our  voluntary  actions  re- 
sult from  a  desire  to  obtain  good  or  to 
avoid  evil ;  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  ad- 
mit the  existence  of  any  other  motive.  As- 
suming this  for  the  present  to  be  true,  an 
important  question  arises  ; — have  we  or  have 
we  not  the  power  to  refrain  from  a  present 
gratification  for  the  sake  of  a  greater  good 
to  be  attained  hereafter  ?  Now  the  selfish 
theory  rests  entirely  on  the  assumption  that 
we  are  capable  of  repressing  the  desire  of 
present  gratification  for  the  purpose  of  ad- 
vancing our  own  greatest  happiness.  The 
satisfying  of  the  passion  of  the  moment  (as 
Butler  has  long  ago  observed)  differs  as 
widely  from  that  regard  to  our  own  great- 
est happiness  which  is  commonly  called  self- 
love,  as  it  does  from  benevolence ;  and  is  no 
more  inconsistent  with  the  latter  than  with 
the  former.  Now  the  restraining  of  the 
present  inclination  for  the  sake  of  obtain- 


9f 


20 

ing  a  future  good  is  constantly  practised  by 
almost  every  one.  Nothing  is  more  common 
than  people  abstaining  from  particular  kinds 
of  food  which  they  are  inclined  to  eat,  from 
an  apprehension  that  they  would  prove  inju- 
rious to  health  ;  or  restricting  themselves  in 
the  use  of  fermented  hquors,  for  fear  of  their 
intoxicating  effects,  and  of  the  injury  to  the 
constitution    which  would   probably  result 
from  indulgence.     If  then  we  are  capable 
of  restraining  and  conquering  our  desires 
for  present  gratification  for  the  sake  of  en- 
joying  some  greater  good    hereafter,   how 
can  it  be  proved  that  we  are  incapable  of 
such   restraint  for    the   purpose    of   doing 
good  to  others  ?      Why,  it  may  be  asked 
of  a  man,  who  gives  up  his  time  to  the  toils 
of  business,  and  refrains  from  indulging  in 
many  pleasures  to  which  he  is  prompted  by 
his  incUnation,— why  do  you  exercise  this 
self-denial,    and    debar    yourself   of   those 
pleasures  in  which  you  feel  inclined  to  in- 
dulge  ?     The  answer  may  be,    that  he  is 
looking  forward  to  the  acquisition  of  such 


21 

a  fortune  as  will  place  him  in  a  situation  of 
independence,  and  provide  for  the  w^ants  of 
his  declining  years.  Every  one  sees  that 
this  answer  is  satisfactory  ;  that  the  course 
of  conduct  pursued  is  rational  and  prudent; 
and  no  one  doubts  that  such  a  person  has 
truly  explained  the  motives  of  his  conduct. 
Suppose  now  many  years  to  have  elapsed, 
and  an  adequate  fortune  to  have  been  ac- 
quired, but  the  party  in  question  to  be  still 
following  his  business,  and  practising  the 
same  self-denial  as  before.  The  inquirer 
again  presents  himself  with  the  same  ques- 
tion, but  the  answer  varies  materially.  It 
is  true,  says  the  person  of  whom  the  in- 
quiry is  made,  that  I  have  acquired  pro- 
perty sufficient  to  secure  my  independence, 
and  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  my  old  age ; 
but  circumstances  have  materially  changed 
since  our  last  conversation ;  I  am  now  mar- 
ried, and  the  father  of  a  large  family ;  and 
I  still  continue  to  carry  on  my  business  for 
the  purpose  of  providing  sufficient  for  the 
establishment  of  my  children  in  the  world. 


I 


22 


Here  then  we  have  a  man  looking  beyond 
himself,  and  regulating  his  conduct  with  a 
view  to  the  good  of  others.  Is  there  any 
better  reason  to  doubt  his  having  given  a 
true  account  of  his  intentions  and  objects 
in  this  case  than  in  the  other  ?  I  conceive 
not.  Here  then  is  a  case  of  disinterested 
benevolence  ;  and  if  it  be  conceded  that  a 
father  may  be  actuated  in  his  conduct  by  a 
disinterested  regard  to  the  well-being  of  his 
child,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  he  may 
have  a  similar  feeling  towards  his  friends 
or  his  countrv. 

10.  It  might  indeed  be  conceded,  with- 
out at  all  affecting  the  argument,  that  in 
one  sense  all  we  do  for  others  is  for  our 
own  gratification  ;  that  is  to  say,  that  we 
never  do  good  to  another,  except  when  our 
feelings  are  in  such  a  state  that  we  receive 
more  pleasure  from  doing  the  act  than  we 
should  from  refraining.  To  desire  the  good 
of  another  as  we  desire  our  own,  to  feel 
for  him  as  we  feel  for  ourselves,  has  ever 
been  accounted  virtuous,  and  is    held  by 


23 

the  general  sentiments  of  mankind  to  differ 
widely  from  that  state  of  feeling,  which  in- 
duces us  to  do  good  to  others  for  the  pur- 
pose of  procuring  ultimately  some  benefit 
to  ourselves,  whether  in  the   nature  of  a 
reward  or  otherwise.     A  man  may  devote 
much  of  his  time  to  a  sick  friend,  attend- 
ing his  bed-side,   and  making  every  exer- 
tion in  his  power  to  alleviate   his  suffer- 
ings ;  he    may    feel  gratified  in  so  doing, 
and  his  sympathies  may  be  so  far  engaged, 
that   it   would   be  doing   the  utmost   vio- 
lence to  his  feelings  to  refrain  from  paying 
those  attentions  to  his  friend  ;    but  these 
feelings,  so  far  from  lessening  our  esteem 
for  him,  are  uniformly  considered  to  give 
him  a  higher  title  to  it :  but  if  the  sole  ob- 
ject of  the  pains  he  is  taking  were  known 
to  be  the  hope  of  receiving  a  legacy  on  the 
death  of  the  sick  man,  all  esteem  for  his 
apparently  friendly  conduct  would  immedi- 
ately vanish ;  and,  so  far  from  being  held 
entitled  to  our  esteem,  he  would  be  univer- 
sally  considered   sordid    and    hypocritical. 


\ 


24 

Such  a  one  would  stand  condemned   by  the 
general  sentiments  of  mankind. 

11.  The  selfish  system  is  derived  entirely 
from  a  confusion  of  ideas  arising  from  mix- 
ing together  two  subjects  of  inquiry  which 
are  quite  distinct  in  their  nature.  The  first 
of  these  inquiries  is,  what  is  virtue?  the 
second,  does  the  pursuit  of  virtue  tend  to 
secure  our  own  greatest  happiness?  The 
last  question  may  perhaps  be  truly  answered 
in  the  affirmative  ;  but,  whether  it  be  so  or 
not,  virtue  does  not  lose  its  essence  and 
character.  Supposing  it  could  be  ascer- 
tained with  certainty  that  the  whole  exist- 
ence of  man  is  confined  to  this  world,  and 
that  the  belief  of  a  future  state  is  a  mere 
delusion.  In  such  a  state  of  things,  a  ques- 
tion might  arise,  whether  it  be  an  act  of 
virtue  for  a  man  to  lay  down  his  life  for  his 
country.  Such  an  act  we  will  assume  to 
be  calculated  to  confer  great  benefits  on 
others,  but  it  is  clear  that  the  loss  of  fife  to 
the  patriot  cannot  be  in  any  way  com- 
pensated.    What  then  has  been  the  feeUng 


25 

of  mankind  on  this  subject  ?  Such  devo- 
tion  to  one's  country  has  been  always  ap- 
plauded as  one  of  the  highest  acts  of  virtue. 
No  one  has  ever  heard  Codrus  and  Decius 
praised  because  they  were  to  be  rewarded 
in  a  future  world  ;  but  always  because  they 
yielded  up  their  hves  voluntarily  for  the 
good  of  their  country. 

12.  But  it  may  be  asked,  why  am  I  to    / 
exert  myself  for  the  good  of  others  when  no  / 
reward  is  to  be  bestowed  on  me  for  so  do- 
ing ?     This  is  only  asking,  in  other  words, 
why  am  I  to  be  virtuous  ?     To  do  good  is  in 
itself  a  virtuous  act,  and  no  further  inquiry 
need  be  made.     When  we  make  it,  we  have 
gone  beyond  the  region  of  moral  philosophy, 
and  have  entered  on  another  inquiry,  that 
of  adopting  the  best  means  of  promoting 
our  own  interest ;  an  important  subject  no 
doubt,  but  at  best  only  one  branch  of  moral 
philosophy,  as  it  is  beUeved  has  been  already 
satisfactorily  proved. 

13.  All  Christians,  and,  I  think,  all  ratio- 
nal theists,  must  admit  that  our  virtues  are 

c 


! 


26 

most  perfect  when  they  most  nearly  resem- 
ble the  moral  perfections  of  the  Deity.  But 
what  conception  are  we  capable  of  forming 
of  the  moral  attributes  of  God  but  that  of 
perfect  goodness  which  induces  him  to  con- 
fer happiness  on  his  creatures  for  their  own 
sakes  ?  Regarding  him  as  a  Being  perfectly 
happy  in  himself,  and  secure  in  his  omnipo- 
tence from  any  interruption  to  his  happi- 
ness, we  can  imagine  no  motive  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  his  creative  energy  but  the  will  to 
confer  happiness  on  his  creatures.  The 
sole  foundation  of  the  love  of  God  is  his 
moral  perfection.  His  unbounded  and  uni- 
versal power  might  well  alarm  us,  and  his 
unspeakable  knowledge  and  wisdom  must 
excite  our  highest  admiration  ;  but  it  is  his 
goodness  and  mercy  which  we  love.  If 
then  human  nature  be,  in  some  degree, 
capable  of  imitating  his  moral  perfections, 
it  is  to  qualities  resembling  them  that  our 
highest  esteem  is  due ;  and  this  is  consist- 
ent with  the  general  sentiments  of  the  hu- 
man race. 


'V 


> 


27 

14.  The  doctrine  of  the  disinterestedness 
of  human  actions  was  zealously  opposed  by 
Brown,  the  able  and  ingenious  author  of  the 
*  Essays    on    the    Characteristics   of  Lord 
Shaftesbury/     According  to  this  author*, 
**  the  only  reason  or  motive  by  which  indivi- 
duals can  possibly  be  induced  to  the  practice 
of  virtue,  must  be  the  feeUng  immediate,  or 
the  prospect  of  future  private  happiness." 
This  is  dogmatically  asserted ;  but  no  proof 
is  given,  nor,  I  conceive,  can  be  given,  that 
w^e  are  not  as  capable  of  acting  with  a  view 
to  the  happiness  of  others  as  for  the  promo- 
tion of  our  own  future  happiness.     It  might 
be  contended,  with  some  plausibility,  that 
all  our  actions  are  determined  by  our  im- 
mediate feelings  ;  but  if  it  be  once  admitted, 
that  a  desire  to  advance  our  future  happi- 
ness can  be  strong  enough  to  overcome  the 
immediate  feeling,  there  can  be  no  difficulty 
in  conceiving  that  a  regard  to  the  happiness 
of  others  may  have  the  same  effect.     When 
the  human  mind  has  sufficiently  enlarged  its 

*  Essay  2nd,  sect.  6.  p.  159. 

c2 


28 


comprehension  to  take  into  its  consideration 
future  events,  and  to  act  with  reference  to 
them  as  if  they  were  present,  there  does  not 
appear  to  be  any  reason  whatever  why  the 
object  proposed  to  be  attained  should  not  be 
the  good  of  others. 

15.  Brown  speaks  with  great  confidence 
on  this  subject.     He  has  the  boldness  to  en- 
counter Hume  ;  and  he  flatters  himself  that 
he  has  confuted  an  argument  of  that  pro- 
found thinker  respecting  the  matter  in  hand. 
'"Tis   evident,"  says   Brown'^,  *'even  to 
demonstration,  that  no  affection  can,  in  the 
strict  sense,  be  more  or  less  selfish  or  disin- 
terested than   another;   because,  whatever 
be  its  object,  the  aff'ection  itself  is  still  no 
other  than  a  mode  either  of  pleasure  or  of 
pain  ;  and  is  therefore  equally  to  be  referred 
to  the  mind  or  feeling  of  the  patient,  what- 
ever be  its   external   occasion.     Indeed  a 
late  writer  of  subtilty  and  refinement  hath 
attempted  to  make  a  distinction  here.     He 


»  Page  163. 


29 

says,  *  It  hath  been  observed,  that  every  act  of  / 
virtue  or  friendship  is  attended  with  a  secret 
pleasure;  from  whence  it  hath  been  con- 
cluded, that  friendship  and  virtue  could  not 
be  disinterested.  But  the  fallacy  of  this  is 
obvious.  The  virtuous  sentiment  or  passion  } 
produces  the  pleasure,  and  does  not  arise 
from  it.  I  feel  a  pleasure  in  doing  good  to 
my  friend,  because  I  love  him  ;  but  I  do  not 
love  him  for  the  sake  of  that  pleasure.'  Now 
to  me  the  fallacy  of  this  is  obvious.  For, , 
in  fact,  neither  the  passion  nor  the  pleasure! 
are  either  the  cause  or  the  consequence  of 
each  other ;  they  neither  produce  nor  arise 
from  each  other,  because,  in  reality,  they 
are  the  same  thing  under  different  expres- 
sions. This  will  be  clear,  if  we  state  the  case 
as  follows  :  '  to  love  my  friend,  is  to  feel  a 
pleasure  in  doing  him  good :'  and  con- 
versely, *  to  feel  a  pleasure  in  doing  good 
to  my  friend,  is  to  love  him.'  Where  't  is 
plain  that  the  terms  are  synonymous.  The 
pleasure,  therefore,  is  the  very  passion  it- 


i! 


30 

self ;  and  neither  prior  nor  posterior  to  it,  as 
this  gentleman  supposeth." 

16.  We  will  now  proceed  to  a  minute 
examination  of  this  passage.  Affection,  ac- 
cording to  the  representation  of  Brown,  is 
only  a  mode  of  pleasure  or  of  pain.  Ad- 
mitting this  to  be  true,  the  conclusion  is 
clear,  that  in  all  voluntary  actions  the  agent 
must  be  determined  to  the  act  by  the  desire 
to  procure  immediate  pleasure  or  to  avoid 
immediate  pain.  If  this  be  denied,  the  au-  i 
thor's  principle  fails ;  for  if  our  voluntary  ^ 
actions  be,  in  any  degree,  determined  by  re- 
flection and  a  view  to  future  good,  then  is 
pleasure  and  pain,  at  least  immediate  plea- 
sure and  pain,  not  the  only  determining 
power  of  the  will.  But  that  our  actions  are 
thus  determined  is  admitted  by  the  author 
himself,  when  he  allows  that  the  prospect  of 
future  happiness  is  a  motive  by  which  indi- 
viduals may  be  induced  to  the  practice  of 
virtue.  If  this  be  true,  voluntary  actions 
are  not  always  determined  merely  by  the 


i 


I 


I 
ID. 


31 

pleasure  or  pain  of  the  moment,  but  are 
sometimes  regulated  by  a  view  to  future 
good.  Admitting  man  to  be  capable  of  thus 
acting,  there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not 
be  allowed  that  he  may  act  with  a  disinter- 
ested regard  to  the  good  of  others.  This 
motive  only  requires  us  to  overcome  the 
desire  of  present  good  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  attainment  of  our  own  future  happi- 
ness requires  it,  but  no  further. 

17.  In  the  comment  on  the  passage  of 
Hume  which  has  been  just  cited,  Brown 
charges  that  philosopher  with  a  fallacy,  as 
Hume  had  charged  the  supporters  of  the 
selfish  system.  We  will  endeavour  to  show 
with  whom  the  fallacy  really  lies.  '*  To  love 
my  friend,"  says  Brown,  '*  is  to  feel  a  plea- 
sure in  doing  him  good."  Surely  this  is  a 
most  strange  and  unphilosophical  assertion. 
It  makes  the  affection  entertained  for  a  friend 
to  consist  in  the  pleasure  attendant  on  doing 
him  good.  Previously,  therefore,  to  that 
act  friendship  could  have  no  existence. 
Hume's  statement,  on  the  other  hand,  is 


32 

strictly  just.  *'  I  feel  a  pleasure,'*  he  says, 
**  in  doing  good  to  my  friend,  because  I  love 
him ;  but  I  do  not  love  him  for  the  sake  of 
that  pleasure."  The  love  of  a  friend  is  here 
assumed  to  be,  what  it  really  is,  a  desire  to 
promote  his  happiness.  This  desire  must 
exist  previously  to  the  act  to  which  it  gives 
birth ;  and  is,  therefore,  clearly  to  be  di- 
stinguished from  the  pleasure  attending  the 
act.  If  Brown's  doctrine  be  true,  no  man 
can  love  his  friend  unless  he  have  the  power 
of  doing  him  good ;  and  the  degree  of  his 
friendship  must  be  regulated  by  that  of  his 
power.  A  father  may  have  the  most  tender 
affection  for  his  son,  and  mav  be  contribu- 
ting  to  his  happiness  every  day ;  but  if  the 
son  should  become  a  soldier,  and  be  taken 
prisoner  by  the  enemy,  and  be  in  such  a 
condition  that  his  father  should  be  unable  to 
afford  him  any  assistance,  the  parental  love 
must  cease,  or  at  least  be  suspended  during 
the  period  when  things  remain  in  this  state ; 
since  to  love  another  is  nothing  more  than 
feeling  a  pleasure  in  doing  him  good. 


M 


33 

18.  This  doctrine  of  Brown,  which  con- 
founds the  disposition  to  do  a  particular  act 
with  the  pleasure  accompanying  the  per- 
formance of  the  act,  is,  in  truth,  fatal  to  the 
whole  theory  of  morals,  even  on  the  selfish 
system.  All  that  we  call  virtue,  at  least  so 
far  as  its  object  is  our  own  good,  the  only 
end  admitted  by  the  selfish  theory,  takes  its 
character  from  its  looking  to  an  ulterior  ob- 
ject beyond  the  satisfying  of  the  present 
desire.  No  one  considers  eating  a  good 
dinner,  or  going  to  the  opera,  acts  of  virtue, 
however  great  may  be  the  pleasure  enjoyed 
thereby.  By  virtue  is  always  understood 
an  act  of  the  will,  having  reference  to  some 
object  beyond  mere  present  gratification. 
That  object  may  be  either  some  personal 
good  to  the  individual,  or  some  benefit  to 
others.  Those  who  restrain  their  immediate 
desires  for  the  sake  of  some  future  good 
to  themselves  always  enjoy  a  share  of  our 
esteem  on  that  account ;  but  those  who  act 
for  the  good  of  others  are  far  more  highly 
esteemed  ;  and  this  distinction  is,  and  always 

c  5 


34 


has  been,  made  universally.  There  is,  there- 
fore, all  the  evidence  in  favour  of  its  reality 
which  the  case  requires,  or  indeed  admits 
of ;  and  the  supporters  of  the  selfish  scheme 
are  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  asserting 
that  this  universal  feeling  is  founded  on  a 
gross  delusion. 

19.  The  language  used  by  Brown  on  this 
subject  tends  to  confuse  the  minds  of  his 
readers  as  to  what  is  the  real  point  of  dif- 
ference between  him  and  Hume,  which  is 
this  :  whether,  in  the  actions  which  are  usu- 
ally called  benevolent,  the  real  object  of  the 
agent  be  to  do  good  to  another,  or  to  enjoy 
the  pleasure  which  arises  from  the  perform- 
ance of  the  beneficent  action.  Now  if  there 
be  no  desire  to  serve  a  man's  friend  previ- 
ously to  the  act,  from  whence  can  the  plea- 
sure resulting  from  the  act  itself  arise  ?  If 
A  be  indifferent  about  the  happiness  of  B,  it 
seems  quite  clear  that  A's  doing  good  to  B 
can  produce  no  satisfaction  to  A.  If  the 
benevolent  action  give  him  pleasure,  it  can 
be  for  no  other  reason  but  because  he  pre- 


35 


viously  desired  the  happiness  of  his  friend. 
I  can  conceive  no  other  intelligible  account 
of  this  matter. 

20.  The  strange  error  into  which  the  sup- 
porters of  the  selfish  system  have  fallen  on 
this  subject,  may,  perhaps,  ha^^e  arisen  from 
their  attention  having  been  directed  to  the 
great  pleasure  derived  by  benevolent  per- 
sons from  doing  good,  which  is  undoubt- 
edly one  of  the  principal  sources  of  human 
happiness.  The  existence  of  this  pleasure, 
however,  is  so  far  from  proving  their  point, 
as  to  afford  a  direct  proof  of  the  contrary 
doctrine,  as  has  been  already  observed ;  the 
pleasure  arising  altogether  from  the  bene- 
volent desire  which  had  previously  existed 
in  the  mind  of  the  agent,  and  which  prompt- 
ed him  to  perform  the  act.  It  may  be  ob- 
served however  that  this  pleasure  varies,  and 
must  from  its  nature  varv,  in  different  cases, 
in  exact  proportion  to  the  real  benevolence 
felt  by  the  agent  for  the  object  of  his  bene- 
volent action,  which,  indeed,  is  hardly  more 
than  saying,  that  the  more  a  man  desires  a 


I 


36 

particular  event,  the  more  he  will  rejoice  at 
the  happening  of  that  event,  which  few,  it 
is  presumed,  will  feel  inclined  to  deny.  Now 
this  circumstance  opens  a  delightful  view  of 
the  moral  principles  of  our  nature,  and  tends 
strongly  to  prove  that  disinterested  virtue 
is  the  true  road  to  our  greatest  happiness. 
Thus  the  more  enlarged  and  extended  our 
benevolence,  the  stronger  feelings  of  pleasure 
we  sliall  enjoy  in  doing  good  to  others  ;  and 
we  shall  reach  our  greatest  happiness  (so 
far  as  it  is  derived  from  our  connexions  with 
our  fellow-creatures)  when  we  have  attained 
to  a  general  benevolence  extended  to  all 
with  whom  we  have  any  relation,  and  to 
whom  we  have  any  opportunity  of  doing 
good.  The  more  perfect,  therefore,  our  be- 
nevolence, the  greater  will  be  our  happiness ; 
and  the  same  observation  may  be  justly  ap- 
plied to  our  other  moral  sentiments,  as  we 
shall  endeavour  to  show  hereafter. 

21.  It  is  hoped  that  the  arguments  which 
have  been  produced  are  sufficient  to  sup- 
port  the   negative    side   of    the    question, 


37 

whether  a  regard  to  our   greatest  interest 
is  the  only  principle  of  morals. 

22.  We  will  now  proceed  to  the  second 
question,  whether  moral  sentiments  form  a 
part  of  our  nature,  or  are  mere  deductions 
of  reason. 

23.  In  proceeding  to  consider  the  ques- 
tion, whether  we  come  into  the  world  with 
a  moral  as  well  as  with  a  rational  nature, 
I  must  observe,  that  much  confusion  has 
arisen  from  the  strange  and  unfounded  no- 
tions which  have  often  been  entertained 
concerning  what  is  called  the  moral  sense 
or  conscience.  This  has  been  represented 
to  be  a  principle  of  the  mind  which  is  an 
infallible  guide  in  all  moral  questions  ;  al- 
ways pointing  out,  with  unerring  certainty, 
what  course  of  conduct  should  be  followed, 
and  what  avoided.  This  doctrine  is  shown 
to  be  false  by  the  fact  that  very  different 
sentiments  on  moral  subjects  are  held  in 
different  nations  and  in  different  ages,  and 
that  these  sentiments  are  often  inconsistent 
with  each  other.     Where  then,  it  is  justly 


38 

asked,  is  the   infallible  moral  sense  to  be 
found?  and  which  of  the    conflicting  doc- 
trines are  to  be  considered  the  dictates  of 
this  unerring  guide?      This   refutation   of 
the  opinion  in  question  is  unanswerable  ; 
but  it  has  been  too  hastily  concluded,  from 
the  fact  that  human  nature  can  boast  of  no 
infallible  guide  in  questions  of  moral  con- 
duct, that  man  has  no  moral  nature.     No 
one  denies  that  man  is  a  rational  being,  and 
1  that  his  reason  is  an  instrument  for  the  dis- 
i  covery  of  truth.     But  how^  different  are  the 
conclusions  at  which  different  individuals 
arrive  in  matters  of  reasoning !    How  great, 
I  had  almost  said,  how  infinite,  are  the  di- 
versities of  opinion  in  the  world  1    No  one, 
however,   on  account   of  these  diff'erences, 
denies  the  existence  of  reason.     The  diver- 
sity of  sentiment  on  moral  subjects  in  dif- 
ferent  ages    and  among    different   nations 
seems  to  afford  no  better  ground  for  deny- 
ing the  existence  of  man's  moral  nature. 

24.  Let  us  now  proceed  to  consider  what 
is  the  distinct  meaning  of  the  proposition. 


' 


39 

that  man  has  a  moral  nature.  Some  con- 
sideration of  our  rational  nature,  the  exist- 
ence of  which  no  one  doubts,  will  tend  to 
elucidate  the  subject.  A  new-born  infant 
cannot  be  truly  said  to  be  a  rational  being 
in  any  other  sense  than  this,  that  he  pos- 
sesses what  may  be  called  the  germ  of  rea- 
son, which  in  process  of  time  will  come  to 
be  fully  developed.  An  infant  is  neither 
capable  of  reasoning  nor  of  moral  senti- 
ment. He  has  for  some  time  only  bodily 
wants  and  desires.  When  he  feels  hungry, 
he  cries  till  his  hunger  is  satisfied  ;  and 
when  he  feels  any  other  pain,  till  it  is  alle- 
viated. His  rational  powers  unfold  them- 
selves, or  are  formed  by  slow  degrees.  Ex- 
actly a  similar  process  is  gone  through  in 
the  formation  or  development  of  moral  sen- 
timents. In  time  a  child  finds  out  that  his 
present  conduct  will  have  an  influence  on 
his  future  well-being ;  and  he  learns  to  re- 
frain from  indulgence  in  such  things  as  would 
ultimately  prove  injurious  to  him.  His 
moral  sentiments  seem  to  arise  in  the  same 


I 


40 

way.     He  finds  that  he  has  the  power  of 
communicating  enjoyment  or  suffering  to 
others.     This  knowledge  is  usually,  indeed 
I  believe  universally,   when    there  are  no 
disturbing  causes,  accompanied  by  sympa- 
thy with  that  enjoyment  or  suffering.     This 
sympathy  appears  so  clearly  to  belong  to 
our  nature  as  to  render  it  difficult  to  under- 
stand how  any  sentient  and  inteUigent  being 
can  be  without  it.     Where  there  is  no  con- 
flicting interest,  no  feeUng  of  resentment  to 
be  gratified,  nor   any  extraneous   circum- 
stance calculated  to  incline  one  individual 
to   injure    another,    the    universal    feeling 
seems  to  be  that  of  sympathy.     No  one  de- 
nies that  he  ought  to  do  good  rather  than 
evil  in  all  ordinary  cases.     Every  man  who 
voluntarily   inflicts   evil   on   another  finds 
some  excuse  for  doing  so  ;  either  by  assert- 
ing that  he  has  been  injured,  and  has  a 
right  to  punish  the  party  who  has  injured 
him  ;  or  that  the  bad  conduct  of  the  other 
party  is  deserving  of  punishment.    Possibly 
some  of  the  very  worst  of  the  Roman  em- 


41 

perors  and  some  few  other  individuals  may 
have  lost  all  sympathy  with  their  fellow- 
creatures,  and  all  moral  principle  ;  but  (ad- 
mitting the  fact)  these  cases  are  only  ex- 
ceptions, and  it  would  be  as  absurd  to 
deny  the  moral  constitution  of  man  on  ac- 
count of  these  anomalous  instances,  as  to 
deny  his  rational  nature  because  some  men 
are  madmen. 

25.  If  the  correctness  of  these  views 
should  be  admitted,  it  follows  that  our 
moral  nature,  or,  as  it  is  commonly  called, 
conscience,  is  as  essential  a  part  of  our- 
selves as  our  reason,  to  which  it  is  closely 
analogous.  Both  are  our  guides  for  differ- 
ent purposes  ;  and  both  are  far  from  being 
infallible  guides.  If  it  be  said  that  con- 
science frequently  errs,  so  it  may  be  answer- 
ed does  reason.  If  diversity  of  moral  senti- 
ments  is  found  among  different  nations  and" 
in  different  ages,  so  are  differences  of  opi- 
nion on  all  subjects  which  are  not  capable 
of  being  reduced  to  mathematical  certainty. 
The  existence,  then,  of  the  moral  nature  of 


42 


man  can  with  no  more  reason  be  denied 
than  the  existence  of  his  rational  nature, 
unless  it  can  be  proved  that  the  former  is 
derived  from  the  latter. 

26.  Our  next  inquiry  then  must  be,  whe- 
ther our  moral  sentiments  are  merely  de- 
ductions of  reason.  In  entering  on  this  in- 
quiry it  seems  impossible  not  to  be  forcibly 
struck  with  the  palpable  distinction  between 
the  strong  and  vivid  feelings  with  which  we 
are  wont  to  contemplate  moral  actions,  and 
the  calm  and  quiet  state  of  mind  which  ac- 
companies our  perception  of  truth  when  it  is 
discovered  by  a  process  of  reasoning.  If 
moral  sentiments  be  merelv  founded  on  rea- 
soning,  how  does  it  happen  that  certain  ac- 
tions generate  in  us  the  highest  esteem  and 
regard  for  the  agent,  while  those  of  a  con- 
trary character  lead  us  to  hate  and  despise 
the  person  who  has  performed  them  ?  There 
is  indeed  a  pleasure,  and  a  very  great  one, 
in  the  discovery  of  truth,  but  it  is  of  a  very 
different  character  from  the  emotion  which 
attends  the  contemplation  of  virtuous  con- 


43 


duct.  What  resemblance  can  be  found  be- 
tween the  deUght  resulting  from  having 
solved  a  mathematical  problem,  and  the  re- 
spect with  which  we  view  the  conduct  of  a 
patriot,  or  the  veneration  felt  for  the  forti- 
tude of  a  martyr  ?  In  the  first  case  we  have 
merely  a  feeling  of  pleasure  at  the  disco- 
very of  truth  ;  in  the  other  we  are  irresist- 
ibly impelled  to  admire  and  love  the  agent, 
and  the  strongest  feelings  of  the  human 
heart  are  called  into  action. 

27.  If  our  moral  sentiments  were  wholly 
founded  on  reasoning,  itwould  seem  to  follow 
that  they  would  be  most  strongly  felt  by 
those  whose  intelligence  is  the  most  clear, 
profound,  and  comprehensive.  But  is  this 
the  case?  Certainly  all  that  history  and 
observation  teach  us  of  human  nature  shows 
that  persons  of  the  highest  intelligence  are 
often  extremely  deficient  in  moral  feeUngs 
and  sentiments;  nor  are  the  cases  unfre- 
quent  where  great  moral  excellence  is  found 
with  but  a  moderate  portion  of  intellect. 

28.  It  is  now  time  to  attend  to  the  senti- 


44 


ments  of  Paley  respecting  the  moral  princi- 
ple of  man.  That  celebrated  writer  begins 
the  fifth  chapter  of  the  first  book  of  his 

*  Moral  Philosophy  '  with  the  following  story 
from  Valerius  Maximus : — ''  The  father  of 
Caius  Toranius  had  been  proscribed  by  the 
triumvirate.  Caius  Toranius,  coming  over 
to  the  interests  of  that  party,  discovered  to 
the  officers  who  were  in  pursuit  of  his 
father's  life,  the  place  where  he  concealed 
himself,  and  gave  them  withal  a  description, 
by  which  they  might  distinguish  his  person, 
when  they  found  him.  The  old  man,  more 
anxious  for  the  safety  and  the  fortunes  of 
his  son  than  about  the  little  that  might  re- 
main of  his  own  life,  began  immediately  to 
'inquire  of  the  officers  who  seized  him,  whe- 
ther his  son  w^as  well ;  whether  he  had  done 
his  duty  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  generals  ? 

*  That  son  (repUed  one  of  the  officers) ,  so 
dear  to  thy  affections,  betrayed  thee  to  us  ; 
by  his  information  thou  art  apprehended, 
and  diest !'  The  officer  with  this  struck  a 
poniard  to  his  heart,  and  the  unhappy  pa- 


45 


rent  fell,  not  so  much  affected  by  his  fate  as 
by  the  means  to  which  he  owed  it.  Now 
the  question  is,  whether,  if  this  story  were 
related  to  the  wild  boy  caught  some  years 
ago  in  the  woods  of  Hanover,  or  to  a  savage 
without  experience,  and  without  instruction, 
cut  off  in  his  infancy  from  all  intercourse  with 
his  species,  and  consequently  under  no  pos- 
sible influence  of  example,  authority,  edu- 
cation, sympathy,  or  habit ;  whether,  I  say, 
such  a  one  would  feel,  upon  the  relation, 
any  degree  of  that  sentiment  of  disapproba- 
tion of  Toranius's  conduct  which  we  feel,  or 
not  ?  They  who  maintain  the  existence  of 
a  moral  sense  ;  of  innate  maxims  ;  of  a  na- 
tural conscience;  that  the  love  of  virtue 
and  hatred  of  vice  are  instinctive,  or  the 
perception  of  right  and  wrong  intuitive  (all 
which  are  only  different  ways  of  expressing 
the  same  opinion),  affirm  that  he  would. 
They  who  deny  the  existence  of  a  moral 
sense,  &c.  affirm  that  he  would  not.  And, 
upon  this,  issue  is  joined." 


\ 


46 


29.  This  is  certainly  a  most  extraordinary 
way  of  attempting  to  solve  a  moral  problem. 
Instead  of  the  question  put,  one  might  just 
as  easily,  and  just  as  much  to  the  purpose, 
have  asked  whether,  if  the  story  had  been 
told  in  Arabic  to  one  who  knew  not  a  word 
of  that  language,  he  would  have  been  affected 
by  it.  Dr.  Paley's  savage  would  undoubt- 
edly have  had  no  feeUng  of  disapprobation 
excited  in  his  mind  by  the  recital  of  a  story 
of  which  he  could  understand  nothing.  Not 
being  aware  of  the  existence  of  fathers,  sons, 
triumvirs  or  officers,  he  could  certainly  have 
no  sentiments  at  all  about  such  persons  or 
their  actions.  All  that  can  possibly  be  de- 
duced from  what  is  said  by  Paley  on  this 
subject  is,  that  there  are  not  in  the  mind 
anv  distinct  infallible  moral  maxims  direct- 
ing  the  conduct  of  individuals  in  particular 
cases,  before  they  have  acquired  by  experi- 
ence a  knowledge  of  the  relation  in  which 
thev  stand  to  others  :  a  doctrine  w^hich  had 
been  long  before  estabhshed  by  Locke,  and 


47 


which  opinion  of  innate  infallible  moral 
maxims  would  probably  find  few,  if  any, 
supporters  in  the  present  day. 

30.  The  important  question  of  the  moral 
nature  of  man  is  left  wholly  untouched  by 
the  above  story,  and  Paley's  application  of 
it;  but  the  chapter  in  which  it  is  found 
contains  some  arguments  to  prove  that  mo- 
rality is  not  at  all  founded  on  sentiment, 
but  is  wholly  derived  from  the  deductions 
of  reason.  We  will  proceed  to  examine  the 
validity  of  these  arguments. 

31.  Moral  sentiments  w^e  have  considered 
to  be  a  part  of  human  nature ;  and  the 
proof  adduced  is,  that  they  exist  in  every 
human  being,  and  are  as  surely  developed 
in  the  progress  of  life  as  the  rational  facul- 
ties. Sympathy  with  others,  and  a  regard 
for  their  well-being,  we  have  said,  is  always 
looked  upon  w^ith  approbation  where  there 
are  no  disturbing  causes  in  operation.  Let 
us  now  consider  whether  the  arguments  of 
Paley  prove  anything  inconsistent  with  this 
opinion. 


48 


32.  The  first  fact  produced  by  Paley  to 
disprove  the  existence  of  the  moral  sense  is, 
that  in  some  countries  children  are  accus- 
tomed to  destroy  their  parents,  or  (as  he 
expresses  it)  to  *'  despatch  them  out  of  the 
way;"  and  that  this  practice  is  **  counte- 
nanced by  public  opinion."  If  this  be  true, 
it  neither  proves  that  such  children  are  en- 
tirely devoid  of  sympathy  for  their  parents, 
nor  that  such  a  want  of  feeling  would  be 
generally  approved  of.  The  fact  stated  is 
rather  to  be  accounted  for  from  an  ill-direct- 
ed sympathy  than  from  a  negation  of  it.  In 
countries  in  an  early  stage  of  society,  where 
the  necessaries  of  life  are  procured  by 
hunting  and  other  precarious  means,  it  is 
impossible  either  to  provide  adequately  for 
the  wants  of  the  feeble  and  the  aged,  or 
to  administer  to  them  the  comforts  which 
their  infirmities  require.  The  fact  of  chil- 
dren **  despatching  their  parents  out  of  the 
way,"  therefore,  ought  not  to  be  attributed 
to  a  desire  to  save  themselves  the  trouble 
of  taking  care  of  them,  but  to  a  belief  that. 


49 

in  their  situation,  death  is  preferable  to  life. 
The  fact  does  not  tend  to  disprove  the  ex- 
istence of  our  moral  nature,  but  only  shows 
that  our  moral  sentiments  sometimes  take 
a  wrong  direction ;  just  as  the  absurd  opi- 
nions which  are  often  entertained  do  not 
prove  that  men  are  not  rational  beings,  but 
only  that  on  particular  occasions  they  fail 
to  make  a  proper  use  of  their  reason.     It 
may  well  be  doubted,  till  further  proof  be 
adduced,   whether    the    language  of  Paley 
states  the  case  fairly.     ''  In  one  country," 
he  says,  ''  it  is  esteemed  an  oflice  of  piety  in 
children   to  sustain  their  aged  parents ;  in 
another,  to  despatch  them  out  of  the  way." 
It  remains  to  be  proved,  that  in  any  coun- 
try the  cherishing  of  aged  parents  is  not 
esteemed  a  virtue  in  all  cases  where  the 
children  have  the  power  of  supporting  them 
in  comfort ;  and  whether  destroying  them  is 
approved  of  anywhere,  except  in  those  cases 
in  which  no  adequate  means  of  sustaining 
them  are  at  the  command  of  their  children, 
and  consequently  putting   them   to   death 


50 

seems  to  be  conferring  a  boon  rather  than 
inflicting  an  injury.  The  advocates  of  the 
doctrine  of  a  moral  nature  in  man  are  not 
at  all  concerned  to  deny  that  the  exercise 
of  our  reason  is  required  for  the  regulation 
of  those  moral  sentiments,  which,  as  they 
contend,  belong  to  us  by  nature,  and  that 
a  sound  ethical  system  cannot  be  attained 
except  by  the  just  and  sober  exercise  of  our 
rational  faculties.  Our  moral  nature  alone 
could  never  show  us  the  necessity  of  general 
rules  in  morality.  How  essential  these  are 
has  been  shown  by  many  writers,  and  by 
none  more  clearly  than  Paley  ;  and  the  de- 
ductions of  reason  alone  point  out  this  ne- 
cessity. 

33.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  our 
present  inquiry  is,  whether  morality  is 
wholly  founded  on  reason  ;  and  that  we  are 
endeavouring  to  show  that  moral  sentiments 
are  natural  to  man,  and  are  developed  as 
he  advances  towards  maturity.  Many  of 
the  facts  produced  by  Paley  in  denial  of  the 
existence  of  an  infallible  moral  sense  have 


' 


51 

no  tendency  to  disprove  the  moral  nature 
of  man,  as  it  has  been  stated  and  explained 
above.     It  will,    however,  be  necessary  to 
remark  on  a  few  of  them.     ''  Theft,"  he 
says,  ''  which  is  punished  by  most  laws, 
by  the  laws  of  Sparta  was  not  unfrequently 
rewarded."     Theft  was  undoubtedly  allowed 
by  the  laws  of  Lycurgus ;  but  the  object  of 
this    permission    was  to   teach  the  young 
Spartans  skill  and  dexterity  in  carrying  on 
the  stratagems  of  war  ;  and  if  they  failed  to 
manage  the  business  so  skilfully  as  to  pre- 
vent their  being  caught  in  the  fact,  they 
were  severely  punished.     Admitting,  how- 
ever, the  immoraUty  of  this  law  in  the  fullest 
extent,  how  does   the  fact  that  lawgivers 
have  sometimes  enacted  immoral  laws  dis- 
prove the  existence  of  moral  principles  in 
human  nature  ?     The  whole  of  the  Spartan 
institutions,  duly  considered,  affords  an  ar- 
gument against  the  selfish  system  of  morals, 
instead  of  supporting  it.     The  general  good 
of  the   nation   was   its   great   object,  and 
individual  interests  were  made  to  yield  to  it 

d2 


i. 


52 

in  a  degree  which  has  perhaps  never  been 
attained  by  any  other  nation. 

34.  The  case  of  suicide  being  approved 
of  in  some  countries  can  certainly  afford  no 
argument  against  the  proposition  for  which 
we  are  now  contending,  that  sympathy  with 
our  fellow-creatures  is  a  moral  principle  of 
our  nature ;  and  the  same  observation  will 
apply  to  the  promiscuous  commerce  of  the 
sexes,  which  is  said  to  prevail  among  '*  the 
savages  of  the  tropical  regions  without  re- 
serve, compunction  or  disgrace/'  as  well  as 
to  other  odious  vices  mentioned  by  Paley. 

35.  The  fact  next  brought  forward  may 
seem  to  be  really  at  variance  with  our  doctrine . 
''If,''  says  Paley,  ''an  inhabitant  of  the 
polished  nations  of  Europe  be  delighted  with 
the  appearance,  wherever  he  meets  with  it, 
of  happiness,  tranquillity,  and  comfort,  a 
wild  American  is  no  less  diverted  with  the 
writhings  and  contortions  of  a  victim  at  the 
stake."  How,  it  may  be  asked,  can  it  be 
made  consistent  with  the  doctrine  that  sym- 
pathy for  others  belongs  to  our  nature,  that 


53 

human  beings  should  thus  delight  in  inflict- 
ing tortures  on  their  fellows,  and  that  to  the 
utmost  extent  that  their  ingenuity  can  de- 
vise ?  Now  let  it  be  steadily  borne  in  mind 
that  our  inquiry  is,  not  what  passions  men 
are  subject  to,  but  what  is  by  nature  the 
object  of  our  moral  approbation.  That  thei 
passions  of  the  human  heart  are  capable  of 
taking  an  evil  direction  all  are  agreed,  and 
every  day's  experience  proves  it.  It  has 
been  already  laid  down,  that  sympathy  with 
others  is  natural  to  man,  and  is  always  the 
object  of  his  approbation,  except  where  some 
disturbing  cause  prevents  the  natural  and 
just  operation  of  this  principle.  Revenge, 
one  of  the  most  powerful,  as  well  as  one  of 
the  most  hateful  of  human  passions,  when 
it  fully  possesses  the  mind,  will  undoubt- 
edly destroy  our  sense  of  what  is  just  and 
right  towards  the  object  of  it ;  but  this  is 
a  distorted  state  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  it 
would  be  as  erroneous  to  form  our  judgment 
of  the  mind,  in  its  ordinary  and  healthy 
state,  from  what  we  see  of  it  when  under 


/ 


54 

the  dominion  of  this  passion,  as  to  draw 
conclusions  as  to  the  general  clearness  of 
sight  of  an  individual  from  the  errors  of 
vision  to  which  we  might  find  him  exposed 
while  in  a  state  of  intoxication.  True  it  is 
that  the  North  American  savage  carried  his 
revenge  against  his  enemies  to  a  frightful 
extreme,  but  it  still  remains  to  be  proved 
that  he  had  no  sympathy  w^ith  his  family, 
his  friends,  and  his  country  ;  that  he  did 
not  approve  of  those  sympathies  in  others  ; 
and  that  these  sympathies  are  not  the  natu- 
ral workings  of  the  human  heart. 

36.  Paley's  view  of  this  subject  is  sum- 
med up  in  the  following  words: — '*Even 
amongst  ourselves,  and  in  the  present  im- 
proved state  of  moral  knowledge,  we  are  so 
far  from  a  perfect  consent  in  our  opinions  or 
feelings  ;  that  you  shall  hear  duelling  alter- 
nately reprobated  and  applauded,  according 
to  the  sex,  age,  or  station  of  the  person  you 
converse  with  ;  that  the  forgiveness  of  inju- 
ries and  insults  is  accounted  by  one  sort  of 
people  magnanimity,  by  another  meanness  ; 


DO 


that  in  the  above  instances,  and  perhaps  in 
most  others,  moral  approbation  follows  the 
fashions  and  institutions  of  the  country  we 
live  in ;  that  fashions  also,  and  institutions 
themselves  have  grown  out  of  the  exigen- 
cies, the  climate,  situation,  or  local  circum- 
stances of  the  country  ;  or  have  been  set  up 
by  the  authority  of  an  arbitrary  chieftain, 
or  the  unaccountable  caprice  of  the  multi- 
tude ;  all  which  looks  very  little  like  the 
steady  hand  and  indelible  characters  of 
Nature." 

37.  The  real  question  between  the  sup- 
porters and  the  impugners  of  the  selfish 
system  of  morals  is  this :  Whether  the  phae- 
nomena  of  human  nature  are  more  ratio- 
nally explained  by  resolving  all  our  moral 
sentiments  and  feelings  into  a  regard  to  our 
own  interest ;  or  whether  we  have  also  feel- 
ings and  sentiments  which  are  original  prin- 
ciples of  our  nature,  and  are  to  be  valued 
and  esteemed  either  as  being  intrinsically 
excellent,  or  calculated  to  advance  the  hap- 
piness of  others.     We  shall  now  endeavour 


56 

to  show  that  we  have  all  the  evidence  which 
can  be  reasonably  expected,  that  sympathy 
with  our  fellow-creatures  is  a  part  of  our 
nature.     It  certainly  exists  very  generally, 
and   there   is   no   evidence   that   a    single 
human  being  has  ever  been  without  some 
share    of    it.      The  most    worthless    and 
selfish   characters   have   usually  some   ob- 
ject   of  affection.     Very  vicious  and   ma- 
lignant persons  are  often  found  to  have  a 
strong  regard  for  their  near  connexions; 
and  even  where  a  man  is  so  depraved  as  to 
oppress  and  injure  those  whom  it  is  his  par- 
ticular  duty  to  love  and  cherish,  some  ex- 
ception is  often  found  to  the  general  ob- 
liquity  of  moral  feeUng  and  conduct.     The 
tyrannical  father  is  sometimes  an  affection- 
ate husband  ;  and  he  who  seems  to  have  cast 
off  all  affection  for  his  wife,  and,  in  general, 
for  his   children,  will  sometimes  retain  a 
strong  regard  for  a  particular  child.      So 
natural  do  our  sympathies  appear,  that  it 
may  well  be  doubted  whether  any  human 
being  has  ever  existed  who  was  altogether 


t>7 

cut  off  from  all  regard  to  his  fellow- 
creatures.  The  direction  which  our  sym- 
pathies take  is  indeed  indefinitely  varied  bv 
pre-existing  and  surrounding  circumstances  ; 
but  its  apparent  universaUty,  in  some  shape 
or  other,  in  every  human  being,  seems  to 
indicate  clearly  and  unequivocally  *' the 
steady  hand  and  indelible  characters  of  Na- 
ture." 

38.  The  interest  felt  for  particular  indi- 
viduals often  leads  in  practice  to  the  perpe- 
tration of  injustice  to  others.     Thus  parents 
who  really  love  their  children  are  often  in- 
duced, for  the  purpose  of  providing  for  them, 
to  cheat  and  defraud  others.     The  patriot- 
ism so  much  vaunted  in  ancient  times  was 
a  mixed  principle,  partly  virtuous  and  partly 
vicious.      The  history  of  no  other  people, 
perhaps,  shows  this  in  so  striking  a  light  as 
that  of  the  Romans.     The  power,  the  ex- 
tended dominion,  the  riches,  and  the  dignity 
of  the  republic  were  regarded  as  the  things 
to  be  principally  looked  to  and  advanced. 
These  were  to  be  promoted  at  all  times  and 

d5 


r 


58 

by  all  means  ;  while  injustice  and  oppression, 
exercised  on  other  nations,  though  usually 
attempted  to  be  concealed  by  some  plausible 
pretence,  were  carried  to  a  shocking  extent. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  individual  interests 
of  particular  citizens  seem  to  have  been  in 
many  instances  merged  in  a  devotion  to 
those  of  the  republic,  with  which  the  Roman 
citizen  in  a  great  degree  identified  himself. 
This  state  of  things,  however,  only  proves 
that  the  Romans  followed  the  light  of  Nature 
in  their  principles  and  feelings  towards  their 
own  countrymen,  and  departed  from  it  in 
their  intercourse  with  other  nations. 

39.  Dr.  Paley  was  gifted  by  nature  with 
a  remarkably  clear  and  sound  intellect :  no 
writer  has  surpassed  him  in  expressing  di- 
stinctly and  concisely  what  he  had  to  say, 
and  very  few  indeed  have  approached  his 
excellence  in  that  respect.  His  understand- 
ing,  however,  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
distinguished  either  by  depth  or  comprehen- 
sion of  thought.  In  refinement  of  mind,  and 
in  all  that  variety  of  mental  perceptions  and 


\ 


59 

feelings  which  are  perhaps  best  expressed  by 
the  word  sentiment,  he  appears  to  have  been 
remarkably  deficient.   If  the  theory  contend- 
ed for  in  this  work  be  true,  such  a  mind 
was  very  ill  fitted  to  form  a  system  of  ethics. 
The  character  of  his  mind  is  distinctly  indi- 
cated in  the  following  passage  from  the  third 
chapter  of  the  second  book  of  his  '  Moral 
Philosophy' :—'' When   I  first  turned  my 
thoughts  to  moral  speculations,  an  air  of 
mystery  seemed  to  hang  over  the  whole  sub- 
ject ;  which  arose,  I  beHeve,  from  hence, 

that  I  supposed,  with  many  authors  whom  I 
had  read,  that  to  be  obliged  to  do  a  thing 
was  very  different  from  being  induced  only 
to  do  it ;  and  that  the  obhgation  to  practise 
virtue,  to  do  what  is  right,  just,  &c.,  was 
quite  another  thing,  and  of  another  kind, 
than  the  obligation  which  a  soldier  is  under 
to  obey  his  ofiicer,  a  servant  his  master,  or 
any  of  the  civil  and  ordinary  obligations  of 
human  life.     Whereas,  from  what  has  been 
said,  it  appears  that  moral  obligation  is  like 
all  other  obligations  ;   and  that  obligation  is 


60 

nothing  more  than  an  inducement  of  suf- 
ficient strength,  and  resulting,  in  some  way, 
from  the  command  of  another." 

40.  In  this  passage  morahty  is  treated  as 
a  mere  matter  of  contract.  Paley  does  not 
at  all  recognise  the  relation  in  which  we 
stand  to  the  Deity  as  our  Creator,  and  the 
obhgation  under  which  we  lie  to  him  for  all 
the  happiness  we  have  enjoyed,  as  giving 
him  any  right  to  our  services,  or  imposing 
on  us  any  obhgation  to  obey  his  will.  That 
such  a  theory  should  have  been  propounded 
in  an  enhghtened  age,  and  in  a  country 
blessed  with  the  knowledge  of  Christianity, 
and  not  only  propounded,  but  very  exten- 
sively received,  and  that  by  many  of  the 
most  distinguished  individuals  of  the  time, 
does  seem  a  most  strange  and  unaccountable 
fact. 

41.  But  it  may  be  objected,  that  Paley 
does  in  fact  lay  the  foundation  of  morality 
in  the  will  of  God  alone.  This  is  true  ;  but 
the  reason  assigned  by  him  is,  that  God  will 
reward  or  punish  us  in  the  world  to  come, 


I 


61 

according  to  our  obedience  or  disobedience 
to  his  laws.  The  right  of  God  to  our  service 
then  is  founded  entirely  on  his  attribute  of 
power,  and  is  in  no  degree  drawn  from  the 
circumstance  of  his  being  our  Creator  and 
Benefactor.  Real  love  and  gratitude  to  God 
have  in  truth  no  place  in  Paley's  ethics. 
'*  The  love  of  God,  indeed,"  he  says,  *'is 
the  subUmest  gratitude ;"  but  his  readers 
will  not  forget  that  he  has  affirmed,  by  his 
definition  of  virtue,  that  nothing  is  virtuous 
but  what  is  done  for  the  sake  of  everlasting 
happiness.  Is  not  the  term  gratitude  w^hoUy 
misapplied  to  a  feeling  towards  the  Deity, 
in  no  degree  founded  on  the  benefits  already 
received,  but  deriving  its  existence  solely 
from  the  hope  and  expectation  of  benefits  to 
come?  According  to  Paley 's  system,  grati- 
tude is  only  a  false  pretence,  and  adds  the 
vice  of  hypocrisy  to  its  own  worthlessness. 

42.  The  following  observation  on  the  dif- 
ference between  prudence  and  duty  is  to  my 
mind  sufficient  to  show  the  error  of  the 
whole  system  of  Paley  : — "  The  difference. 


62 


63 


and  the  only  difference,  is  this  ;  that  in  the 
one  case  we  consider  what  we  shall  gain  and 
lose  in  the  present  world ;  in  the  other  case 
we  consider  what  we  shall  gain  or  lose  in  the 
world  to  come."     Can  anything  be  plainer, 
than  that  this  is  a  difference  in  degree  only, 
and  not  in  kind ;  and  that  if  the  actions 
which  are  derived  from  a  regard  to  our  own 
happiness  in  another  world  are  deserving  of 
esteem  and  moral  approbation,  a  degree  of 
the  very  same  sentiment  should  follow  all 
acts  of  worldly  prudence  ?     But  every  per- 
son feels  that  his  admiration  of  the  heroism 
of  the  patriotic  soldier,  of  the  generosity  of 
the  active  philanthropist,  and  of  the  forti- 
tude of  the  martyr,  is  of  a  wholly  different 
character  from  the  approbation  with  which 
he  regards  the  prudent  management  and 
honest  industry  by  which  a  man  is  enabled 
to  accumulate  a  fortune. 

43.  From  all  these  considerations,  Paley's 
work  seems  to  me  not  to  deserve  the  name 
of  a  treatise  on  moral  philosophy  ;  the  whole 
inquiry  being,  in  truth,  not  what  a  man 


ii 


ought  to  do,  but  what  it  is  most  prudent  for 
him  to  do.  The  entire  system  is  founded 
on  a  regard  to  the  mere  power  of  the  Deity, 
without  any  reference  to  his  moral  attri- 
butes, and  is,  in  all  its  essential  features, 
identified  with  the  principles  of  Hobbes. 

44.  The  passage  about  to  be  cited  from 
the  writings  of  that  extraordinary  man  ex- 
empUfies  the  extravagances  into  which  the 
supporters  of  the  selfish  system  are  forced, 
for  the  purpose  of  explaining  the  ordinary 
feelings  and  sentiments  of  human  nature. 
Hobbes  resolves  not  only  beneficence  to 
friends,  but  even  the  love  of  parents  for  their 
own  children,  into  the  love  of  power*. 
''There  is  yet  another  passion,  sometimes 
called  love,  but  more  properly  good-will  or 
charity.  There  can  be  no  greater  argument 
to  a  man  of  his  own  power,  than  to  find 
himself  able  not  only  to  accomplish  his  own 
desires,  but  also  to  assist  other  men  in  theirs : 
and  this  is  that  conception  wherein  consist- 
eth  charity.     In  which,  first,  is  contained 

*  Human  Nature,  chap.  ix.  s.  17. 


64 

that  natural  affection  of  parents  to  their 
children  which  the  Greeks  call  ^ropyri,  as 
also  that  affection  wherewith  men  seek  to 
assist  those  who  adhere  unto  them.  But 
the  affection  wherewith  men  many  times 
bestow  their  benefits  on  strangers  is  not  to 
be  called  charity  ;  but  either  contract,  where- 
by they  seek  to  purchase  friendship  ;  or  fear, 
which  maketh  them  to  purchase  peace." 
Such  is  the  forced  and  extravagant  explana- 
tion given  of  those  human  sympathies, which, 
from  their  universality,  wx  may  justly  con- 
clude to  be  original  priaciples  of  our  na- 
ture. 

45.  Not  content  with  denying  the  exist- 
ence of  what  are  generally  and  justly  esteem- 
ed the  highest  moral  qualities  of  human  na- 
ture, Hobbes  denies  their  existence  alto- 
gether, even  in  God  himself;  or  at  least, 
that  they  are  of  any  value,  or  that  our  reve- 
rence and  adoration  of  him  is  rightly  founded 
upon  them.  He  sees  nothing  to  admire  or 
to  adore  in  the  Deity  but  his  supreme  un- 
limited power.    In  his  tract  on  '  Liberty  and 


.1 


65 

Necessity'  (a  work  distinguished  by  extra- 
ordinary vigor  of  intellect) ,  after  quoting  a 
passage  from  St.  Paul's  epistle  to  the  Ro- 
mans, he  proceeds  as  follows: — *' Accord- 
ing therefore  to  this  answer  of  St.  Paul,  I 
answer  my  lord's  objection,  and  say,  the 
power  of  God  alone,  without  other  helps,  is 
sufficient  justification  of  any  act  he  doth. 
That  which  men  make  amongst  themselves 
here  by  pacts  and  covenants,  and  call  by 
the  name  of  justice,  and  according  where- 
unto  men  are  accounted  and  termed  rightly 
just  or  unjust,  is  not  that  by  which  God 
Almighty's  actions  are  to  be  measured  or 
called  just,  no  more  than  his  counsels  are 
to  be  measured  bv  human  wisdom.     That 
which  he  does  is  made  just  by  his  doing  it ; 
just,  I  say,  in  him,  though  not  always  just 
in  us."     And  in  another  passage  in  the  same 
work   he   says,    "  Piety  consisteth  in  two 
things :   one    that    we   honor  God  in  our 
hearts  ;  which  is,  that  we  think  as  highly  of 
his  power  as  we  can  (for  to  honor  anything 
is  nothing  else  but  to  think  it  to  be  of  great 


66 

power) ;  the  other  is,  that  we  signify  that 
honor  and  esteem  by  our  words  and  ac- 
tions, which  is  called  cultus,  or  the  worship 
of  God."  According  to  this  doctrine,  then, 
we  are  to  honor  the  Deity  on  account  of 
his  power  alone  ;  audit  is  perfectly  indiffer- 
ent, as  to  our  estimation  of  him,  whether 
he  possess  one  moral  attribute  or  not.  If 
instead  of  creation  being,  as  there  is  abun- 
dant reason  to  think  it  is,  a  work  of  bene- 
volence ;  if,  instead  of  the  Almighty  having 
created  his  creatures  for  the  purpose  of 
making  them  happy,  we  could  for  a  mo- 
ment entertain  the  horrid  idea  that  he  has 
formed  them  expressly  to  inflict  misery  upon 
them,  he  would  have  been  nevertheless 
equally  entitled  to  our  adoration  and  love. 
This  extravagant  doctrine  is  so  clearly  con- 
tradicted by  the  reason  and  by  the  feeUngs 
of  man,  as  to  warrant  us  in  at  once  discard- 
ing it  as  an  outrageous  absurdity. 

46.  It  is  not  intended  to  assert  that  all 
the  supporters  of  the  selfish  system  of  morals 
are  willing  to  go  the  extravagant  lengths  of 


\ 


67 

Hobbes,  but  these  opinions  seem  to  be  very 
legitimately    drawn  from    their   doctrines. 
Hobbes  was  a  man  of  a  most  powerful  in- 
tellect;   and  although  his    arrogant  spirit 
prompted  him  to  lay  down  dogmatically,  as 
the  foundation  of  his  doctrines,  principles 
which   are  not   self-evident,   and  therefore 
should    have    been   proved   by   argument, 
without  proving    or   attempting  to   prove 
their  truth,  yet  those  principles  being  once 
admitted,  he  often  draws  conclusions  from 
them  with  admirable  force  and  consistency 
(though  sometimes  his  reasonings  are  clearly 
sophistical) ;  and  if  his  followers  have  not 
gone  the  same  length  as  their  leader,  it  is 
probably  to  be  imputed  to  their  not  possess- 
ing minds  so  powerful  and  logical  as  his. 
Ohsta  principiis  must  be  the  rule  to  those 
who  desire  successfully  to  oppose  the  opi- 
nions of  Hobbes.     The  first  principles  be- 
ing admitted,  his  opponents  are  sure  to  be 
defeated  ;  but  those  principles  are  assumed 
without  reason,  and  in  defiance  of  it. 

47.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the 


#. 


68 

opinions  just  mentioned  were  peculiar  to 
Hobbes.  It  appears  from  Plato  and  Ari- 
stotle that  similar  sentiments  were  held  by 
some  of  the  early  Greek  philosophers^. 

48.  The  following  observations  of  Lord 
Shaftesbury,  in  direct  opposition  to  the  doc- 
trines we  have  been  combating,  are  consist- 
ent with  all  our  knowledge  and  experience 
of  human  nature,  and  with  every  concep- 
tion  which  we  can  form  of  rational  beings : 
''  'T  is  impossible  to  suppose  a  mere  sensi- 
ble creature  originally  so  ill-constituted  and 
unnatural,  as    that,   from  the   moment  he 
comes  to  be  tried  by  sensible  objects,  he 
should  have  no  one  good  passion  towards 
his  kind,  no  foundation  either  of  pity,  love, 
kindness,  or  social  affection.     T  is  full  as 
impossible  to  conceive,  that  a  rational  crea- 
ture coming  first  to  be  tried  by  rational  ob- 
jects, and  receiving  into  his  mind  the  images 
or   representations   of   justice,    generosity, 
gratitude,  or  other  virtue,  should  have  no 

*  See  on  this  subject  the  first  chapter  of  Cudworth's 
'  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality.' 


\ 


69 

liking  of  these,  or  dislike  of  their  contraries  ; 
but  be  found  absolutely  indifferent  towards 
whatever  is  presented  to  him  of  this  sort*." 
49.  An  important  argument  in  favour  of 
the  moral  nature  of  man  is  derived  from  the 
consideration  that  all  virtuous  actions  have 
a  tendency  to  lead  to  other  similar  actions, 
and  thus  to  form  habits  of  virtue.     The 
performance  of  every  duty  is  attended  with 
some    degree    of   pleasure,  and  is   always 
looked  back  upon  with  satisfaction.     Now 
this  pleasure,  by  the  great  mental  law  which 
is  usually  called  the  association  of  ideas,  is 
presented  to  the  mind  in  connexion  with 
the  act  which  gives  rise  to  it,  and  as  we  all 
must  desire  happiness,  we  become  incUned 
to  a  repetition  of  such  acts  as  are  accom- 
panied  with  pleasurable   sensations.     This 
doctrine  of  association  of  ideas  is  explained 
by  Locke,  Hume,  and  others  ;  but  the  most 
detailed  and  satisfactory  account  of  it  is  to  be 
found  in  Hartley's  '  Observations  onMan.' 
50.  As    actions  which   flow  from   a  be- 

*  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  book  i.  part  iii.  s.  1. 


70 

nevolent    intention    have   a    tendency    to 
strengthen    and    improve    the   benevolent 
principle,  evil  actions,  on  the  other  hand, 
are  always  attended  with  more  or  less  of 
pain,  and,  consequently,  are  usually  looked 
back  upon  with  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  of 
regret.    That  pain  attends  all  the  malevo- 
lent passions  must  be  obvious  to  every  one. 
Anger,  revenge  and  envy  always  occasion 
unhappiness  to  the  mind  which  they  pos- 
sess,   and  the    pain    which   is    felt  must 
have   some   tendency   to   correct   the   evil 
passion.    That  it  does  not  effect  this  in  all 
cases,  is  explained  by  the  circumstance,  that 
all  our  actions,  good  and  bad,  tend  to  form 
habits,  that  is,  to  occasion  the  recurrence  of 
similar  acts  again  and  again.     The  differ- 
ence between  virtuous  and  vicious  actions 
is,  that  both  have  a  tendency  to  produce 
similar  acts  in  future  ;  but  in  the  former 
case_the  tendency  is  strengthened  by  the 
pleasure  which  accompanies  the  good  action, 
while  the  pain  which  belongs  to  evil  deeds 
acts  as  an  antagonist  force  in  at  least  dirai- 


71 

nishing  the  general  tendency  of  actions  to 
produce    habits,    and    in   some   instances 

overcoming  it. 

51.  The  following  quotation  from  a  note 
on  Bishop  Butler's  first  sermon  on  Human 
Nature  is  an  excellent  summary  of  the  doc- 
trine which  we  have  been  endeavouring  to 
establish.     "  If  any  person  can  in  earnest 
doubt  whether  there  be   such  a   thing  as 
good- will  in  one  man  towards  another ;  (for 
the  question  is  not  concerning  either  the 
degree  or  extensiveness  of  it,  but  concern- 
ing the  affection  itself)  let  it  be  observed, 
that,  whether  man  be   thus  or   otherwise 
constituted,  what  is  the  inward   frame  in 
this  particular,  is  a  mere  question  of  fact  or 
natural  history,  not  proveable  immediately 
by  reason.     It  is  therefore  to  be  judged  of 
and  determined  in   the    same  way    other 
matters  of  fact  or  natural  history  are ;  by 
appeaUng  to  the  external  senses,  or  inward 
perceptions  respectively,  as  the  matter  un- 
der consideration  is  cognizable  by  one  or 
the  other :  by  arguing  from  acknowledged 


72 

facts  and  actions ;  for  a  great  number  of 
actions  of  the  same  kind,  in  different  cir- 
cumstances and  respecting  different  objects, 
will  prove  to  a  certainty  what  principles  they 
do  not,  and,  to  the  greatest  probability,  what 
principles  they  do  proceed  from  :  and  lastly, 
by  the  testimony  of  mankind.  Now  that 
there  is  some  degree  of  benevolence  amongst 
men,  may  be  as  strongly  and  plainly  proved 
in  all  these  ways,  as  it  could  possibly  be 
proved,  supposing  there  was  this  affection  in 
our  nature.  And  should  any  one  think  fit 
to  assert,  that  resentment  in  the  mind  of 
man  was  absolutely  nothing  but  reasonable 
concern  for  our  own  safety,  the  falsity  of 
this,  and  what  is  the  real  nature  of  that 
passion,  could  be  shown  in  no  other  wavs 
than  those  in  w^hich  it  may  be  shown,  that 
there  is  such  a  thing,  in  some  degree,  as 
real  good-will  in  man  towards  man.  It  is 
sufficient  that  the  seeds  of  it  be  implanted 
in  our  nature  by  God.  There  is,  it  is  own- 
ed, much  left  for  us  to  do  upon  our  own 
heart  and  temper  ;  to  cultivate,  to  improve, 


73 

to  call  it  forth,  to  exercise  it  in  a  steady 
uniform  manner.  This  is  our  work:  this 
is  virtue  and  religion." 

52.  We  have  now  arrived  at  the  last 
question  respecting  the  theory  of  morals ; 
whether  any  moral  sentiments,  distinct  from 
a  desire  to  advance  our  own  happiness  or 
that  of  others,  exist  in  the  human  mind, 
and  are  to  be  accounted  parts  of  our  moral 
nature. 

53.  Some  light  may  be  thrown  on  this 
subject  by  directing  our  attention  to  the 
ordinary  use  of  language.  Now  that  there 
are  in  all  languages  terms  denoting  appro- 
bation and  disapprobation  of  actions  in 
themselves,  without  any  reference  to  their 
consequences,  cannot  be  fairly  denied.  The 
feeling  of  shame  too  is  of  a  totally  different 
character  from  that  disapprobation  of  parti- 
cular actions  which  we  entertain  on  account 
of  their  injurious  effects  to  the  agent  or 
others.  But  the  sentiment  which  I  would 
particularly  select  on  this  part  of  our  sub- 
ject is  gratitude.     Gratitude  is,  I  believe, 

£ 


74 

universally  esteemed.  No  instance  has,  to 
my  knowledge,  been  produced  of  a  single 
human  being  who  has  approved  of  ingrati- 
tude. On  the  contrary,  it  is  universally 
reprobated,  even  by  bad  men. 

54.  Though  the  language  of  men,  which 
expresses  their  opinions  and  feelings,  has 
recognised  the  existence  of  the  virtues  now 
under  consideration,  it  is  not  easy  to  find 
a  word  appUcable  to  the  whole  class,  which 
is  not,  in  some  degree,  objectionable.  The 
word  *'  sentiment"  has  been  used  so  loosely, 
and  in  so  many  different  senses,  and  has 
been  sometimes  applied  to  feeUngs  so  httle 
entitled  to  respect  or  consideration,  as  to 
expose  the  use  of  it  to  censure,  and  even  to 
ridicule.  It  seems,  however,  to  be  the  word 
best  adapted  to  express  the  moral  principles 
which  we  now  have  in  view ;  and  I  shall,  in 
this  Essay,  use  it  freely,  as  denoting  all 
those  moral  feelings  which  attach  to  actions 
considered  in  themselves,  and  without  re- 
gard to  their  consequences  with  respect  to 
the  well-being  of  ourselves  or  others. 


75 


55.  In  consistency  then  with  the  above 
classification,  we  will  consider  the  virtues 
as  divided  into  three  classes: — I.  Those 
which  conduce  to  our  own  greatest  good, 
of  which  what  is  usually  called  self-love  is 
the  principle.  2.  Those  which  have  for  their 
object  the  good  of  others,  w^hich  may  all  be 
resolved  into  benevolence.  3.  Those  which 
arrange  themselves  under  the  head  of  moral 
sentiment ;  as  gratitude,  temperance,  purity, 
and  the  like. 

56.  If  any  one  should  be  disposed  to 
censure  the  author  for  an  improper  use  of 
words  in  these  divisions,  he  may  not  per- 
haps be  prepared  to  defend  himself ;  nor  is 
he  anxious  to  do  so.  It  is  enough  for  the 
purpose  in  hand  to  state  expUcitly,  that  the 
words  self-love,  benevolence,  and  moral  sen- 
timent, will,  in  this  work,  be  used  in  the 
sense  which  has  been  just  explained. 

57.  The  substance  of  what  has  been 
stated  above  may  be  expressed  in  another 
way,  which  may  appear  to  some  minds 
more  clear  and  satisfactory  than  that  which 

e2 


iimiiiimii^raii;aii«aiiiMriMta*iiiiiai^^ 


76 


n 


has  been  adopted.     Virtue  then  will  be  di- 
vided into  three  classes  as  before,  the  cha- 
racters of  which  will  be  expressed  as  follows  : 
1.  Sentiments  and  actions  good  in  them- 
selves.   2.  Such  as  derive  their  merit  from 
their  tendency  to  promote  our  own  happi- 
ness.   3.  Such  as  tend  to  promote  the  good 
of  others.     Here  it  is  evident,  that  the  first 
class  is  identical  with  the  third  of  the  former 
arrangement,  the  second  with  the  first,  and 
the  third  with  the   second.     I  prefer  the 
first  order  as  the  most  convenient  one  in 
which  we  can  treat  of  the  subject ;  and  shall 
therefore  commence  with  the  consideration 
of  those  virtues  which  have  for  their  object 
our  own  greatest  happiness. 


\ 


CHAPTER  n. 


OF  SELF-LOVE. 


1.  A  HUMAN  being,  on  its  first   introduc- 
tion into  the  world,  appears  to  differ  little, 
if  at  all,  from  the  inferior  orders  of  animals  ; 
it  is  a  creature  of  mere  physical  sensation 
and  appetite.     When  assailed  by  hunger  or 
any  other  pain  it  expresses  its  feeUngs  by 
cries,  and  continues  those  manifestations  of 
uneasiness  till  its    hunger  is    satisfied   by 
food,  or  sleep,  or  some  other  mode  of  reUef 
puts  an  end  to  its  pain.     Of  the  rational 
nature,  which  all  allow  it  to  possess,  and  of 
the  moral  nature,  which  it  is  contended  in 
this  Essay  is  also  an  essential  part  of  hu- 
manity, it  shows  no  indications.     By  slow 
de2:rees  its  rational  nature  unfolds  itself; 


78 

it  observes  some  things  uniformly  to  follow 
others;  forms  the  ideas  of  cause  and  ef- 
fect ;  and  thus  commences  that  process  of 
reasoning  which  is  to  continue  through  life, 
to  direct  in  a  large  degree  its  future  con- 
duct, and  to  influence  its  future  happiness. 
Thus  he  learns  to  control  the  desire  of  the 
moment ;  and  to  regulate  his  conduct,  not 
merely  with  a  view  to  present  pleasure,  but 
so  as  to  secure  a  greater  enjoyment  in  fu- 
ture, in  preference  to  indulging  his  inclina- 
tion for  a  shghter  one  at  the  present  time. 
As  the  views  of  the  mind  are  enlarged,  an 
idea  is  formed  of  what  it  is  that  constitutes 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  which  can 
be  enjoyed  in  the  whole  of  life  ;    and  the 
more  rational  and  moral  of  the  human  spe- 
cies are  led  to  act  with  a  view  to  obtain  the 
greatest  felicity  which  they  can  reach.    This 
is  called  self-love  ;  and  a  rational  regard  to 
our  own  happiness  is  considered  by  the  sup- 
porters of  what  has  been  all  along  called  the 
selfish  system  to  be  the  only  real  moraUty. 
2.  The  term  self-love  has  been  objected 


t 


1 


79 

to  •by  a  very  able  ethical  writer  of  our  own 
times,  the  late  Sir  James  Mackintosh ;  but 
perhaps  without  much  reason.  If  we  are 
rightly  said  to  love  others  when  we  desire 
this  happiness,  and  pursue  such  a  course  of 
conduct  as  we  think  calculated  to  promote 
it,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  good 
reason  to  object  to  the  term  self-love  as  de- 
signating those  voluntary  actions  which  have 
for  their  end  the  attainment  of  our  own 
greatest  happiness. 

3.  It    is  not    material   for   the  purpose 
aimed  at  in  this  work,  to  examine  with  any 
minuteness  the   theories  which  have   been 
proposed  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  the 
origin  of  self-love.     Whether  it  be  consi- 
dered as  formed  by  the  association  of  ideas, 
in  the  manner  described  by  Hartley  in  his 
'  Observations  on  Man,'  or  in  any  other  way, 
does  not   greatly   concern  the   inquiry  in 
which  we  are  engaged.     It  is  sufficient  to 
say,  that  at  an  early  period  of  life  a  regard 
to  our  future  happiness  is  sure  to  arise; 
that  it  becomes  more  and  more  comprehen- 


/ 


\ 


\ 


\ 


■\ 


80 

sive  in  its  range,  till  it  takes  in  the  whole  of 
our  existence ;  and  that  it  exercises  a  con- 
siderable influence  on  our  conduct. 

4.  Those  authors  who  have  embraced  what 
we  believe  to  be  the  true  theory  of  morals, 
have  sometimes  treated  self-love  as  incon- 
sistent with  benevolence,  and  consequently 
have  wTitten  about  it  in  disparaging  terms. 
It  has,   however,  been   wtII    observed    by 
Bishop  Butler,  that  there  is  no  inconsistency 
between  self-love  and  benevolence  ;  and  that 
so  far  from   men   in  general  being  influ- 
enced too  much  by  self-love,  it  is  most  cer- 
tain that  thev  are  not  usually  sufficiently 
under  its  influence.     The  immediate  desire, 
the  passion  of  the  moment,  is  often  found  to 
be  far  too  strong  for  the  calm  regard  to  our 
greatest  interest  which  is  commonly  called 
self-love.     It  is  only  when  we  endeavour  to 
secure  our  own  greatest  happiness  by  inflict- 
ing injuries  on  others  that  self-love  is  the 
proper  object  of  blame.     When  just  ideas 
have  been  formed  respecting  what  will  con- 
tribute to  our  greatest  good,  we  shall  gene- 


81 

rally  find  that  doing  good  to  others  is  much 
more  likelv  to  assist  us  in  the  attainment 
of  our  object  than  injuring  them ;  and,  of 
course,  so  far  as  we  are  influenced  by  self- 
love,  we  shall  be  disposed  to  regulate  our 
conduct  accordingly. 

5.  Paley's  chapter  on  Human  Happiness, 
in  his  '  Moral  Philosophy,'  contains  the  fol- 
lowing very  characteristic  passage  :  ' '  I  will 
omit  much  usual  declamation  on  the  dig- 
nity and  capacity  of  our  nature ;  the  supe- 
riority of  the  soul  to  the  body,  of  the  ra- 
tional to  the  animal  part  of  our  constitu- 
tion ;  upon  the  worthiness,  refinement,  and 
deUcacy  of  some  satisfactions,  or  the  mean- 
ness, grossness,  and  sensuality  of  others;  be- 
cause I  hold  that  pleasures  differ  in  nothing 
but  in  continuance  and  intensity  ;  from  a 
just  computation  of  which,  confirmed   by 
what  we  observe  of  the  apparent  cheerful- 
ness, tranquillity,  and  contentment  of  men 
of  different  tastes,  tempers,    stations,  and 
pursuits,  every  question  concerning  human 
happiness  must  receive  its  decision."     Now 

E  5 


\ 


i 


82 

the  assertion,  that  pleasures  differ  in  nothing 
but   in   continuance   and   intensity,    either 
means  nothing  more  than  that  the  greatest 
pleasure  is  the  greatest  pleasure,    or  it  is 
wholly  false.     If  it  be  asserted,  that  plea- 
sures do   not   differ  in   their  effects  upon 
the  mind  and  character,    nothing  can  be 
clearer  than  that  this  assertion  is  void  of 
foundation.     Supposing  the  pleasure  which 
a  particular  individual  enjoys  from   indul- 
gence in  intemperance  to  be  precisely  equal 
to  that  which  another  derives  from  acts  of 
benevolence  ;  how   difli'erently  ought   these 
pleasures  to  be  estimated,  when  considered 
as  regards  their  ultimate  results  on  our  hap- 
piness !     The  pleasures  of  intemperance  will 
probably  lead  to  disease,    and  perhaps  to 
I   premature  death  ;  while  those  of  benevolence 
tend  to  produce  perpetually  increasing  en- 
joyment. 

6.  Hartley,  a  far  more  profound  thinker 
than  Paley,  has  made  three  classes  of  the 
pleasures  of  self-interest;  which  he  calls 
gross  self-interest,  refined  self-interest,  and 


\ 


i 


83 

rational    self-interest.      His    classification, 
however,  is  not  very  satisfactory ;  nor  is  it 
consistent  with  the  common  use  of  language, 
as  he  includes  the   pleasures  of  sensation 
and  those  of  imagination  under  the  same 
head  of  gross  self-interest.     The  best  clas- 
sification  perhaps  will  be,  sensual,  intelkc:i_ 
tual,  and  moralj)leasurgs.     Now  it  will  be 
rm  difficult  matter  to  show,  that,  with  a  view 
to  the  attainment  of  our  own  greatest  hap- 
piness alone,  and  without  taking  into  the  ac- 
count the  effects  of  our  conduct  on  the  well- 
being  of  others,  the  second  class  of  these 
pleasures  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  first,  and 
the  third  to  the  second. 

7.  That  intellectual  are  to  be  preferred  to 
sensual  pleasures,  few  thinking  persons  will 
be  disposed  to  deny.  The  latter  indeed  are 
not  to  be  despised.  When  we  consider  how 
frequently  we  are  in  the  habit  of  taking 
food,  and  that  eating  and  drinking  afford 
us  real  enjoyment,  it  is  impossible  not  to 
consider  them  as  holding  a  part,  though 
an  inferior  one,  among  the  real  pleasures  of 


/ 


84 

life.     These  pleasures,  however,  seem  to  be 
enjoyed  in  the  highest  degree  by  those  who 
are  least  solicitous    about  them.      All  ex- 
quisite refinement  respecting  food  and  drink 
tends  to  defeat  its  own  purpose,  and  usually 
ends  in  a  fastidiousness  which  prevents  the 
epicure  from  receiving  satisfaction  from  al- 
most anything.     On  the  other  hand,  hardly 
any   wholesome  food   or  beverage   fails  to 
give  pleasure  to  those  who  have  prepared 
themselves  for  enjoying  it  by  labour  or  ex- 
ercise.    Intellectual  pleasures  have  not  the 
same     tendency    to    destroy     themselves. 
Those  indeed  who  addict  themselves  to  the 
pursuit  of  poetry,  belles  lettres,  and  the  fine 
arts,  will  go  on  refining  their  taste,  but  that 
refinement  will  add  to  their  pleasure.     We 
may  read  what  books  we  please ;  and  op- 
portunities of  beholding  and  admiring  fine 
specimens  of  the  arts  are  within  the  reach 
of  a  great  number  of  individuals.     These 
refined  pleasures  of  the  mind  do  not  cloy 
like  sensual  pleasures ;   but  their  tendency 
is  rather  to  increase,  and  to  yield  greater 


I 


85 

and  greater  enjoyment  in  proportion  to  the 
time  we  bestow  upon   them.     Even  those 
who  have  not  attained  any  great  refinement 
of  taste  will  often  find  perpetual  enjoyment 
in  intellectual  pursuits.     Tlie^nature  of  the 
human  mind  is  such,  that  anything  which 
fully  occupies   it   is   capable  of  becoming 
a  source  of  considerable  happiness.     The 
application  of  the  mind  to  business,  though 
for  no  higher  purpose  than  that  of  getting 
money,  affords  very  great  enjoyment ;   and 
if  the  desire  of  gain  be  not  excessive,  and 
the    mind    be    not    particularly   liable    to 
anxiety,  it  is  a  source  of  almost  unmingled 
satisfaction,  where  the  pursuit  of  the  object 
in  view  is  successful.     Higher  intellectual 
pursuits  are  often  accompanied  with  a  strong 
desire  of  literary  distinction,  and  a  jealousy 
of  rivals,    feeUngs   calculated   to   produce 
great  uneasiness  ;   but  when  the  mind  rises 
above  such  considerations,  and  devotes  it- 
self in  earnest  to  the  pursuit  of  knowledge 
from  a  love  of  its  intrinsic  excellence,  the 
pursuit  becomes  a  source  of  great  satisfaction. 


^i 


1^ 


f; 


86 


8.  One  of  the  most  unhappy  mistakes  of 
the  human  race  is  the  preference  of  intellec- 
tual to  moral  excellence.  This  seems  to 
arise  from  that  strong  desire  to  be  thought 
well  of  by  others,  which  is  common  to  all 
men;  and  the  generally  prevaiUng  but 
vicious  feeling  by  which  we  are  prompted 
to  pursue  intellectual  improvement,  not  on 
account  of  its  own  excellence,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  excelling  others,  and  thereby 
attracting  admiration  to  ourselves.  Now 
intellectual  superiority  obtains  a  far  higher 
degree  of  reputation  and  fame  than  moral 
excellence.  Power  is  the  great  object  of 
idolatry  with  a  large  portion  of  our  species  ; 
and  the  possession  of  superior  intellectual 
endowments  always  confers  some  degree  of 
it.  Knowledge  is  power,  as  was  long  ago 
said  by  Bacon  Genius  and  talents  are 
powers  ;  for  these  words  denote  the  power 
to  effect  what  is  beyond  the  reach  of  others. 
Power  of  all  sorts  is  usually  looked  up  to  with 
respect,  but  especially  that  which  enables 
us  to  exert  a  direct  and  extensive  influence 


87 


over  others.     Thus  kings  and  statesmen, 
and,  most  of  all,  successful  warriors,  attain 
a  degree  of  celebrity  which  surpasses  that 
of  all  others,  at  least  in  the  generation  in 
which  they  flourish.     Their  influence  is  in- 
deed less  felt  in  general  in  succeeding  times  ; 
and  therefore,  in  the  end,  the  intellectual 
exertions  of  those  who  have  produced  great 
original  works  of  genius,  or  largely  advanced 
science,  becomes  more  extended  than  that  of 
statesmen  and  w^arriors.     The  fame  of  the 
Duke  of  Marlborough  was  greater  in  his  day 
than  that  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton ;  but  in  our 
times  Newton  is  far  more  celebrated  than 
Marlborough.     When  the  successes  of  the 
statesman  and  the  warrior  produce  lasting 
eff'ects,  such  as  the  founding  of  a  new  dy- 
nasty, changing  the  constitution  of  a  coun- 
try, or  a  permanent  conquest  of  it,  a  cor- 
responding degree  of  fame  attends  and  fol- 
lows it.      The  fame  of  Alexander  and  of 
Caesar  is  not  exceeded  by  that  of  any  human 
being.     If  Napoleon  had  succeeded  in  esta- 
blishing his  dynasty  in  France,  and  had  died 


■  T"TMii'~i'  »;■ 


88 

before  his  reverses  began  in  Russia,  his 
fame  would  probably  have  even  excelled 
theirs;  but  his  defeat  and  fall,  and  the 
crumbling  to  pieces  of  the  vast  political 
edifice  which  he  had  raised,  will  probably 
greatly  diminish  the  admiration  of  posterity 
for  his  unparalleled  conquests. 

9.  The  spirit  of  moral  excellence  is  di- 
rectly opposed  to  that  desire  of  honour  and 
of  distinction  which  is  most  frequently  the 
motive  of  strenuous  intellectual   exertion. 
It  is  in  its  nature  calm,  peaceable,  and  un- 
assuming; it  pursues  laudable  objects  for 
their  own  sakes,  and  entertains  no  desire  to 
excel   others.     That   desire   is   indeed  ob- 
viously inconsistent  with    benevolence,   at 
least   with   that   high  degree   of  it  which 
prompts  us  to  feel  an  interest  for  others  as 
we   do    for   ourselves.      Moral   excellence 
seeks  not  fame,  nor  does  it  often  attain  it ; 
it  pursues  its  noiseless  course   quiet   and 
undisturbed ;  and  the  man  whose  goodness 
makes  him  a  blessing  to  the  circle  within 
which  he  moves,  is  often  scarcely  known 


89 

beyond  it.  ''  Thousands,"  Burke  justly  ob- 
serves, in  his  admirable  sketch  of  the  cha- 
racter of  Rousseau,  ''  admire  the  sentiment- 
al writer ;  the  affectionate  father  is  hardly 
known  in  his  parish." 

10.  Notwithstanding,  however,  the  pre- 
ference given  by  the  world  to  intellectual 
eminence  above  moral  excellence,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  latter  is  far  more  fa- 
vourable to  the  happiness  of  the  individual 
than  the  former.     The  desire  of  power  and   \ 
of  distinction  is  evidently  unfavorable  to 
happiness,  as  every  degree  of  success  will   j 
only  lead  to  further  wants.     The  most  suc- 
cessful conquerors,  so  far  from  being  satis- 
fied with  their  conquests,  have  been  con- 
tinually seeking    further   opportunities    of 
subduing  other  nations,  and  extending  their 
dominions.      The  man   who    has  acquired 
reputation  in  science,   art,  or  literature,  if 
the  desire  of  distinction  be  his  leading  ob- 
ject, can  never  be  without  something  fur- 
ther to  desire.     The  most  successful  there- 
fore of  those  who  ardently  seek  for  extended 


90 

power,  or  high  reputation,  find  themselves 
engaged  in  a  perpetual  pursuit  of  some 
fresh  accession  of  reputation  or  power,  and 
are  exposed  to  all  the  annoyances  w^hich 
arise  from  the  fear  of  rivals  and  the  uncer- 
tainty of  success.  It  may  indeed  be  truly 
said,  that  intellectual  pursuits  are  not  ne- 
cessarily attended  wdth  the  disquieting  feel- 
ings of  ambition ;  it  is  however  certain  that 
they  are  so  very  generally.  Supposing  them, 
however,  to  be  followed  for  their  own  sakes, 
they  are,  in  general,  far  from  yielding  equal 
dehght  with  the  kindly  feelings,  by  which 
we  are  induced  to  exert  ourselves  for  the 
good  of  others.  The  human  character  is 
essentially  social.  Solitude  is  alw^ays  a 
state  of  unhappiness,  or,  if  there  be  any 
exceptions,  they  are  to  be  found  in  cases  of 
reUgious  enthusiasm.  On  this  subject  we 
cannot  enter  at  present.  Putting  then  re- 
ligious enthusiasm  aside,  w^e  may  safely  lay 
it  down,  that  mere  solitary  pleasure  can 
never  satisfy  the  human  mind.  If  any  one 
should  doubt  this,  let  him  imagine  the  case 


91 

of  a  most  successful  investigator  of  science, 
whose  industry  had  made  him  acquainted 
with  its  most  abstruse  parts,   and    whose 
genius  had  enlarged  its   bounds,  but  who 
should  be  cut  off  from  the  possibility  of 
communicating  his  knowledge  or  his  disco- 
veries to  others.     The  question  is,  would 
such  a  one  be  happy  ;    and  I  am   greatly 
indeed  mistaken  if  all  persons  competent  to 
judge  would  not,  without  hesitation,  return 
a  negative  answ^er  to  the  question'*.     If  then 
the  pleasures  of  science  be  incomplete  unless 
w^e  couple  with  them  the  communication  of 
the  results  to  others,  the  necessity  of  such 
communication  must  arise  either  from  the 
desire  of  extending  the  reputation  of  the  vo- 
tary of  science,  or  from  that  sympathy  with 
our  fellow-creatures  which  we  have  all  along 

*  Cicero  expresses  himself  very  strongly  on  the  sub- 
ject ; "  Si  contigerit  ea  vita  sapienti,  ut,  omnium  rerum 

affluentibus  copiis,  quamvis  omnia,  quee  cognitione  digna 
sint,  summo  otio  secum  ipse  consideret,  et  contempletur ; 
tamen,  si  solitudo  tanta  sit,  ut  hominem  videre  non  pos- 
sit,  excedat  a  vita."— De  Officiis,  i.  43. 


92 

considered  to  be  an  essential  part  of  our 
nature,  and  the  fruitful  source  of  our  virtues. 
There  seems  to  be  no  other  conceivable  way 
of  accounting  for  the  fact.  Now  if  the  desire 
of  making  others  acquainted  with  the  re- 
sults of  our  scientific  investigations  proceed 
from  the  wish  to  advance  our  own  reputa- 
tion, it  is  the  very  feeling  which  we  have 
seen  in  the  last  section  is  insufficient  for 
our  happiness  ;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
arise  from  our  sympathy  with  others,  it 
brings  us  at  once  into  the  region  of  mo- 
rality. It  is  not  merely  an  intellectual,  but 
also  a  moral  pleasure. 

.  11.  Now  let  us  direct  our  attention  to  a 
consideration  of  the  pleasure  attendant  on 
virtuous  feeUngs  and  conduct.  Every  one 
of  the  virtues  tends  directly  to  increase  our 
own  happiness.  Prudence  enables  us  to 
provide  for  our  future  wants;  temperance 
promotes  our  health ;  integrity  in  our  deal- 
ings  conciUates  the  esteem  of  all  with  whom 
we  have  to  do.  ''  Mercy,"  says  Shakspeare, 
**  is   twice   bless'd ;   it   blesseth   him   that 


93 


gives,  and  him  that  takes ;"  and  the  same 
remark  may  be  truly  extended  to  every 
modification  of  benevolence.  The  act  of 
voluntarily  doing  good  to  another  is  never 
unaccompanied  by  pleasure  to  the  agent, — a  = 
fact  so  notorious,  as  to  be  the  foundation  of 
the  selfish  svstem  of  morals,  against  which  i 


we  have  been  contending. 

12.  But  an  objection  will  here  present 
itself,   and   it   cannot   fairly   be  denied  to 
have  some  force.     If  it   be   allowed   that 
pleasure  is  a  constant  attendant  on  acts  of 
benevolence,  it  must  also  be  admitted  that 
much  pain  must  be  endured  by  those  whose 
benevolent  efforts  fail  of  producing  the  in- 
tended effect.     And  how^  often  is  this  the 
case  !     Frequently  is  the  benevolent  man 
unable  to  stop  the  hand  of  the  spoiler  and 
oppressor ;  often  does  he  witness  scenes  of 
distress  which  he  wants  the  power  to  re- 
lieve;   his  exertions  for  others  will  some- 
times meet  with  an  ungrateful  return,  and 
will  often  be  defeated  by  the  folly  of  those 
whom  he  had  intended  to  serve. 


94 


13.  Allowing,  however,  all  the  force  to 
this  objection  which  fairly  belongs  to  it,  it 
still  only  proves  that  the  pleasures  of  bene- 
volence are  attended  by  a  certain  mixture 
of  pain,  which  must  be  deducted  from  the 
pleasure  to  enable  us  accurately  to  measure 
its  amount.     That  the  pLeasure  is,  in  ordi- 
nary cases,  far  greater  than  the  pain,  seems 
to  be  satisfactorily  proved  by  what  probably 
few  will  be  disposed  to  deny,  that  persons 
of  great  benevolence  are  generally  blessed 
with  calmness  of  mind  and  cheerfulness  of 
temper.     This  is  certainly  not  universally 
the  case,  but  it  will,  I  beheve,  be  found  to 
be  so  in  a  very  great  majority  of  instances. 
Benevolence,  indeed,  seldom  entirely  fails 
in  attaining  its  object.     Scarcely  an  indi- 
vidual can  be  found  who  does  not  possess 
some  means  of  adding  to  the  happiness  of 
others.     Every  day,  in  ordinary  cases,  af- 
fords an  opportunity  of  doing  this.     The 
intercourse   of  men   is   in  a  great  degree 
made  up  of  reciprocal  kindness.     Parents 
are  constantly  bestowing  benefits  on  their 


95 


children,  and  children  have  frequent  oppor- 
tunities of  making  a  grateful  return.     The 
relation  of  master  and  servant  affords  con- 
tinual occasions   for   the   exercise   of  this 
virtue.     On  the  whole  we  may  safely  as- 
sert, that  a  man's  circumstances  must  be 
unusually  unfavourable  who  does  not  possess 
the  means  of  adding,  in  some  degree,  to  the 
enjoyments  of  those  who  compose  the  circle 
in  which  he  moves.     Now  every  act  of  be- 
nevolence has  its  attendant  pleasure ;  the 
number,  therefore,  of  pleasures  of  this  kind 
is  very  great.     It  must  be  added,  that  the 
feeling  of  benevolence  is  essentially  plea- 
surable ;    even    compassion,   which    has   a 
mixture  of  pain,  has  also  a  pleasure  pecu- 

liar  to  itself. 

14.  The  observations  just  made  respect- 
ing the  comparative  value  of  sensual,  moral, 
and  intellectual  pleasure,  must  be  taken  to 
have  only  a  very  general  application,  and 
cannot  be  rigidly  appUed  to  every  particular 
case.  Even  with  respect  to  sensual  plea- 
sure, there  are  some  men  whose  constitu- 


96 


tions  are  vigorous  enough  to  resist  the  in- 
jurious effects  of  intemperance  and  extreme 
indulgence  in  sensual  pleasures ;  and  some 
individuals  of  strong  minds  and  robust  con- 
stitutions,  and  urged  by  a  vehement  desire 
of  acquiring  knowledge,  become  so  com- 
pletely absorbed  in  their  intellectual  pur- 
suits, particularly  those  which  require  a  very 
close  abstract  attention,  such  as  the  mathe- 
matics, as  to  exclude  all  external  annoy- 
ances, and  to  attain,  in  their  studies,  a  state 
of  almost  unmixed  enjoyment. 

15.  The  disquieting  nature  of  all  the  ma- 
levolent passions  must  be  obvious  to  every 
observer.  Ovid's  admirable  description  of 
envy  will,  in  some  degree,  apply  to  them  all : 

Pallor  in  ore  sedet :  macies  in  corpore  toto  : 
Nusquam  recta  acies  :  livent  rubigine  dentes  : 
Pectora  feUe  virent :  lingua  est  suffusa  veneno. 
Risus  abest.  nisi  quern  visi  movere  dolores. 
Nee  fruitur  somno,  vigilacibus  excita  curis  : 
Sed  videt  ingratos,  intabescitque  videndo. 
Successus  hominum ;  carpitque  et  carpitur  una  ; 
Suppliciumque  suum  est*.  ^ 


*  Met.,  lib.  ii.  fab.  xii.  68. 


97 

16.  Another  most  fruitful  source  of  hap- 
piness is  a  cheerfulness  of  temper,  which 
seems  to  be  a  gift  of  nature  to  particular 
individuals,  and  which  can  apparently  be 
attained  by  no  others.     It  is  perhaps  not 
too  much   to   say,  that  a  temper  of  this 
sort   is   the   greatest   source   of  happiness 
in  the   world;    it  does  not   appear  to  be 
necessarily  associated  with  any  mental  or 
moral  peculiarity  of  character ;  it  is,  how- 
ever, incompatible  with  the  malevolent  pas- 
sions.    Whether  those  passions  ever  take  a 
permanent  hold  on  characters  originally  of 
the  sort  described,  I  cannot  pretend  to  say ; 
but  if  so,  they  will  most  assuredly  destroy 
the  cheerfulness   of   spirit   which  is  their 
characteristic.     The  incompatibility  of  the 
two   is    proved  by   all   experience.      This 
happy  temper  always  takes  the  most  cheer- 
ful view   of  all   matters   which   their   cir- 
cumstances   admit    of;    is   full   of    hope, 
easily  susceptible  of  joy,  and  wholly  indis- 
posed to  yield  to  anxiety  or  despair.     I'his 
I   believe  to  be   the   happiest   of  all   dis- 

F 


aaMfe«.-iit,fiafe.^»..tfa»----^..  .^i.:^ 


98 

positions ;  but  it  affords  us  no  materials  in 
the  discussion  before  us.  No  art  is  able  to 
confer  it  on  those  to  whom  nature  has 
denied  it,  and  the  circumstances  of  life 
must  be  very  unfortunate  indeed  to  eradi- 
cate it  where  it  is  given  by  nature. 

17.  The  pleasures  which  arise  from  a 
just  sense  of  the  relation  in  which  we  stand 
to  our  Maker,  and  from  the  feelings  of 
reverence,  love,  confidence,  and  resignation 
which  we  ought  to  entertain  towards  him, 
will  be  treated  of  in  a  subsequent  part  of 
this  Essay. 

18.  The  foregoing  observations  tend  to 
show  that  self-love  and  benevolence  are  not 
generally  inconsistent  with  each  other,  but 
would  often  lead  to  the  same  course  of  cor- 
duct ;  still  they  are  principles  clearly  distin- 
guishable, and  in  some  instances  (at  least 
as  far  as  this  world  is  concerned)  opposed  to 
each  other.  Thus  the  patriot,  who  devotes 
his  life  for  his  country,  can  hardly  be  said 
to  receive  an  adequate  compensation  in  the 
feeling  of  approbation  which   attends  his 


99 

self-sacrifice.  Yet  this  is  a  case  which  has 
always  commanded  the  applause  of  the 
world;  and  that  fact  seems  sufficient  in 
itself  to  destroy  the  selfish  system  of 
morals. 


f2 


100 


CHAPTER   III. 


OF  BENEVOLENCE. 


1.  The  theory  which  we  have  been  endea- 
vouring to  support  affirms,  that  sympathy 
with  our  fellow-creatures,  and  a  desire  to 
advance  their  happiness,  are  parts  of  our 
nature  ;  and  that  they  are,  with  few  ex- 
ceptions, developed  in  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree  in  every  human  being  at  an  early 
period  of  life.  With  respect  to  the  excep- 
tions just  mentioned,  we  may  observe,  that 
no  one  denies  that  man  is  a  rational  being, 
although  some  few  come  into  the  world  in 
a  state  of  idiocy,  and  remain  so  during 
their  whole  lives.  A  human  being,  without 
moral  feelings  or  principles  of  any  kind,  is 
as  rarely  to  be  found  as  an  idiot.     Indeed 


101 

the  cases  are  identical ;  at  least  I  am  not 
aware  that  any  instance  can  be  produced  of 
one,  who  possessed  the  faculty  of  reason, 
having  not  only  thrown  off  all  the  re- 
straints  of  morality  in  his  conduct,  but 
having  also  gone  the  length  of  denying  the 
existence  of  all  moral  distinctions.  We  at- 
tribute, then,  a  moral  nature  to  man  on  the 
same  grounds  on  which  he  is  admitted  to 
have  a  rational  nature. 

2.  As  the  rational  nature  of  man  is  by 
no  means  a  certain  guide,  but  often  falls 
into  great  errors,  in   Hke   manner   is  the 
moral  nature  subject  to  err.      It  requires 
careful   cultivation    rightly   to    direct    the 
moral  sentiments,   and  great  care  to  pre- 
vent the  corruption  of  the  natural  sources 
of  good  feeUng  in  the  human  heart.     We 
are  hable  to  be  misled  by  evil  example,  and 
to  be  seduced  from  the  hne  of  duty  by  the 
passions.     It  is  necessary,  in  order  to  our 
moral   nature's   attaining  its    proper  end, 
that  it  should  be  regulated  by  our  reason. 
It  is  only  when  the  rational  and  the  moral 


102 

faculties  act  together,  that  the  highest  re- 
sults of  virtue  are  produced.     This  will  be 
easily  understood  by  famiHar  examples.     A 
tender  mother  is  very  desirous  to  give  her 
children  all  the  pleasure  in  her  power,  and 
is  unwilUng  to  refuse  them  any  gratification 
which  she  can  bestow;    but  she   speedily 
finds  that,   by  indulging  them  in  all  their 
wishes,  she  will  be  forming  habits  which 
must   ultimately   prove   injurious    to   their 
virtue  and  to  their  happiness.     Compassion 
is  natural  to  the  human  heart ;  but  to  yield 
to  our  kindly  feelings  on  every  appearance 
of  distress,  to  give  to  all  who  ask,  as  our 
sympathy  might  prompt  us  to  do,  without 
investigation  of  the  reality  of  the  professed 
distress,  and  with  no  consideration  of  the 
probable  consequences  of  the  relief  afforded 
on  the  future  character  and  conduct  of  the 
recipient  of  our  bounty,  is  a  mode  of  pro- 
ceeding far  more  hkely  to  produce  injurious 
than  beneficial  consequences. 

3.  In  endeavouring  to  explain  the  nature 
of  benevolence,  it  will  be  necessary  to  con- 


103 

sider  it  as  a  feehng  and  as  a  principle.    The 
principle  of  benevolence  should  be  extended 
to  all  whom  we  have  the  power  of  serving ; 
and  this  supposes  that  they  should  all  be 
the  objects  of  the  general  feehng.     But  be- 
sides  this  general  feehng,  our  benevolent 
affections  are  attracted  to  particular  indi- 
viduals  in  a  much  higher  degree  than  that 
which  is  necessary  to  enable  us  to  fulfil  our 
duty   to    our    fellow- creatures   in   general. 
Here,  as  everywhere  else,  we  shall  be  wise 
in  following  nature.     Could  a  man  feel  the 
same  lively  interest   in   the   well-being  of 
each  individual  inhabitant  of  a  large  town 
which  he  does  for  his  own  children,  such  a 
feehng  would  be  entirely  useless,  as  he  can 
never  possess  the  means  of  advancing  the 
happiness  of  a  large  number  of  individuals 
in  the  same  degree  as  he  can  that  of  his 
own  family.     The  strong  feeling  of  attach- 
ment to  individuals  by  no  means  lessens 
general   benevolence   towards   the   species, 
but  seems  rather  to  increase  it.    The  tender 
husband  and  affectionate  father  is  usually 


104 

a  person  of  general  benevolence  of  cha- 
racter, while  those  who  are  without  objects 
of  near  and  strong  affection  are  often  cold  and 
hard-hearted.     Married  men  are  generally 
more  benevolent  than  bachelors  ;  for  "  wife 
and  children,"  as   Bacon  justly  observes, 
"are  a  kind  of  disciphne  of  humanity." 
"  Single  men,"  he  goes  on  to  say,  "  though 
they  be  many  times  more  charitable,  be- 
cause their  means  are  less  exhaust,  yet  on 
the   other   side   they  are   more  cruel   and 
hard-hearted,  (good  to  make  severe  inqui- 
sitors,) because  their  tenderness  is  not  so 
oft   called  upon."      We  must  not  indeed 
carry  this  too  far.     It  is  certain  that  all 
married  men  are  not  benevolent,  while  some 
single  men  are  so  in  an  eminent  degree.    It 
will,  however,  I  think,  in  general  be  found 
that  single  are  far  more  selfish  than  married 
men. 

4.  The  deepest  feelings  are  implanted  by 
nature  where  they  are  most  required,  and 
where  they  will  produce  the  most  beneficial 
effects.     In  general,  the  highest  degree  of 


105 

benevolence  is  that  felt  by  married  persons 
for  each   other,  and  by  parents  for  their 

chddren       nd  these  are  precisely  the  cases 
in  which  most  good  can  be  conferred     The 

love  of  children  for  their  parents  is  the  next 

degree  of  affection,  and  in  some  cases,  par- 
ticularly in  daughters,  it  is  hardly  less  in- 
tense than  the  connubial  and  parental  af- 
foctions.      Women    are   in   general  more 
benevolent  than  men,  at  least  in  the  do- 
mestic circle  ;  and  as  unmarried  daughters 
usually  hve  constantly  at  home  with  their 
parents    while   sons   are   absent  pursuing 
their  different  calhngs  elsewhere,  the  lov: 

h-     .K         '  ''  ^'P'  "P  ^"'J  i'^^reased, 
while  that  of  sons  is  in  general  diminish: 

mg.  \/e  love  those  on  whom  we  have  be- 
stowed benefits  more  than  those  who  have 
benefited  us ;  and  men  are  attached  not 
only  to  their  hving  offspring,  but  to  inani- 
mate things,  as  books,  pictures,  &c.  which 
they  have  produced.  It  is  a  curious  saying 
of  Aristotle*,  that  an  artist  loves  a  work  of 

*  Eth.  Nic,  ix.  7. 
F  5 


106 


his  own  better  than  it  would  love  him  if  it 
could  become  animated  and  sensible.     In 
general,  the  love  of  children  for  their  pa- 
rents is  by  no  means  equal  to  that  of  their 
parents  for  them,  nor  is  it  desirable  that  it 
should  be  so.     They  are  intended  to  form 
other  relations,  and  to  find  new  objects  of 
affection  in  the  married  state;  nature  has 
therefore  provided  that  they  shall  strongly 
desire   to   enter  into   that    state,   and,   of 
course,  their  attachment  to  all  that  belongs 
to  the  single  state  is,  in  some  degree,  less- 
ened by  that  desire.     The  ordinary  use  of 
language  has  a  reference  to  this  state  of 
things.     People  are  said  to  be  settled  when 
they  are  married,  which  term  indicates  that 
the  single  is  considered  merely  preparatory 
to  the  married  state. 

5.  But  though  the  benevolent  feehngs  of 
children  towards  their  parents  are  less  strong 
than  those  of  parents  to  their  children,  yet 
are  they  in  all  well-disposed  natures'  ex- 
tremely powerful,  and  in  general  exceed 
in  intensity  all  other  affections  except  the 


107 

connubial-  and  the  parental.  This  feeling 
usually  exists  during  the  whole  of  the  life 
of  the  parents,  particularly  in  daughters, 
for  in  sons  it  is  often  much  weakened  by 
the  causes  mentioned  above. 

6.  Benevolent   feelings,   with  regard  to 
friends,  form  an  important  branch  of  human 
affections.     Much  of  the  happiness  of  life 
IS  made  up  of  the  intercourse  which  sub- 
sists between  those,  who,  from  similarity  of 
tastes  and   pursuits,   or  from  some  other 
cause,  have  contracted  friendship  for  each 
other.      Of  the   importance   of  friendship 
nothing  need   be   said ;   it  is  a  necessary 
want  of  our  nature ;  and  a  man  who  has 
no  friend,  be  his  outward  possessions  and 
his  intellectual  attainments  what  they  may, 
can  have  little  enjoyment  of  life. 

7.  As  the  advantages  of  friendship  are 
very  great,  it  is  desirable  that  some  degree 
of  it,  or  at  least  a  feeling  approaching  to  it, 
should  be  felt  by  those  with  whom  we  are 
most  in  communication ;  and  this  is  gene- 
rally the  case.     The  mere  circumstances  of 


108 

near  neighbourhood  and  frequent  meetings 
almost  necessarily  leads  to  some  degree  of 
kindness  and  good-will  between  the  neigh- 
bours. The  relations  of  tutor  and  pupil, 
and  master  and  servant,  are,  in  all  well- 
disposed  individuals,  in  general  attended  by 
feelings  of  mutual  kindness. 

8.  The  difference  of  feeling  between  men 
and  women  is  remarkably  adapted  to  their 
respective  situations  in  life.     In  strong  at- 
tachment to  her  immediate  connexions,  and 
in  compassion  for  distress  directly  presented 
to  her,  woman  is  in  general  far  superior  to 
man;   while  man  has  much  more  of  en- 
larged and  general  benevolence  than  woman. 
This  is  as  it  should  be.     The  tenderness  of 
woman  is  fitted  for  her  station.   To  her  care 
are  committed  the  helplessness  of  infancy 
and  the  decrepitude  of  age.     She  will  tend 
her  sick  child  with  a  love  which  knows  no 
bounds ;   and  will  keep  her  station  by  the 
bed  from  which  her  aged  parent  is  to  rise 
no  more,  with  unwearied  and  unconquerable 
affection.  Neither  tlie  waywardness  of  child- 


109 

hood  nor  the  peevishness  of  age  has  power 
to  weaken  her  affection.     She  makes  every 
kmd  of  allowance  for  their  infirmities  •  pos 
sesses   her   soul   in   peace ;    "  beareth   all 
thmgs,    hopeth    all    things,    endureth    all 
thmgs."     Often   is  she   doomed   to  suffer 
harsh  treatment  from  the  husband  who  has 
solemnly  vowed   to  love  and  cherish  her 
and  mgratitude   from  the   children  whose 
welfare  she  has  watched  over  with  anxious 
and  unceasing  solicitude.     These  things  she 
will  bear  without  a  murmur,  and  without 
relaxmg  in  attention  to   her  duties      The 
circumstances  of  human  hfe  call  man  to  dif- 
ferent scenes ;  and  his  actions  have  a  far 
wider  operation  upon  the  general  good.    As 
a  legislator  he  has  to  assist  in  enacting  laws 
which  influence  largely  the  well-being  of  the 
community ;   as  a  soldier  he  must  expose 
himself  to  imminent  danger  in  the  service 
of  his  country ;  he  is  sometimes  called  on 
o  assist  and  protect  the  weak  and  helpless 
from  the  aggression  of  the  powerful  oppress 
or.  at  no  small  risk  of  injury  to  himself 


k-rr 


110 

If  he  fill  a  public  station,  he  may  be  exposed 
to  calumny  and  misrepresentation ;  to  the 
frowns  of  the  powerful,  or  to  the  insane  fury 
of  the  multitude.     To  fit  him  for  the  per- 
formance  of  his  duties,  nature  has  given  him 
a  more  firm  but  less  delicate  moral  texture 
than  that  which  she  has  bestowed  on  woman. 
Sometimes,  indeed,  (as  if  to  give  us  a  fore- 
taste of  what  may  be  expected  in  a  higher 
state  of  existence,)  we  find  in  man  a  tender- 
ness of  feeling  almost  equal  to  that  of  wo- 
man ;  while  some  few  women  possess  that 
comprehensive  and   vigorous    moral  senti- 
ment, which  is  generally  found  in  men  onlv. 
9.  We  have  already  adverted  to  our  bene- 
volent feeUngs  towards  our  familv  connex- 
ions,  our  friends,  and  our  neighbours.    The 
two  next  objects  of  benevolence  to  be  con- 
sidered, are  the  particular  district  with  which 
we   are    immediately   connected,   and    our 
country.     The  interest  felt  in  the  affairs  of 
the  parish,  county,  &c.  in  which  an  indivi- 
dual resides,  varies  greatly  in  particular  per- 
sons, and  is  in  general  proportioned  to  the 


111 

part  which   he   takes   in   its   affairs.     He 
whose  exertions  are  chiefly  confined  to  his 
parish  is  likely  to  feel  a  stronger  interest 
respecting   it   than   those   whose   situation 
places  them  more  in  connexion  with  the  in- 
terests   of  a  whole  county.     The  general 
prosperity  of  the  country  which  one  inha- 
bits ,s  an  object  of  interest  to  all ;  and  its 
importance  is  so  great,  as  often  to  establish 
a  supremacy  over  more  confined  but  nearer 
interests.     The  love  of  their  country  has 
earned  some  noble  spirits  to  the  very  heights 
of  virtue.     Genuine  patriotism  is,  however 
perhaps  a  rarer  virtue  than  it  is  usually 
thought  to  be.     The  Romans  have  been 
long  celebrated  as  a  patriotic  people ;  but  if 
the  motives  of  most   of  their  great   men 
could   be   fully   analysed,  it  may  well   be 
doubted  whether  their  great  actions  were 
not,  m  a  high  degree,  stimulated  by  the 
hope  of  enjoymg  the  power  and  dignity  of 
consul,  dictator,  &c.,  of  having  the  sweet 
sound  of  imperator   shouted  forth  by  the 
troops  whom  they  should  lead  on  to  victory. 


-i 


112 

and  of  enjoying  the  magnificent  triumphs 
by  which  their  victories  would  be  rewarded. 
Certainly,  when  we  calmly  consider  the  in- 
justice and  cruelty  exercised  by  the  Romans 
on  other  nations,  it  seems  difficult  to  give 
them  credit  for  so  much  real  virtue  as  has 
been  usually  assigned  to  them. 

10.  Having  given  a  general  account  of 
several  modifications  of  the  benevolent  af- 
fections, we  will  now  proceed  to  show  that 
they  all  require  to  be  directed  and  controlled 
by  reason.     The  greatest  and  the  most  pre- 
valent  errors  respecting  human  nature  have 
arisen  from  partial  views  of  it.     Some  have 
highly  estimated  the  intellectual,  and  thought 
Httle  of  the  moral  part  of  man.     Genius  and 
learning  have  been  too  often  the  exclusive 
objects  of  admiration.     In  our  own  days, 
what  is  called  imagination  is  idoUzed  ;  and 
the  production  of  any  novelty,  however  in- 
consistent with  good  taste,  and  however  de- 
void of  sound  sense,  is  admitted  by  the  mul- 
titude as  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  pos- 
session of  this  admired  quality.      Affected 


113 

and   exaggerated    sentiments,    incongruous 
metaphors,  hyperbolical   tropes,  unnatural 
characters,  and  incredible  incidents,  are  ex- 
travagantly admired  by  many  who  have  no 
mean  opinion  of  their  own  critical  sagacity; 
while  the  just  sentiments,  the   characters 
true  to  nature,  the  probable  incidents,  the 
purity  and  simplicity  of  style,  which  have 
bestowed  immortahty  on  the  great  works  of 
ancient  and  modern  genius,  would  probably 
be  thought  ''  flat  and  unprofitable  "  by  the 
same  class  of  critics.     This  perverted  taste 
has  unhappily  extended  to  moral  subjects. 
The  calm  and  unostentatious  virtues,  which 
in  truth  form  the  staple  commodity  of  hu- 
man happiness,  are,  it  is  to  be  feared,  but 
very  inadequately   estimated    in    our   own 
times.     Be  that,  however,  as  it  may,  it  is 
certain  that  our  moral  sentiments  require  to 
be  restrained  and  directed  by  reason,  and 
that  both  parts  of  our  nature  must  move 
harmoniously  together  to  produce  the  ends 
for  which  they  were  given. 

11.  The  production  of  happiness  is  the 


114 

only  rational  object  of  our  voluntary  actions ; 
and  it  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  inquiry, 
why  we  perform  any  particular  action,  that 
it  tends  to  produce  happiness,  either  to  our- 
selves or  to  others.     The  question,  why  we 
are  to  do  good  to  others,  (as  has  been  ah^eady 
observed,)  lies  beyond  the  limits  of  moral 
philosophy,  and  is  only  one  branch  of  the 
larger  question,  whether  it  is  our  interest  to 
be  virtuous.     Those  who  embrace  what  is 
usually  termed    the   Utilitarian   theory   of 
morals,  seem  to  be  perfectly  right  as  to  the 
end  of  our  moral  actions,  but  to  err  greatly 
in  not  perceiving  that  the  principles  of  our 
nature  prompt  us  to  such  actions  long  before 
we  are  capable  of  forming  an  opinion  re- 
specting the  great  question  of  what  tends 
to  the  greatest  general  good.     A  child  finds 
that  he  possesses  the  power  of  giving  plea- 
sure to  his  brothers  and  sisters,  and  feels  a 
disposition  to  do  so  long  before  his  faculties 
have  sufliciently  expanded  to  enable  him  to 
form  a  notion  of  general  good,  and  of  the 
proper  means  of  attaining  it.   When  in  pro- 


1! 


115 

cess  of  time  this  idea  is  formed,  it  may,  and 
it  ought,  in  some  degree,  to  enter  into  our 
consideration  and  to  influence  our  conduct. 
After  all,  how^ever,  its  operation  is  very  con- 
fined.    We  can  in  no  instance  calculate, 
with  anything  approaching  to  certainty,  on 
the  probable  effects  of  our  conduct  in  all 
their  ramifications,  and  must  therefore  be 
content  to  perform  such  actions  as  we  have 
reason  to  beheve  will  produce  immediately 
beneficial  consequences,  without  being  soH- 
citous  about  their  remote  effects.     That  is 
the  real  practical  principle  on  which  men 
act ;  and  the  Utilitarians  themselves  would 
laugh  at  one  who  delayed  to  assist  his  friend 
till  he  had  calculated  all  the  probable  con- 
sequences, direct  and  remote,  of  his  so  doing. 
12.  Every  sensible  moral  writer  admits 
the  necessity  of  general  rules.     These  rules, 
however,  are  not,  as  they  are  often  repre- 
sented to  be,  mere  abstractions  of  reason, 
but  have  foundations  laid  deep  in  the  moral 
nature  of  man.     Children  know  and   feel 
that  they  ought  to  love  and  obey  their  pa- 


116 

rents,  long  before  their  minds  have  been  led 
far  enough  into  speculation  to  see  the  great 
importance  of  this  duty  to  the  well-being  of 
the  species ;  and  thousands  pass  through 
life  without  having  advanced  far  enough  in 
generalization  to  reach  this  general  prin- 
ciple. 

13.  But  though  it  is  impossible  for  the 
most  enlarged  and  cultivated  human  capa- 
city to  estimate  with  any  approach  to  pre- 
cision all  the  consequences  which  will  result 
from  any  particular  action,  it  is  certain  that 
our  ability  to  estimate  probable  conse- 
quences goes  on  enlarging  in  proportion  to 
the  improvement  of  the  rational  faculties, 
and  the  pains  we  take  to  ascertain,  as  nearly 
as  we  can,  what  effects  are  likely  to  follow 
from  our  actions.  No  subject,  perhaps,  is 
better  calculated  to  illustrate  this,  than  that 
of  giving  alms.  The  first  natural  impulse 
is,  to  give  in  all  cases  where  there  is  an  ap- 
pearance of  distress.  It  is,  however,  soon 
perceived  that  great  deceit  is  often  practised 
by  those  who  solicit  alms  ;  that  the  assumed 


117 

distress  is  often  apparent,  and  not  real ;  and 
that  the  money  given  frequently  tends  to  no 
other  purpose  but  to  the  encouragement  of 
idleness  and  profligacy.     This  view  of  the 
subject  may,  however,  lead  to  a  very  great 
error,  by  inducing  persons  to  abstain  from 
giving  alms  altogether ;  and,  by  so  doing, 
passing  by  cases  of  real  and  severe  distress 
which  they  have  the  power  of  relieving,  and 
hardening  their  own  hearts,  and  destroying 
that  sympathy  for   the  sufferings  of  their 
fellow-creatures  which  naturally  belongs  to 
the  human  heart. 

14.  The  necessity  of  directing  and  re- 
straining the  natural  impulses  of  our  bene- 
volent feeUngs  by  reason  and  a  regard  to 
consequences,  is  nowhere  more  apparent 
than  in  the  conduct  of  parents  towards 
their  children.  The  more  affectionate  the 
parent,  the  greater  is  the  risk  of  that  inju- 
dicious indulgence  which  is  commonly  and 
expressively  called,  spoihng  children.  It 
cannot  be  necessary  to  enlarge  on  this  sub- 
ject, as  the  very  name  of  a  spoiled  child  will 


118 

not  fail  to  suggest  to  every  mind  the  mise- 
rable effects  of  the  foolish  fondness  by  which 
parents  are  led  to  an  indiscriminate  indul- 
gence of  the  wishes  of  their  children.     It 
may  not  be  amiss,  however,  to  observe,  that 
over-much  indulgence  is  not  the  only  way 
of  spoiling  children  ;  and  that  the  plan  of 
undue  severity  adopted  by  some  parents,  in 
addition  to  the  infliction  of  present  misery 
on  the  children,  often  draws  after  it  conse- 
quences not  less  to  be  deplored  than  those 
which  are  the  result  of  too  much  indulgence  ; 
and  that  it  is  better  that  the  conduct  of  the 
parent,  if  it  must  deviate  from  the  rational 
middle  course,  should  lean  rather  to  the  mild 
than  to  the  severe  extreme,  as  more  conso- 
nant to  the  best  feeUngs  of  the  human  heart, 
and  better  calculated  to  strengthen  and  con- 
firm that  natural  affection  between  the  pa- 
rent and  the  child,  which  is  one  of  the  most 
fruitful  and  important  sources  of  all  that  is 
most  lovely  and  excellent  in  human  nature. 
15.  The  necessity  of  general  rules  is  ad- 
mitted by  all  moralists  ;  and  it  is  one  of  the 


119 


greatest  difficulties  in  ethical  science  to  form 
them  correctly.  The  inquiry  into  this  sub- 
ject seems  to  have  stopped  short  of  its  le- 
gitimate extent.  The  following  remarks  of 
Cicero  will  afford  a  suitable  introduction  to 
what  I  have  to  say  on  this  subject.  After 
treating  morals  as  made  up  of  the  honestum 
and  the  utile,  and  stating  some  objections 
to  a  threefold  ethical  division  made  by  Pan- 
aetius,  he  proceeds  as  follows  :  *'  Hac  divi- 
sione  duo  praetermissa  sunt :  nee  enim  solum, 
utrum  honestum  an  turpe  sit,  deliberari  solet ; 
sed  etiam  duobus  propositis  honestis,  utrum 
honestius ;  itemque  duobus  propositis  utili- 
bus,  utrum  utilius :  ita,  quam  ille  triplicem 
putavit  esse  rationem,  in  quinque  partes 
distribui  debere  reperitur.  Primum  igitur 
est  de  honesto,  sed  dupliciter;  tum  pari 
ratione  de  utili ;  post  de  comparatione 
eorum,  disserendum''^." 

16.  In  laying  down  general  rules  for  the 
regulation  of  our  conduct,  then,  we  should 
keep  steadily  in  mind  what  is  the  end  of  all 

*  De  Officiis,  i.  3. 


120 

morality.     Now  the  only  intelligible  object 
to  be  attained  by  moral  principles,  is  hap- 
piness, either  that  of  the  individual  or  of 
others.    That  both  these  objects  are  rational 
and  ultimate  ones,  no  one  can  deny.     But 
among  actions  which  tend  to  produce  hap- 
piness, some  are  fitted  to  do  so  in  a  higher, 
and  others  in  a  lower  degree.     In  order, 
then,  duly  to  estimate  the  importance  of  a 
particular  action,  we  must  consider  in  what 
degree  it  is  calculated  to  produce  happiness. 
There  is  also  a  negative  side  of  the  question, 
as  the  prevention  of  misery  is  as  legitimate 
an  object  of  our  moral  exertions  as  the  pro- 
duction of  happiness.     It  is  an  act  of  virtue 
to  advance  a  loan  of  money  to  an  industri- 
ous man,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  him  the 
means  of  exercising   his   industry  for  the 
support  of  himself  and  his  family  ;  and  it  is 
also  virtuous  to  endeavour,  by  w^hatever  just 
means  we  may  have  in  our  power,  to  induce 
a  man  to  break  off  habits  of  intemperance, 
by  w^hich  he  is  bringing  ruin  upon  himself 
and  those  he  is  bound  to  support.    Of  these 


121 


two  modes  of  doing  good,  the  latter  is  obvi- 
ously more  important  than  the  former.     In 
one  case,  industry  may  enable  the  person 
intended  to  be  benefitted  to  surmount  his 
difficulties ;  in  the  other,  he  is  proceeding 
in  the  sure  road  to  destruction.     In  another 
view,   too,   the  latter  is  by  far  the  more 
important  act.     An  alliance  exists  between 
all  the  virtues  ;  and  habits  of  vice  of  every 
kind   are,  more  or  less,  injurious   to   the 
general   character.     That   intemperance   is 
closely  allied  with  imprudence  is  obvious  ; 
nor  can  any  one  fail  to  perceive  its  incon- 
sistency with  that  calmness  of  mind  and 
self-possession,  which  enable  a  man  to  ac- 
quire the  mastery  of  his  passions,  and  to 
resist   the  temptations  by  which  he  is  in 
danger  of  being  seduced  from  the  paths  of 
virtue. 

17.  As  this  work  does  not  profess  to  be 
a  treatise  on  morals,  but  is  merely  an  in- 
quiry into  the  moral  nature  of  man,  nothing 
more  is  to  be  expected  than  a  general  state- 
ment of  the  principles  from  which  it  is  con- 

6 


122 


ceived  that  moral   doctrines   are   properly 
deduced.     We  may,  I  think,  safely  lay  it 
down,  that  moral  is  to  be  preferred  to  phy- 
sical good,  and,  of  course,  the  larger  to  the 
smaller  quantity  in  all  cases.     It  is  a  plea- 
sure to  all  to  follow  their  own  incUnations, 
or,  in  the  homely  language  often  used,  to 
have  their   own  way.     Nobody  is  fond  of 
being  restrained  from  indulging  his  wishes. 
A  kind  parent,  therefore,  will  desire  to  re- 
frain as  much  as  he  can  from  laying  re- 
straint upon  his  children  ;  but  if  the  parent 
be  wise  as  well  as  kind,  he  will  be  mind- 
ful of  the  importance  of  forming   in   the 
mind  of  his  child  that  habit  of  self-control, 
w^ithout  which  his  future  life  can  be  neither 
virtuous  nor  happy.     He  will  bear  in  mind, 
that  indulging  him  in  all  his  incUnations, 
even  those  which  are  in  themselves  indiffer- 
ent, will,  in  all  probability,  lay  the  foun- 
dation   of    a    self-willed    temper,    and    an 
impatience   of  restraint,    which   will  be   a 
source  of  great  unhappiness  to  himself  and 
others. 


123 


18.  Our  incompetence   to   trace  all  the 
consequences  of  our  actions  on  the  future 
well-being  of  ourselves  and  others,  creates 
the  necessity  of  rules  more  restricted  than 
what  may  be  justly  called  the  great  general 
rule  of  personal  and  social  morality,  that  a 
man  ought  in  all  cases  to  do  all  the  good, 
and  to  prevent  all  the  evil  in  his  power.     It 
must  not,  however,  be  lost  sight  of,  that  this 
is  the  universal  principle,  and  a  reference  to  it 
will  be  constantly  necessary  for  the  purpose 
of  assigning  proper  limits  to  our  other  moral 
rules,  to  ascertain  to  what  exceptions  they 
are  Uable,  and  to  decide  between  different 
rules  which  appear  to  be  conflicting  with 
each  other.     A  very  Httle  reflection  on  this 
subject  will  show  us  the  necessity  of  distin- 
guishing  between   general    and    particular 
consequences.     The  particular  consequence 
of  kiUing  a  wicked  rich  man,  who  makes 
use  of  his  riches  to  oppress  others  and  to 
promote  vice  and  immoraUty,  and  by  whose 
death  his  property  would  descend  to  a  son 
of  a  virtuous  character,  would  no  doubt  be 

g2 


124 


beneficial ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  per- 
mission to  kill  another  on  account  of  the 
bad  use  which  he  makes  of  his  property 
(and  if  allowed  in  one  case,  as  Paley  justly 
observes,  it  must  be  allowed  in  all,)  would 
be  a  most  pernicious  principle,  which  would 
fill  the  world  with  bloodshed,  and  make  men 
live  under  a  continual  apprehension  of  being 
assassinated.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  than 
that  this  general  evil  consequence  far  out- 
w^eighs  any  partial  good  which  can  be  ex- 
pected from  the  act  above-mentioned. 

19.  The  duty  of  children  to  obey  their 
parents  in  the  earlier  periods  of  life,  and  to 
treat  them  with  the  utmost  respect  and 
kindness  throughout  the  whole  of  their  lives, 
is  of  such  paramount  importance  to  the 
well-being  of  the  human  race  as  scarcely  to 
admit  of  any  exception,  although  there  are 
instances  in  which  the  conduct  of  the  pa- 
rent is  such  as  to  induce  one  to  think,  on 
the  first  view  of  the  subject,  that  the  child  is 
emancipated  from  the  filial  duties  altogether. 
Possibly  indeed  in  some  very  extreme  cases 


125 


this  may  be  allowed  ;  as  where  parents  have 
attempted  to  take  away  the  lives  of  their 
children ;  or  a  father  has  violated,  or  at- 
tempted to  violate,  his  own  daughter.  That 
the  history  of  the  world  contains  authentic 
accounts  of  such  moral  monsters  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt.  Putting  aside,  however, 
these  extreme  cases,  it  seems  plain,  that 
very  bad  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  parents 
will  not  exonerate  the  children  from  their 
fiUal  duties.  If  the  other  side  of  the  ques- 
tion be  taken,  the  consequence  will  be,  the 
utter  destruction  of  one  of  the  most  import- 
ant moral  principles.  Few  parents  do  their 
duty  to  their  children  in  all  particulars ; 
and  if  the  obhgation  of  the  child  to  obev, 
honor  and  succour  the  parent  were  allowed 
to  be  diminished  in  proportion  to  the  defect 
of  duty  on  the  part  of  the  parent,  a  conti- 
nual investigation  of  the  conduct  of  the  pa- 
rent would  be  going  on  in  the  minds  of  the 
children,  and  fihal  duty  would  be  continually 
weakening,  till  it  became  nothing  but  a 
name. 


126 

20.  The  obligation  to  perform  our  pro- 
mises is  a  very  important  rule  of  morals, 
yet  there  are  many  circumstances  which 
will  justify  a  man  in  breaking  his  promise. 
These  excepted  cases  are  admirably  summed 
up  by  Paley  (who  is  as  excellent  in  detail 
as  he  seems  to  me  to  be  erroneous  in  his 
general  principle)  in  the  5th  chapter  of  the 
3rd  book  of  the  '  Moral  Philosophy.'  TelUng 
a  falsehood  is  undoubtedly  in  general  a 
moral  offence ;  yet  few  will  doubt,  that  to 
''  tell  a  falsehood  to  a  madman  for  his  own 
advantage,  or  to  an  assassin  to  defeat  or 
divert  him  from  his  purpose"*^,"  and  many 
similar  cases,  which  might  easily  be  adduced, 
are  justifiable  on  moral  principles.  These 
are  instances  in  which  the  particular  bene- 
ficial consequences  outweigh  the  general  in- 
jurious one  of  the  breach  of  a  moral  rule, 
and  therefore  we  are  justified  by  our  great 
leading  principle,  '  that  we  ought  to  do  all 
the  good,  and  to  prevent  all  the  evil  in  our 
power/ — to  resort  to  falsehood  in  such  cases. 

*  Paley. 


127 


21.  No  question  which  respects  the  ne- 
cessity of  adhering  to  general  rules  has 
been  more  discussed,  and  few  perhaps  have 
more  difficulties,  than  that  of  the  right  of 
resistance  to  the  supreme  authority  of  the 
country  in  which  we  live.  The  absolute 
necessity  of  some  form  of  government  to 
restrain  the  bad  passions  of  men,  to  esta- 
blish and  to  preserve  rights  of  property,  and 
to  prevent  the  virtuous  part  of  society  from 
becoming  a  prey  to  those  whose  conduct  is 
unrestrained  by  religious  or  moral  princi- 
ples ;  and  the  undoubted  fact,  that  even 
constitutions  which  are  very  full  of  defects 
and  vices,  yield,  on  a  fair  comparison  of  their 
results,  a  great  balance  of  good  to  the  people  ; 
that  no  government  can  be  worse  than,  and 
scarcely  any  can  be  conceived  to  be  so  bad 
as,  a  state  of  anarchy ;  these  and  the  like 
considerations  have  often  disposed  good 
and  wise  persons  to  support  the  doctrine  of 
absolute  obedience  to  the  civil  government, 
with  no  exception  whatever. 

22.  One  of  the  ablest  defences  of    the 


128 


doctrine  in  question  is  contained  in  a  dis- 
course on  passive  obedience  by  that  most 
acute  and  able  writer,  and  truly  excellent 
man,  Bishop  Berkeley.  The  principle  which 
he  lays  down,  and  of  the  truth  of  which  he 
appears  to  entertain  an  unhesitating  convic- 
tion, is*,  that  ''  there  is  an  absolute  un- 
limited non-resistance  or  passive  obedience 
due  to  the  supreme  civil  power  wherever 
placed  in  any  nation."  After  laying  the 
foundation  of  morals  f  in  ''  the  Divine  will, 
or  the  general  design  of  Providence  with  re- 
gard to  mankind,  and  the  methods  most  di- 
rectly tending  to  the  accomplishment  of  that 
design,'' he  goes  on  to  state,  that  it  is  *'  the 
general  well-being  of  all  men,  of  all  nations, 
of  all  ages  of  the  world,  which  God  designs 
should  be  procured  by  the  concurrent  ac- 
tions of  each  individual.  The  well-being 
of  mankind,"  he  proceeds  to  say  j,  **  must 
necessarily  be  carried  on  in  one  of  these  two 
ways  :  either  first,  without  the  injunction  of 
any  certain  universal  rules  of  morality,  only 

*  Sect.  2.  t  Sect.  7.  X  Sect.  8. 


129 


by  obliging  every  one,  upon  each  particular 
occasion,  to  consult  the  public  good,  and 
always  to  do  that  which  to  him  shall  seem 
in  the  present  time  and  circumstances  most 
to  conduce  to  it  ;  or,  secondly,  by  enjoining 
the  observance  of  some  determinate,  esta- 
bUshed  laws,  which,  if  universally  practised, 
have,  from  the  nature  of  things,  an  essential 
fitness  to  procure  the  well-being  of  man- 
kind ;  though  in  their  particular  application 
they  are  sometimes,  through  untoward  acci- 
dents, and  the  perverse  irregularity  of  hu- 
man wills,  the  occasion  of  great  sufferings 
and  misfortunes,  it  may  be,  to  very  many 
good  men."  He  then  very  clearly  shows 
the  impracticability  of  adopting  the  first  of 
these  modes,  and,  of  course,  the  necessity 
of  resorting  to  the  second;  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  discourse  consists  of  reason- 
ing to  show  the  necessity,  and  of  exhorta- 
tions to  persuade  to  the  practice  of  abiding, 
under  all  circumstances,  by  the  rule  which 
requires  obedience  to  the  established  civil 
power  of  the  state. 

G  5 


130 


23.  Berkeley's  argument  is  pursued  with 
great  acuteness,  and  the  conclusion  from 
the  premises  assumed  seems  irresistible. 
The  question  therefore  is,  whether  the  pre- 
mises  themselves  be  sound.  It  is  certain 
that  the  doctrine  of  absolute  passive  obedi- 
ence has  fallen  into  great  disrepute,  and  very 
few  indeed  would  probably,  at  the  present 
day,  assert  it.  It  becomes,  therefore,  of 
importance  to  discover  the  foundation  of 
the  error  (if  such  it  be)  of  Berkeley  and 
other  supporters  of  the  doctrine  of  passive 
obedience. 

24.  Now  Berkeley's  error  seems  to  lie  in 
not  distinguishing  between  general  and  uni- 
versal rules.  No  one  has  shown  more 
clearly  than  this  eminent  author  the  neces- 
sity of  general  rules ;  but  he  always  calls 
them,  not  general  but  universal ;  and  there- 
in has,  it  is  conceived,  committed  a  great 
error. 

25.  We  have  seen,  that  the  proper  ob- 
jects of  our  relative  duties  are  the  produc- 
tion of  happiness  and  the  prevention  of  mi- 


131 


sery.  We  have  also  seen,  that  in  order  to 
accomplish  these  purposes,  it  is  necessary 
that  some  of  the  most  important  of  these 
rules,  as  in  the  case  of  promises  and  of  the 
obligation  to  tell  the  truth,  should  be  de- 
parted from  in  cases  where  the  particular 
evil  consequences  likely  to  result  from  the 
rule  are  such  as  to  outweigh  the  general 
beneficial  one  of  adhering  to  it ;  and  we 
have  justified  these  exceptions  by  the  ap- 
plication of  the  universal,  or  at  least  the 
most  general  rule  which  can  be  laid  down 
on  the  subject,  namely,  that  our  duty  re- 
quires us  to  produce  all  the  happiness,  and 
to  prevent  all  the  misery  in  our  power. 

26.  Let  us  now  consider  whether,  in  the 
language  of  Berkeley  (and  no  better  is  to  be 
found),  '*  the  general  well-being  of  all  men, 
of  all  nations,  of  all  ages  of  the  world,"  is 
likely  to  be  best  promoted  by  holding  the  rule 
of  obedience  to  established  government  to  be 
absolutely  universal ;  or  only  a  general  rule, 
subject  to  exception  in  extreme  cases  of 
misgovernment. 


132 

27.  No  reasonable  person  can  admit  the 
necessity  of  general  rules  in  morals,  without 
at  the  same  time  allowing  that,  in  order  to 
justify  a  departure  from  them,  an  excepted 
case  should  be  very  distinctly  made  out.  The 
absolute  necessity  of  some  sort  of  govern- 
ment to  protect  the  weak  from  the  aggression 
of  the  powerful ;  to  keep  peace  and  order  in 
society;  to  secure  the  rights  of  property, 
without  which  industry  cannot  be  expected 
to  exert  itself  to  procure  the  necessaries, 
comforts,  and  conveniences  of  life,  must  be 
obvious  to  all;  and  its  importance  is  as 
evident  as  its  necessity.  The  importance 
then  of  the  rule  which  requires  obedience 
to  the  established  authority  in  every  coun- 
try being  admitted,  the  question  to  be  con- 
sidered is,  whether  it  will  most  conduce  to 
the  good  of  mankind  that  the  rule  should 
be  held  to  be  universal,  or  that  it  should  be 
subject  to  some  exceptions. 

28.  The  best  means  of  coming  to  a  con- 
clusion on  this  subject  seem  to  be,  to  con- 
sider the  ordinary  effects  of  the  possession 


133 

of  power  on  the  human  character.  Now 
that  power  does  in  general  tend  to  corrupt 
the  mind,  appears  to  be  the  opinion  of  man- 
kind in  all  ages,  as  far  as  we  can  collect  it 
from  their  practice.  To  make  those  who 
possess  power  responsible  in  some  way  or 
other  is  the  universal  practice  of  all  nations, 
in  all  cases  except  that  of  the  supreme 
power  of  the  state.  Nothing  can  be  of 
greater  consequence  in  any  country  than  the 
independence  of  the  judicial  power ;  and, 
in  this  country,  that  independence  is  fully 
established;  but  even  in  the  case  of  the 
highest  judges  in  the  land  a  responsibility 
exists,  as  they  are  liable  to  be  removed 
from  their  offices  by  the  sovereign,  on  an 
address  from  both  houses  of  parHament  for 
that  purpose. 

29.  As  then  it  has  been  thought  neces- 
sary in  all  countries  to  make  the  possessors 
of  inferior  offices  responsible  to  the  supreme 
power  of  the  state— which  fact  satisfactorily 
proves,  that  by  the  common  opinion  of  man- 
kind power  is  likely  to  be  abused  unless  it 


M  iiiniiiiriiiiflii 


sat 


134 

be  subject  to  responsibility — it  becomes  a 
question  of  no  small  importance,  whether 
even  the  supreme  power  of  the  state  should 
not  be  held  responsible,  in  extreme  cases, 
to  the  people,  for  whose  good  all  political 
power  is  a  trust. 

30.  I  have  assumed  political  power  to  be 
a  trust  for  the  good  of  the  people,  because  it 
seems  to  be  universally  admitted  to  be  so. 
The  only  conceivable  reason  why  the  mass 
of  the  community  should  yield  obedience  to 
the  small  part  of  it  which  enjoys  political 
power,  is,  that  it  is  for  their  benefit  so  to  do. 
The  most  strenuous  supporters  of  the  doc- 
trine of  passive  obedience  do  not  deny  that 
sovereigns  are  answerable  to  God  for  their 
misdeeds ;  and  the  only  reason  why  they 
are  held  to  be  absolutely  irresponsible  to 
men  is,  that  the  w^ell-being  of  the  world  will 
be  advanced  by  a  strict  and  undeviating 
submission  to  the  rule  which  requires  obe- 
dience to  the  supreme  civil  power  of  the 
state.  The  first  question  then  to  be  decided 
is,  whether  the   supreme  power   in   every 


135 

country  is  Ukely  to  be  administered  most 
for  the  advantage  of  the  people  by  those 
who  possess  it  considering  themselves  irre- 
sponsible   to   any  human  power,  however 
unjust,  tyrannical  and  cruel  their  admini- 
stration of  government  may  be,  and  the  peo- 
ple feeling  bound  to  submit  to  any  tyranny 
which  the  sovereign  may  set  up;    or   by 
those  who  understand,  that  in  the  event  of 
their  misusing  the  power  which  they  enjoy 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  community  to 
their  oppression,  they  will  run  an  imminent 
risk  of  losing  the  power  which  has  been 
thus  abused.     No  reason  can  be  given  why 
the  good  effects  of  responsibiUty,  which  are 
acknowledged  to  exist  in  all  other  cases, 
should  not  equally  apply  to  this.     The  doc- 
trine,   therefore,    of  unlimited    obedience, 
under  all    circumstances,   to  the  supreme 
power,  must  fall  to  the  ground,  unless  it  can 
be  supported  on  some  other  ground. 

31.  But  though  it  cannot  be  denied,  that 
an  apprehension  that  a  day  of  retribution 
may  come  will  operate  as  a  motive  to  pre- 


136 

vent  tyrannical  and  oppressive  rule  by  the 
supreme  power  of  the  state,  yet  it  may  be 
very  plausibly  said,  that  allowing  resistance 
by  force  to  the  supreme  power  in  any 
case,  will  infallibly  lead  to  such  disloyalty 
to  legitimate  government,  and  to  such  an 
interference  by  the  people  at  large  with  the 
supreme  power,  as  will  give  an  anarchical 
character  to  the  state  of  society,  which  will 
far  outweigh  the  evils  (great  as  they  must 
be  admitted  to  be)  which  arise  from  the 
acts  of  tyranny  sometimes  resorted  to  by 
the  supreme  power.  But  notwithstanding 
the  plausibility  of  this  argument,  it  will 
admit  of  a  ready  and  satisfactory  answer. 
Let  us  steadily  bear  in  mind  that  we  are 
pursuing  an  investigation  of  a  question  of 
morals,  and  inquiring  what  principles  should 
be  adopted  by  those  who  really  desire  to 
regulate  their  conduct  by  a  just  and  sound 
principle.  It  makes  nothing  in  such  an 
inquiry,  that  many  will  be  found  to  act 
without  regard  to  the  just  limitation  of  the 
principle  for  which  we  are  contending.    The 


137 

rules  of  morality  are  unhappily  but  little 
regarded  by  a  large  portion  of  mankind. 
Lay  down  what  rules  we  may,  they  will  be 
only  partially  respected.  The  seltish  and 
unprincipled  will  not  be  prevented  from 
pursuing  a  career  of  disloyalty,  and  from 
resorting  to  rebellion  against  the  supreme 
power  whenever  they  think  that  their  in- 
terests will  be  advanced  by  their  doing  so, 
be  our  theories  what  they  may.  It  is  of  no 
use  to  tell  a  man  that  a  strict  moral  rule 
forbids  his  resisting  the  supreme  power  of 
the  state  on  any  occasion,  when  his  whole 
conduct  plainly  shows  that  he  has  no  regard 
for  moral  rules,  and  that  he  disdains  to  re- 
gulate his  conduct  by  them.  In  endeavour- 
ing to  ascertain  the  probable  consequences 
of  embracing  one  or  the  other  side  of  the 
disputed  question,  we  have  only  to  look  to 
those  who  really  intend  to  regulate  their 
conduct  by  the  principle  which  they  believe 
to  be  the  right  one. 

32.  Is  it  then  hkely  to  produce  the  most 
beneficial  results,  not  merely  in  this  or  that 


138 

particular  country,  but  in  all  countries,  that 
those  who  are  really  disposed  to  regulate 
their  conduct  by  moral  principles  should 
entertain  the  opinion  that  resistance  to  the 
civil  power  may  be  justified  in  extreme 
cases,  rather  than  the  doctrine  of  unlimited 
passive  obedience,  however  unjust,  tyran- 
nical, and  cruel  a  government  may  be? 

33.  The  only  good  suggested  to  arise 
from  the  doctrine  of  passive  obedience  is, 
that  it  prevents  anarchy,  which  is  said  to 
be  worse  than  the  worst  government.  The 
argument  on  the  other  side  is,  that  the  doc- 
trine of  passive  obedience  is  a  direct  encou- 
ragement to  those  who  possess  the  supreme 
power  in  any  country  to  abuse  it,  whenever 
they  may  feel  disposed  to  do  so,  by  taking 
away  (so  far  as  it  operates)  all  terror  of 
responsibiUty  for  their  tyrannical  acts. 

34.  The  evil  likely  to  result  from  the 
prevalence  of  the  doctrine  of  passive  obe- 
dience is  so  obvious,  and  its  injurious  ef- 
fects are  likely  to  have  so  large  an  extension, 
as  to  render  it  quite  unnecessary  to  go  in 


I 


139 

detail  into  the  subject;  the  stress,  there- 
fore, of  the  argument  must  be  on  the  other 
side ;  and  the  opposers  of  the  doctrine  of 
passive  obedience  are  mainly  concerned  to 
show  that  the  apprehensions  of  the  anarchy 
which  would  result  from  the  adoption  of 
the  principle,  that  the  tyranny  of  the  su- 
preme power  may,  in  extreme  cases,  be 
resisted  by  force,  has  been  carried  much 
further  than  reason  will  warrant ;  and  that 
the  mischief  which  may  probably  result 
from  the  adoption  of  that  principle  is  not 
likely  to  be  of  such  an  extent  as  to  over- 
balance the  probable  evils  resulting  from 
the  opposite  opinion. 

35.  It  will  perhaps  tend  to  lessen  an  at- 
tachment to  the  principle  of  unlimited  pas- 
sive obedience  to  observe,  that  the  preser- 
ving of  the  people  from  a  state  of  anarchy, 
which  is  considered  to  be  its  great  excel- 
lence, can  hardly  take  place,  except  under 
despotic  governments,  and  not  always  there. 
If  we  look  into  history,  we  shall  usually  find 
that,  in  all  free  countries,  rebellions  and 


140 

civil  wars  have  been,  at  least  in  part,  occa- 
sioned by  a  contest  for  the  right  to  possess 
the  supreme  power,  or  a  portion  of  it.  In 
our  own  country,  the  wars  between  Wil- 
liam and  Harold,  and  the  Empress  Maud 
and  Stephen,  arose  out  of  a  disputed  suc- 
cession ;  and  in  all  such  cases  the  principle 
of  passive  obedience  cannot  prevent  the 
evils  arising  from  civil  war,  and  the  partial 
anarchy  which  attends  it.  One  who  really 
beUeved  that  WiUiam  the  Norman  had  de- 
rived a  just  title  from  Edward  the  Con- 
fessor (as  he  professed  to  have  done)  to 
the  throne  of  England,  could  never  have 
been  induced  to  think  that  Harold  was,  in 
any  proper  sense,  in  possession  of  the  royal 
authority  from  the  mere  circumstance  of 
WiUiam  being  out  of  the  kingdom  at  the 
death  of  the  Confessor.  The  case  of  the 
Empress  Maud  is  still  stronger,  as  her  title 
to  the  crown  was  undoubted,  and  Stephen 
was  a  mere  usurper,  without  a  shadow  of 
right.  But  supposing,  in  these  contests,  it 
should  be  held  that  Harold  and  Stephen 


141 

were  really  in  possession  of  the  sovereign 
authority,  and  consequently  entitled  to  the 
unlimited  obedience  of  their  subjects,  still 
many  other  cases  may  arise,  as  where,  on 
the  death  of  the  sovereign,  a  doubt  exists 
as  to  who  is  really  his  heir,  and  both  parties 
claiming  to  be  so  get  possession  of  some 
part  of  the  country.  This  is  a  state  of 
things  which  may  happen,  as  well  in  a 
despotic  as  in  a  free  country ;  and  when  it 
does  take  place,  the  doctrine  of  passive 
obedience  does  not  at  all  operate  to  prevent 
the  evils  of  anarchy,  or  at  least  of  civil  war. 
36.  In  a  free  country,  contests  for  politi- 
cal power  very  generally  arise  between  those 
parties,  who,  by  the  principles  of  the  con- 
stitution, possess  some  share  of  it ;  and  the 
dispute  consists  of  conflicting  claims  re- 
specting the  boundaries  of  the  constitu- 
tional authority  of  the  contending  parties. 
In  the  great  civil  war  between  Charles  the 
First  and  the  parliament,  the  respective 
supporters  of  the  two  sides,  no  doubt, 
thought  that  the  powers  in  contention  be- 


142 

tween  the  king  and  the  parliament  belonged 
to  the  side  which  they  espoused,  and  each 
party  professed  to  act  as  if  they  were  actu- 
ally in  possession  of  those  powers,  as  no 
doubt  they  were  thought  by  themselves 
to  be. 

37.  The  state  of  anarchy  which  is  said  to 
arise  from  resistance  to  the  supreme  power 
of  a  state  is,  after  all,  a  fiction.  No  such 
state  does  or  can  arise.  Civil  war  is  in- 
deed, undoubtedly,  one  of  the  greatest  cala- 
mities which  can  befall  a  countrv,  and  its 
evils  can  hardly  be  exaggerated,  but  they 
still  fall  short  of  a  state  of  mere  anarchy. 
Perhaps  the  most  wretched  periods  of  our 
own  history  were  the  civil  wars  of  Maud 
and  Stephen,  and  of  the  White  and  Red 
Roses  ;  but  the  country  was,  even  in  its 
worst  state,  certainly  not  altogether  with- 
out some  regular  government.  The  great 
civil  war  between  Charles  and  the  parlia- 
ment was  followed  by  a  very  tyrannical 
government  set  up  by  Cromwell ;  and  there 
has  seldom  been  a  time  when  the  existing 


143 

government  of  the  country  has  been  less 
powerful  for  any  beneficial  purpose  than 
during  the  period  which  elapsed  between 
the  death  of  that  extraordinary  man  and 
the  restoration  of  Charles  the  Second ;  yet 
it  may  well  be  doubted  whether,  at  either 
of  the  two  last-mentioned  periods,  the  people 
were  exposed  to  greater  calamities  than  those 
which  were  occasioned  by  the  unopposed 
tyranny  of  Henry  the  Eighth.  We  may 
add,  that  that  state  of  imperfect  obedience 
to  existing  authority,  which  is  sometimes 
called  anarchy,  never  lasts  long,  but  is  sure 
to  be  succeeded,  at  no  great  distance  of 
time,  by  a  regular  government  of  some  sort 
or  other. 

38.  It  will  not,  it  is  hoped,  be  inferred 
from  anything  which  has  been  said,  that 
the  author  of  these  observations  esteems 
resistance  to  the  supreme  power  of  the  state 
as  any  other  than  a  most  awful  necessity ; 
never  to  be  resorted  to  but  in  extreme 
cases,  and  about  which  every  conscientious 
man  will  feel  himself  bound  deeply  and 


144 

anxiously  to  consider,  before  he  embraces 
the  bold  and  hazardous  step  of  opposing 
by  force  the  government  under  which  he  is 
living.  But  it  seems  that  the  circumstances 
of  the  great  importance  of  the  measure,  the 
peril  of  the  individual  who  engages  in  it, 
and  the  evils  to  which  it  can  hardly  fail  to 
lead,  even  when  just  in  its  principle  and 
successful  in  its  termination,  afford  argu- 
ments in  favor  of  admitting  a  right  in  the 
people  to  resist  tyranny  by  force.  We  are 
inquiring  by  what  principles  a  moral,  con- 
scientious man  should  regulate  his  conduct ; 
and  there  can  scarcely  be  conceived  a  more 
satisfactory  guarantee  against  his  going 
wrong,  than  the  belief  that  the  laudable  end 
at  which  he  aims  cannot  be  accomplished 
without  occasioning  some  evils,  and  often 
very  great  ones,  which  will  be  a  drawback, 
to  the  extent  in  which  they  exist,  from  the 
good  to  be  obtained  by  the  successful  result 
of  the  intended  resistance. 

39.  What  I  had  to  say  on  this  subject 
may  be  summed  up  as  follows  : — Resistance 


145 


to  the  supreme  power  of  a  state  is  likely,  in 
almost  all  cases,  to  produce  a  great  deal  of 
injury  and  suffering  to  the  community ; 
nevertheless  cases  will  at  times  arise  when 
the  oppressive  and  tyrannical  conduct  of  a 
government  is  such  as  to  render  it  probable 
that  the  evils  resulting  from  resistance  will 
not  be  so  great  as  those  which  will  follow 
from  submission  to  the  tyrannical  acts  of 
the  government.  When  these  extreme  cases 
occur,  a  man  is  fully  justified^  by  a  regard 
to  the  well-being  of  the  whole  community, 
to  resist  by  force  the  supreme  authority  of 
his  country.  It  is  obvious,  as  Paley  justly 
observes,  that  as  '*  in  contentions  between 
the  sovereign  and  the  subject,  the  parties 
acknowledge  no  common  arbitrator,  every 
man  must  judge  for  himself"  when  the 
right  to  resist  arises. 

40.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add,  that 
every  conscientious  man  must  feel  himself 
bound  to  consider  the  subject  deeply  before 
he  resolves  to  enter  on  so  hazardous  and 
uncertain  an  enterprise  as  that  of  opposing 

H 


146 

by  force  the  established  government  of  his 
country.  Among  the  subjects  of  considera- 
tion, one  of  the  most  important  is  the  pro- 
babiUty  of  success.  This  must  be  decidedly 
preponderant  to  justify  resistance.  The  de- 
gree of  probabiUty  must,  as  well  as  all  other 
circumstances  of  the  case,  be  left  to  the  pri- 
vate judgment  of  each  individual ;  and  no 
well-intentioned  man  will  engage  in  such  an 
enterprise  till  he  has  fully  satisfied  himself 
that  there  exists  a  high  degree  of  proba- 
bility of  succeeding.  All  attempts  of  a 
single  individual,  or  of  a  small  number  of 
individuals,  to  effect  a  revolution  or  a  change 
in  the  government  by  force,  are  evidently 
unjustifiable,  as  there  is  little  chance  of  such 
efforts  succeeding. 

41.  It  is  quite  essential,  before  we  resort 
to  force,  that  everv  constitutional  and  peace- 
able  means  of  redress  should  be  tried.  It 
must  always,  too,  be  borne  in  mind,  when 
the  necessity  of  forcible  resistance  to  ty^ 
ranny  arises,  that  a  great  evil  is  to  be 
endured,  for  the  sake  of  putting  an  end  to 


147 

a  still  greater ;  and  that  a  state  of  insur- 
rection and  civil  war  is  never  to  be  entered 
upon  but  with  the  greatest  reluctance,  and 
with  a  sincere  desire  to  bring  it  to  a  close 
at  the  earliest  possible  period.  In  engaging 
in  such  a  violent  cause,  we  are  bound  to 
take  such  measures  as  are  most  likely 
speedily  to  end  it ;  "  bellum  ita  suscipiatur 
ut  nihil  aliud  nisi  pax  qu8esita  videatur"*." 
This  observation  is  just,  as  applied  to  every 
war;  and  the  doctrine  it  inculcates  ought 
never  to  be  lost  sight  of  by  those  who 
think  it  their  duty  to  engage  in  resistance 
to  the  supreme  power  of  the  state,  which 
will  probably  end  in  a  civil  war. 

*  Cic.  de  Off.,  i.  23. 


H  2 


148 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  MORAL  SENTIMENT. 

1.  We  have  now  arrived  at  the  period  when, 
in  pursuance  of  the  analysis  of  our  moral 
principles  contained  in  the  early  part  of 
this  essay,  it  will  be  necessary  to  enter  on 
the  subject  of  those  moral  sentiments  which 
we  have  considered  to  be  a  part  of  our 
nature,  and  distinguishable  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  self-love  and  benevolence. 

2.  It  has  been  already  stated,  that  the 
words  Moral  Sentiment  have  been  adopted 
as  being,  on  the  whole  (though  liable  to 
objection),  the  best  calculated  to  express 
those  feelings  of  our  moral  nature  which 
we  may  say  terminate  in  themselves,  and 
are  universally  considered  laudable,  without 


149 

regard  to  any  consequences,  immediate  or 
remote. 

3.  The  objection  to  the  admission  of 
these  principles,  which  will  immediately 
present  itself  to  the  mind,  is,  that  the  only 
desirable  end  of  existence  is  happiness  ;  and 
that  an  action  or  sentiment  which  has  no 
tendency  to  produce  happiness,  either  to 
ourselves  or  to  others,  must  be  in  its  moral 
nature  indifferent. 

4.  Formidable  as  this  objection  may  ap- 
pear, the  following  considerations  seem  suf- 
ficient to  show  that  it  does  not  present  an 
insuperable  objection  to  the  principles  for 
which  we  are  contending.  The  object  of 
the  last  chapter  was  to  show  that  benevo- 
lence, or  a  disinterested  regard  to  the  well- 
being  of  others,  is  a  moral  principle  of  our 
nature  ;  and  this  was  argued  from  the  ap- 
probation which  it  universally  receives  in  the 
world.  Now  it  will  be  found,  that  those 
dispositions  of  the  mind  to  which  we  have 
given  the  name  of  moral  sentiments,  and 
which  we  have  considered  to  terminate  in 


I 


150 

themselves,  are  distinguished  by  the  same 
character  of  universal  approbation.  The 
virtue  called  gratitude  was  particularly  spe- 
cified, and  it  was  stated  that  the  approba- 
tion of  this  virtue  seems  to  be  quite  uni- 
versal. Assuming  this  to  be  true,  we  will 
proceed  to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  grati- 
tude, and  how  it  comes  to  be  universally 
considered  a  virtue. 

5.  Gratitude  being  admitted  to  be  a  virtue, 
it  must  belong  either  to  the  first  or  to  the 
second  class  of  virtues  already  enumerated  ; 
in  other  words,  it  must  be  a  virtue,  because 
it  contributes  either  to  our  own  greatest  hap- 
piness or  to  that  of  others  ;  or  if  neither  of 
these  tendencies  can  account  for  its  being 
universally  considered  a  virtue,  we  must 
look  for  some  other  foundation.  Now  that 
gratitude  has  not  universally  a  tendency  to 
advance  our  happiness,  by  procuring  any 
thing  external  for  our  advantage,  is  clear. 
Our  benefactor  may  be  in  a  state  of  poverty 
and  sickness,  and  utterly  unable  to  do  any- 
thing to  forward  our  interests  \  but  these 


151 

circumstances  are  never  allowed  to  be  an 
excuse  for  a  want  of  gratitude  on  our  part. 
The  only  way,  then,  in  which  gratitude  can 
universally  advance  our  happiness,  is,  that 
the  feeling  of  gratitude  is  in  itself  plea- 
surable. This  we  shall  consider  presently. 
6.  As  gratitude  does  not  in  all  cases  lead 
to  results  beneficial  to  ourselves,  it  is  quite 
clear  that  it  does  not,  of  necessity,  procure 
happiness  to  others.  The  person  obUged 
may  be  in  such  a  situation  as  to  be  without 
the  power  of  doing  anything  for  the  ser- 
vice of  him  to  whom  he  owes  an  obligation  ; 
but  that  circumstance  is  never  held  to  ab- 
solve him  from  the  duty  of  gratitude.  Our 
highest  gratitude  is  due  to  the  Author  of 
our  being ;  but  it  is  certain  that  no  efforts 
of  ours  can  augment  his  happiness.  The 
duty  of  gratitude,  therefore,  does  not  derive 
its  obligation  from  its  tendency  to  advance 
the  happiness  of  the  person  who  has  con- 
ferred the  obligation,  and  it  is  obvious  that 
it  has  no  direct  tendency  to  promote  the 
happiness  of  any  other  individual. 


I 


152 

7.  That  gratitude  is  generally  a  plea- 
surable state  of  mind  cannot  be  doubted ;  and 
the  same  assertion  may  be  made  of  all  the 
virtues,  the  whole  of  which  have  undoubt- 
edly a  tendency  to  make  their  possessor 
happy.  Virtue  is,  in  truth,  the  proper  busi- 
ness of  the  human  race.  It  may,  however, 
easily  happen,  that  the  sentiment  of  grati- 
tude, in  particular  instances,  produces  far 
more  pain  than  pleasure  ;  as  where  the 
benefactor  is  in  a  situation  which  makes 
him  unhappy.  The  grateful  mind  must 
strongly  wdll  the  happiness  of  him  to  whom 
it  owes  the  debt  of  gratitude,  and  of  course 
must  greatly  sympathize  with  him  in  what- 
ever circumstances  he  may  be  placed.  It  is 
plain  then  that  sympathy  with  a  suffering 
benefactor  may  greatly  outweigh  the  satis- 
faction which  generally  flows  from  the  sen- 
timent of  gratitude.  But  the  circumstance 
that  the  benefactor  is  a  prisoner,  or  suffer- 
ing a  painful  disease,  is  never  held  to  dis- 
charge the  obhgation  of  gratitude  in  the 
person  whom  he  has  obhged. 


153 

8.  It  seems  impossible  for  those  who  ad- 
mit that  the  virtuous  character,  which  is 
universally  ascribed  to  gratitude,  is  not  de- 
rived from  its  tendency  to  promote  either 
our  ow^n  happiness  or  that  of  others,  to 
avoid  the  conclusion,  that  the  sentiment  of 
gratitude  is  a  part  of  our  moral  nature. 
Neither  is  there  any  great  difficulty  in  co- 
ming to  this  conclusion  ;  nor  is  it  in  any  way 
inconsistent  with  any  acknowledged  truth, 
or  with  any  moral  doctrine,  admitted  by 
those  who  allow  a  moral  system  independent 
of  mere  self-interest.  So  entirely  are  all 
agreed  in  accounting  gratitude  a  part  of 
virtue,  that  it  is  never  conceived  possible 
that  a  good  man  should  be  without  it.  I 
cannot  tell  how  others  think  and  feel  on 
this  subject,  but  to  my  mind  there  is  some- 
thing closely  approaching  to  a  contradic- 
tion and  an  absurdity  in  imagining  a  be- 
nevolent man  without  gratitude  to  his  bene- 
factor. Benevolence  and  gratitude  appear 
to  be  in  every  instance  united ;  and  all  our 
experience  seems  to  show  that  they  cannot 

h5 


154 

be  severed.  Never  vet  has  the  world  seen 
a  man  accounted  virtuous,  of  whose  cha- 
racter gratitude  formed  no  part.  It  may, 
therefore,  be  properly  considered  an  essen- 
tial part  of  our  moral  nature. 

9.  The  sense  of  shame  seems  also  to  be 
an  original  moral  principle  ;  its  tendency  is 
indeed  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  the  act  of 
which  we  feel  ashamed ;  but  the  question 
is,  why  do  we  feel  shame  at  all?  and  the 
proper  answer  seems  to  be,  that  certain 
actions  are  in  themselves  indecorous,  and 
unsuitable  to  a  moral  being,  and  that  we 
are  formed  by  nature  to  feel  them  to  be  so. 
To  this  principle  may  be  referred  all  acts 
of  indecency  and  impropriety,  instances  of 
which  will  readily  suggest  themselves  to 
every  reflecting  person,  but  an  enumeration 
of  them  would  expose  us  to  the  very  feeling 
of  self-reproach  of  which  we  are  treating. 

10.  In  one  sense,  indeed,  and  that  a  most 
important  one,  the  moral  sentiments  of 
which  we  have  been  treating  may  be  re- 
ferred to  our  own  happiness,  as  they  are  es- 


155 


sential  to  a  perfect  moral  character.  If  the 
doctrine  intended  to  be  inculcated  in  this 
essay  be  true,  that  morality  is  part  of  our 
nature,  it  follows  that  none  but  the  virtuous 
can  be  happy  ;  for  no  one  probably  will 
contend  that  the  well-being  of  any  creature 
can  be  attained  by  acting  contrary  to  its 
nature ;  and,  in  truth,  all  we  know  of  hu- 
man nature  seems  to  confirm  this  opi- 
nion. 


156 


CHAPTER  V. 

GENERAL  VIEW  OF  HUMAN  NATURE. 

1.  The  errors  contained  in  the  different 
ethical  theories  which  have  been  proposed 
for  the  re2:ulation  of  the  conduct  of  man- 
kind,  have  apparently  arisen  much  more 
frequently  from  a  partial  view  of  human 
nature  than  from  any  other  cause.  This 
might  be  fully  and  satisfactorily  made  out 
by  an  examination  of  the  various  systems 
of  moral  duty,  which  in  different  ages  and 
countries  have  been  presented  to  the  world. 
As  the  work  now  offered  to  the  public  does 
not  profess  to  be  a  history  of  ethical  philo- 
sophy, or  even  a  sketch  of  its  history,  but 
is  merely  an  investigation  of  its  principles, 
it  will  not  be  attempted  to  go  into  the  proof 
of  what  has  just  been  advanced ;  which,  it 


157 

is  however  believed,  will  be  readily  admitted 
to  be  true  by  those  who  are  conversant  with 
ethical  inquiries. 

2.  Man,  according  to  the  view  of  human 
nature  contained  in  this  essay,  is^  a  being 
coinpgunded   of  appetites  and   passions,  a 

-»-.«»»,j  „,..,,   „j^,,,^,.^^„.^,,^^.„,.«. ^  .V.-.,  ,.--  ^  >-r«. 

moral  and  a  _  rational^  natj^^  A1L-.!M?-? 
parts  of  his  nature  are  given,  by  the  Great 
Being  who  formed  him,  for  the  most  bene- 
ficial ends,  and,  when  rightly  directed,  tend 
to  advance  the  general  happiness  of  the 
species,  and  that  of  each  individual.  Each 
of  them  ought  to  exert  its  proper  degree  of 
influence  on  his  conduct ;  and  the  inferior 
part  of  his  nature  should  be  held  in  subjec- 
tionjx)  the  superior.  In  the  first  stages  of 
his  existence  he  is  a  mere  creature  of  appe- 
tite ;  from  his  appetites  his  passions  are 
compounded ;  and,  by  slow  degrees,  his 
moral  and  his  rational  nature  unfold  them- 
selves, and  assert  their  superiority.  His 
moral  nature  tells  him  that  he  must  restrain 
his  appetites  and  passions  whenever  the  in- 
dulgence of  them  is  inconsistent  with  his 


\ 


/ 


158 

own  future  welfare,  or  with  the  good  of 
others ;  and  his  reason  shows  him  that  his 
moral  principles  require  to  be  directed  in 
their  action  by  rational  considerations.  The 
unrestrained  indulgence  of  his  appetite  is 
alike  condemned  by  his  moral  sense  and  by 
his  reason,  and  infalUbly  tends  to  degrada- 
tion and  misery.  His  passions,  given  for 
the  best  of  purposes,  are  Uable,  from  excess 
or  from  wrong  direction,  to  become  instru- 
ments of  misery  to  himself  and  others.  His 
moral  feelings,  when  indulged  without  re- 
gard to  consequences,  often  lead  to  great 
evils,  and  produce  the  very  results  which  he 
is  anxious  to  avoid  ;  and  reason  itself,  when 
it  vainly  attempts  to  absorb  the  whole  man, 
and  seeks  the  annihilation  of  the  appetites, 
passions,  and  moral  sentiments,  leads  to  re- 
sults most  unfavorable  to  virtue  and  to  hap- 
piness. It  is  only  when  all  the  principles 
of  our  nature  move  harmoniously  together, 
that  human  nature  attains  its  highest  excel- 
lence. 

3.  That  the  appetites  and  passions  should 


159 

be  restrained  by  reason,  no  one  doubts;  and 
it  is  quite  clear,  that  the  best  of  the  moral 
feelings,  as  compassion  and  mercy,  require 
to  be  restrained  and  guided  by  rational  con- 
siderations.    Mercy  would  prompt  a  judge 
to  pardon  all  criminals,  but  reason  shows 
that  the  infallible  result  would  be  the  en- 
couragement of  crime.     Compassion  would 
dispose  us  to  relieve  suffering  in  all  cases, 
but  reason  will   speedily  inform  us,  that  if 
all  the  evils  which  men  bring  upon  them- 
selves by  imprudence,  folly,  and  the   im- 
proper indulgence  of  the  appetites  and  pas- 
sions, were  to  be  remedied  by  the  benevolent 
exertions  of  others,  a  most  important  re- 
straint on  evil  actions  would  be  removed  ; 
and  that  the  good  of  society  demands  that 
men  should  suffer  those  evils  which  natu- 
rally result  from  their  bad  conduct,  and  that 
duty  can  only  require  us  to  relieve  them 
when  they  become   excessive.      The  kind 
and  tender  feelings  of  parents  to  their  chil- 
dren require  to  be  continually  checked  and 
guided  by  reason,  as  must  be  felt  by  all 


160 

those  who  have  witnessed  (and  who  has  not?) 
the  unhappy  effects  of  over-much  indul- 
gence. Resentment  of  injuries  is  necessary 
in  order  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  them  ; 
but  when  carried  beyond  its  proper  limits, 
it  is  inconsistent  with  those  feelings  of 
benevolence  with  which  we  ought  to  re- 
gard our  fellow-creatures.  It  is  the  busi- 
ness of  reason  to  find  out  what  are  the  pro- 
per limits  within  which  resentment  should 
be  restrained  =*.  A  regard  to  the  reputation 
of  others  is  a  truly  virtuous  sentiment,  and 
we  ought  to  be  very  sure  that  we  proceed 
upon  good  grounds  when  we  censure  them. 
It  must,  however,  never  be  lost  sight  of,  that 
the  freely  canvassing  of  each  other's  actions 
is  one  of  the  most  important  preservatives 
of  good  conduct.  Every  one  is  aware  that 
his  actions  will  be  observed  and  commented 
upon  by  his  acquaintance  and  those  to  whom 

♦  For  a  full  and  just  account  of  the  nature  of  resent- 
ment as  a  moral  principle,  see  Bishop  Butler's  admirable 
Sermons  on  Resentment  and  Forgiveness  of  Injuries. 


161 

he  is  known,  and  that  every  base  and  dis- 
honorable action  of  which  he  is  guilty  will 
draw  upon  him  the  censure  of  the  world. 
Can  it  then  be  doubted,  that,  but  for  this 
consequence,  dishonourable  and  base  actions 
would  be  far  more  frequent  than  they  are  at 

present  ? 

4.  It  is  very  difficult  to  settle  the  exact 
boundaries  within  which  our  benevolent 
feelings  should  be  allowed  to  regulate  our 
conduct,  and  to  discover  the  precise  degree 
in  which  those  feelings  should  be  restrained 
by  reason.  It  is  quite  possible  to  endeavour 
to  be  too  rational ;  and  in  many  cases  the 
ordinary  promptings  of  our  natural  feelings 
should  be  given  way  to,  although  reason 
may  suggest  strong  doubts  as  to  the  proba- 
ble effects  of  our  conduct.  It  is  of  extreme 
importance  that  we  should  do  nothing  to 
check  the  current  of  our  benevolent  feelings. 
He  who  allows  himself  to  behold  any  object 
of  distress  unmoved,  however  deserved  the 
distress  may  be,  is  in  the  way  of  becoming 
hard-hearted  and  indifferent  to  the  sufl^rings 


162 

of  his  fellow-creatures.     Tliere  is,  perhaps, 
no  subject  in  which  the  conflict  between 
our  benevolent  feeUngs  and  our  reason  leads 
to  greater  difficulties  than  the  case  of  giving 
relief  to  common  beggars.      There   is   no 
doubt  that  a  great  majority  of  persons  of  this 
description  are  impostors,  and  that  by  giving 
indiscriminately  to  common  beggars,  we  are 
encouraging  idleness  and  profligacy  ;  but, 
on   the    other   hand,   there   are   assuredly 
among  them  many  cases  of  severe,  and  some 
of  unmerited  distress,  and  the  habit  of  in- 
discriminately  refusing    rehef    can   hardly 
fail  to  harden  the  heart.     Paley's  observa- 
tions on  this  subject  are  excelleat.     *'  I  by 
no  means  approve  the  indiscriminate  rejec- 
tion of  all  w^ho  implore  our  alms  in  this  way. 
Some  may  perish  by  such  a  conduct.     Men 
are   sometimes  overtaken   by  distress,  for 
which  all  other  relief  would  come  too  late. 
Besides  which,  resolutions  of  this  kind  com- 
pel us  to  offer  such  violence  to  our  huma- 
nity, as  may  go  near,  in  a  little  while,  to 
suflfocate  the  principle  itself ;  which  is  a  very 


163 

serious  consideration.  A  good  man,  if  he 
do  not  surrender  himself  to  his  feelings 
without  reserve,  will  at  least  lend  an  ear  to 
importunities  which  come  accompanied  with 
outward  attestations  of  distress ;  and  after 
a  patient  audience  of  the  complaint,  will  di- 
rect himself,  not  so  much  by  any  previous 
resolution  which  he  may  have  formed  upon 
the  subject,  as  by  the  circumstances  and 
credibility  of  the  account  that  he  receives=^." 
It  mav  be  observed,  too,  that  the  course 
thus  recommended,  is,  after  all,  really  the 
most  rational  course. 

5.  The  question,  whether  mercy  ought  to 
be  extended  to  a  criminal,  is  often  attended 
wdth  very  great  difficulties.  The  primary 
object  of  punishment  is  the  prevention  of 
crime;  the  secondary,  the  reformation  of 
the  criminal.  A  third  legitimate  object  of 
punishment  is  reparation  to  the  injured 
party,  which  has  been  strangely  overlooked 
in  penal  legislation  ;  but  this  matter  has  no 
relation  to  the  subject  before  us.     All  pu- 

*  Moral  Philosophy,  book  III.  part  2.  ch.  5.  §  3. 


164 

nishment  is  in  itself  an  evil,  and  to  justify 
its  infliction,  there  must  be  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  a  greater  good  accruing  to 
society.  It  may  therefore  be  safely  laid 
down,  that  punishment  ought  always  to  be 
remitted,  when  it  can  be  done  without  injury 
to  society,  or  to  the  criminal  himself.  The 
difficulty  is  to  discover  when  this  is  really 
the  case ;  and  this  can  only  be  determined 
by  a  consideration  of  the  particular  cir- 
cumstances of  each  case.  It  is  obvious 
that  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down 
upon  the  subject.  None  but  the  igno- 
rant, the  uncandid,  and  the  unreflecting 
will  form  a  judgment  of  any  man's  whole 
character  from  one  particular  action.  Even 
crimes  of  great  enormity  have  been  some- 
times committed  by  those  whose  general  cha- 
racters were  by  no  means  bad.  It  is  a  just 
observation  of  a  late  writer'^,  that  probably 
no  man  ever  lived  whose  character  would 
fully  realize  the  idea  which  we  form  of  a 
murderer.     Many  years  ago  a  case  occurred 

*  Hazlitt,  I  believe,  for  I  quote  from  memory. 


165 

of  a  man,  whose  general  character  was  good, 
murdering  his  master  and  mistress,  to  the 
commission  of  which  crime  no  intelligible 
motive  has  ever   been  assigned  ;    and  his 
own  account  of  which  was,  that  he  felt  a 
sudden  and  irresistible  impulse  to  commit 
the  murders.     The  greatest  of  poets,  in  (to 
my  taste)  the  greatest  of  his  works,  presents 
us  with  an  account  of  the  murder  of  an  in- 
nocent and  amiable  wife  by  her  husband ;  and 
so  admirably  deUneated  are  the  wicked  and 
subtle  contrivances  of  the  wretch  by  whom 
the  abused  and  deceived  husband  is  led  on 
to  the  commission  of  the  crime,  that  every 
reader  finishes  the  play  with  unmixed  pity 
for  Othello,  and  makes  the  infamous  lago 
the  object  of  all  the  just  indignation  which 
the  perpetration  of  the  crime  is  calculated 
to  excite. 


166 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF  A  FUTURE  STATE. 

1.  The  most  important  questions  which  a 
man  can  ask  of  himself  are,  shall  I  Hve 
again  after  death,  and  what  will  be  ray  con- 
dition, if  there  be  a  future  state  of  existence? 
The  utmost  levity  of  character,  the  most 
unreasonable  scepticism,  the  greatest  reck- 
lessness as  to  future  events,  and  even  aban- 
doned wickedness  itself,  are  insufficient  to 
keep  this  subject  entirely  out  of  sight.  No 
man,  in  his  senses,  can  be  so  silly  and  pre- 
sumptuous as  to  deny  the  possibility  of  a 
future  state ;  and  there  are  probably  none 
who  do  not,  at  least  in  times  of  sickness, 
and  in  contemplation  of  death,  turn  their 
attention,  with  anxiety,  to  their  probable 
condition  in  another  world. 


167 

2.  It  might  be  expected,  that  a  considera- 
tion of  this  awful  subject  would  produce  so 
powerful   an   effect    on   the    mind,    would 
create  so  profound  an  interest,  as  to  keep 
down  and  subdue  all  inferior  and  merely 
worldly  considerations ;  and  it  really  seems 
astonishing  and  unaccountable  that  it  should 
not  do  so.     A  reference  to  a  future  state, 
however,    does,    perhaps,    really   influence 
mankind  in  a  higher  degree  than  it  is  gene- 
rally supposed  to  do ;  and  it  probably  ope- 
rates frequently  and  powerfully  in  the  pre- 
vention of  the  more  heinous  crimes.     No 
one,  I  presume,  can  doubt,  that  if  all  hope 
and  fear  respecting  the  world  to  come  were 
blotted  out  of  the  mind  of  man,  the  condi- 
tion of  the  world  would  be  far  more  misera- 
ble than  it  is  at  present.     That  this  is  a 
general  opinion,  seems  to  be  proved  by  the 
circumstance,  that  in  common  with  those 
who  have  serious  convictions  of  the  truth 
of  religion,  a  great  number,  whose  conduct 
appears  to  show  that  they  are  indifferent 
about  it,  are  desirous  of  supporting  those 


168 

institutions  which  are  intended  to  instil 
religious  principles  into  the  mind.  A 
testimony  to  religion  is  also  afforded  by 
irreUgious  parents  giving  their  children  a 
rehgious  education.     This  is  by  no  means 

uncommon. 

3.  The  object  of  the  present  chapter  is  to 
consider  the  ethical  principles  which  have 
been  already  laid  down  in  connexion  with 
the  doctrine  of  a  future  state. 

4.  Assuming  the  existence  of  a  future 
state,  let  us  consider  what  expectations  we 
should,  on  the  principles  of  natural  religion 
alone,  be  led  to  form  respecting  it.  The 
human  race  is  the  workmanship  of  one 
great  and  incomprehensible  Being,  of  bound- 
less power  and  wisdom.  This  appears 
plainly  from  the  study  of  his  works.  His 
power  has  enabled  him  to  create  us,  and  his 
wisdom  must  have  prompted  him  to  form 
us  for  some  end.  No  one  can  be  so  wild  in 
thought  as  to  imagine,  that,  in  the  creation 
of  man,  the  Deity  had  no  object  in  view. 
We  can,  I  think,  form  no  other  inteUigible 


169 


idea  respecting  this  object,  but  that  it  must 
either  regard  himself  or  the  beings  created. 
We  can  assign  no  limits  to  the  power  of  the 
Deity,  as  we  have  no  evidence  whatever  of 
the  existence  of  any  power  capable  of  op- 
posing and  resisting  his  will ;  nor,  regarding 
him  as  the  Creator  of  all  other  existing  per- 
sons and  things,  can  we  suppose  it  possible 
that  any  such  power  can  exist ;  and  as  what 
we  see  of  his  creation  displays  a  wisdom  far 
beyond  our  largest  thoughts,  we  must  come 
to  the  conclusion,  that  the  Deity  is  perfectly 
happy.  If  we  can  be  sure  of  anything,  it 
is  that  every  being  must  desire  happiness ; 
and  it  is  obviously  absurd  to  suppose,  that 
a  being  of  boundless  power  and  perfect 
wisdom  can  have  any  cause  of  unhappiness 
from  without  or  from  within,  and  therefore 
he  must  be  perfectly  happy.  The  object  of 
creation,  then,  we  cannot  conceive  to  be  to 
add  to  the  happiness  of  the  Creator,  for  he 
is  perfectly  happy  in  himself.  The  creation 
then  of  sentient  beings  we .  must  conclude 
(if  we  form  any  opinion  at  all  on  the  sub- 


170 

ject)  to  have  taken  place  for  the  purpose  of 
placing  them  in  some  particular  state  ;  and 
the  only  conceivable  objects  of  the  Creator 
seem  to  be,  either  to  confer  happiness  or 
misery  on  his  creatures.   We  can  only  judge 
of  the  Deity  by  what  we  observe  and  know  of 
human  nature  ;  and  although  we  cannot  but 
feel  that  the  Divine  mind  is  infinitely  supe- 
rior to  that  of  man,  and  that  the  analogy 
between  them  must,  on  that  account,  be  ex- 
tremely imperfect,  yet  is  that  analogy  the 
only  foundation   of  all  the   reasoning  re- 
specting the  Deity  of  which  we  are  capable. 
Now  it  may,  1  think,  be  truly  asserted,  that 
malignity  is,  in  its  nature,  inconsistent  with 
a  state  of  perfect  happiness.     Some  degree 
of  unhappiness  always   attends   maUgnant 
dispositions.     Revenge  has  often  been  said 
to  be  sweet ;  but  does  any  one  think  that 
the  state  of  a  revengeful  mind,  when  it  has 
attained  its  object,  is  one  of  unmixed  hap- 
l)iness?     It   appears   to   me   to  be  by  no 
means  the  case  ;  but  supposing  it  should  be 
allowed   that  the   satisfaction    of   revenge 


171 

yields  a  pure  unmixed  pleasure,  this  will  not 
affect    our  argument,    the  question  being, 
whether  pure  unprovoked  maUgnity  can  be 
a  happy  state  of  mind  ;  for,  antecedently  to 
the  creation  of  sentient  beings,  they  could 
have  given  no  offence  to  the  Creator.     It 
seems  then  impossible  to  beheve  that  God 
formed   his   creatures   for  the   purpose   of 
making   them   miserable.     This— which,  it 
must  be  confessed,  is  of  the  nature  of  an  a- 
priori  argument— is  to  my  mind  irresistible  ; 
nor  am  I  aware  that  anything  plausible  has 
been  advanced  to  weaken  its  force.     It  may 
indeed  be  said,  that  we  are  here  going  be- 
yond the  reach  of  the  human  faculties,  and 
that  we  cannot  reason  on  the  Divine  mind  at 
all ;  but  if  this  argument  be  sound,  it  will 
not  stop  short  of  destroying  natural  religion 
altogether.    If  the  phaenomena  of  nature  are 
sufficient  to  lay  a  foundation  for  a  behef  in 
the  existence  of  God  and  in  his  attributes, 
and  to  place  men  under  an  obligation  to 
obey  his  laws,  it  seems  impossible  to  stop 
short  of  considering  the  nature  of  those  at- 

i2 


fl 


172 


tributes,  and  to  draw  such  conclusions  from 
a  consideration  of  their  nature  as  our  im- 
perfect reason  will  enable  us  to  form. 

5.  Another,  and,  as  it  seems  to  me,  a  con- 
elusive  argument,  maybe  advanced,  to  show 
that   the  Deity  did  not,  in   the   creation, 
intend   to  make   his   creatures   miserable; 
namely,  that  no  indications  of  such  an  in- 
tention  have  been  found  in  his  works.     ''  If 
God,"  says  Paley  with  his  usual  clearness 
and  aptness,  ''  had  wished  our  misery,  he 
might  have  made  sure  of  his  purpose,  by 
forming  our  senses  to  be  so  many  sores  and 
pains  to  us,  as  they  are  now  instruments  of 
gratification  and  enjoyment ;  or  by  placing 
us  amidst  objects  so  ill-suited  to  our  percep- 
tions, as  to  have  continually  offended  us, 
instead  of  ministering  to  our  refreshment 
and  delight.     He  might  have  made,  for  ex- 
ample, everything  we  tasted,  bitter  ;  every- 
thing we  saw,  loathsome ;  every  thing  we 
touched,  a  sting  ;  every  smell,  a  stench;  and 
every  sound  a   discord.— Evil,   no  doubt, 
exists ;  but  is  never,  that  we  can  perceive, 


173 

the  object  of  contrivance.  Teeth  are  con- 
trived to  eat,  not  to  ache  ;  their  aching  now 
and  then  is  incidental  to  the  contrivance, 
perhaps  inseparable  from  it ;  or  even,  if  you 
will,  let  it  be  called  a  defect  in  the  contri- 
vance ;  but  it  is  not  the  object  of  it. — We 
never  discover  a  train  of  contrivance  to 
bring  about  an  evil  purpose.  No  anatomist 
ever  discovered  a  system  of  organization 
calculated  to  produce  pain  and  disease  ;  or, 
in  explaining  the  parts  of  the  human  body, 
ever  said,  this  is  to  irritate  ;  this  to  inflame ; 
this  duct  is  to  convey  gravel  to  the  kidneys ; 
this  gland  to  secrete  the  humour  which  forms 

the  gout^." 

6.  Rejecting  then  the  horrid  notion, 
(which  indeed,  in  its  full  extent,  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  held  by  any  one,)  that 
the  intention  of  the  Deity  in  forming  his 
creatures  was  to  make  them  miserable,  the 
only  remaining  supposition  is,  that  their  own 
happiness  was  his  object  in  creating  them. 
Assuming  the  inquiry  to  lie  within  the  limits 

*  Moral  Philosophy,  Book  II.  ch.  v. 


MfelttiBjlBMltiwrfl 


174 

of  our  faculties,  there  seems  to  be  no  other 
possible  hypothesis.     Divines  indeed,  of  a 
certain  class,  are  fond  of  saying  that  God 
created  man  for  his  own  glory;  but  this 
notion,  in  the  sense  in  which  they  under- 
stand it,  is  not  very  intelligible  ;  nor  does  it 
appear  to  have  been  adopted  in  philosophy. 
It  is  difficult  to  understand  what   (except 
communicating  happiness  to  the  creatures 
he  has  formed)  can  be  intended  by  the  glory 
of  God,  but  such  displays  of  his  perfections 
as  excite  the  admiration  of  his  creatures. 
To  ascribe  a  desire  of  glory  in  this  sense  to 
the  Deity  is  to  make  him  resemble  the  vain 
and  ostentatious,  certainly  not  the  most  re- 
spectable of  the  race  of  mankind.     From  the 
representations  too  often  made  of  the  state  of 
the  blessed  in  the  world  to  come,  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  many  persons  consider  heaven 
as  a  splendid  palace,  where  God  sits  on  a 
throne ;  and  that  his  supreme  delight  con- 
sists in  listening  to  myriads  of  angels  and 
men  continually  singing  his  praises.     This 
seems  to  be  the  idea  entertained  of  God's 


175 


glory;  and  degrading  as  it  cannot  fail  to 
appear  to  all  who  have  attained  exalted  and 
spiritual  notions  of  the  perfections  of  the 
Creator,  it  is  apparently extremelyprevalent, 
though  it  owes  its  entire  support  to  a  few 
figurative  representations  in  the  Scriptures. 
The  only  worthy  notion  which  we  can  form 
respecting  the  feeling,  if  we  may  so  express 
ourselves,  (for  we  really  know  not  what 
language  to  use  respecting  God,)  of  the 
Deity  towards  his  creatures,  is,  that  he  wills 
their  happiness  ;  and  his  glory,  according  to 
our  conceptions,  must  consist  in  conferring 
happiness  upon  them. 

7.  Another,  and  a  most  powerful  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  the  benevolent  object  of 
the  Deity  in  creation  arises  from  observing 
the  apparent  design  which  is  discerned  in 
the  structure  and  organization  of  the  animal 
world,  which,  the  more  it  has  been  examined, 
the  more  it  has  appeared  calculated  to  secure 
the  life  of  the  animal,  and  to  promote  its  en- 
joyment ;  and  on  the  adaptation  of  the  laws 
of  the  material  world  to  the  wants  and  en- 


176 

joyments  of  man,  and  of  the  inferior  creation. 
That  these  things  are  so  must  be  taken  for 
granted  here  ;  but  those  who  wish  to  be  fully 
satisfied  of  the  truth  of  the  positions  ad- 
vanced above  will  find  the  argument  fully  de- 
veloped and  irresistibly  enforced  in  many 
works  on  Natural  Theology,  with  which  the 
literature  of  this  country  is  adorned.  It  is 
enough  to  say  here,  that  wherever  the  search- 
ing spirit  of  philosophical  investigation  has 
discerned  design  in  the  works  of  creation, 
that  design  has  appeared  to  be  benevolent, 
A  contrivance  indicating  malevolence,  as  has 
been  already  stated,  is  absolutely  unknown. 
8.  But  here  the  great  difficulty  presents 
itself,  of  the  existence  of  physical  and  moral 
evil  in  the  world ;  and  the  well-known  di- 
lemma arises :  either,  it  is  said,  God  could 
have  created  the  good  which  exists  in  the 
universe  without  the  evil,  and  he  would  not, 
which  shows  a  defect  of  goodness ;  or  he 
would  have  done  so,  and  could  not,  which 
shows  a  defect  of  power.  Formidable  as 
this  objection  to  the  perfect  goodness  and 


177 


boundless  power  of  the  Creator  may  appear, 
it  seems  to  me  susceptible  of  such  an  an- 
swer as  may  satisfy  a  sober  inquirer. 

9.  It  will  be  necessary  to  begin  by  consi- 
dering, after  duly  estimating  the  extent  of 
the  human  faculties,  in  what  degree  we  can 
reasonably  expect  to  understand  this  diffi- 
cult subject.     Now,  in  the  first  place,  let  us 
consider  what,  according  to  any  conception 
which  we  can  form,  must  be  the  difference 
between  the  Creator  and  the    intellectual 
creatures  which  he  has  formed.     Our  idea 
of  God  is,  that  he  is  a  self-existent  uncaused 
Being,  who  has  existed  from  all  eternity, 
and  whose  nature  and  attributes  are  derived 
from  no  other,  and  can  be  limited  and  con- 
trolled by   none.     We  believe   the   whole 
creation  to  have  been  formed  by  this  incon- 
ceivably great  Being  ;  and  it  is  evident  that 
self-existence  cannot  belong  to  any  created 
being.     No  one  can  be  at  once  created  and 
uncreated,  self-existent    and  derived  from 
the  will  of  another.     All  created  beings  are, 
and  necessarily  must  be,  inferior  to  their 


I  5 


178 


Creator  in  power ;   for  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  that  the  being  formed  is  equal  to 
him  that  formed  him.     In  relation  then  to 
the  Deity,  every  one  of  his  creatures  maybe 
truly  said  to  be  imperfect.     Be  his  power 
what  it  may,  it  is  still  immeasurably  inferior 
to  that  of  the  great  Being  who  gave  it  ;  be 
his  knowledge  ever  so  great,  it  must  be  far 
below  that  of  him  who  made  him  w^hat  he 
is ;  allow  him  to  possess  most  exalted  wis- 
dom in  choosing  the  best  ends,  and  contri- 
ving the  most  efficacious  means  for  the  at- 
tainment of  those  ends,  his  wisdom  must 
still  be  far  short  of  that  of  his  Creator.     His 
power,  knowledge  and  wisdom  are  therefore 
imperfect ;  and  so  wide  does  the  chasm  ap- 
pear to  us  between  the  Creator   and   his 
creatures,  that  whatever  degree  of  power, 
knowledge  and  wisdom  he  may  confer  upon 
them,  w^e  are  irresistibly  led  to  believe  that 
he  might  have  given  still  higher  degrees  of 
those   excellences  ;    and  the  question   will 
arise  in  the  restless  and  inquiring  mind, 
why  has  he  not  done  so  ?     But  this  ques- 


179 

tion,  it  is  evident,  can  never  be  satisfactorily 
answered;  for  suppose  whatever  accession 
of  power,  knowledge  and  wisdom  you  please, 
the    question  continually  arises,   why  not 
more  ?  and  must  do  so  till  it  takes  the  form 
of  inquiring  why  the  Creator  has  not  made 
his   creatures  equal  to  himself,  which   we 
have  already  seen  is  absurd.     It  seems  then 
that  the  full  comprehension  of  this  subject 
lies  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  facul- 
ties ;  and  that  we  must  be  contented  to  form 
our  ideas  of  the  ways  of  the  Deity,  not  from 
what  we  imagine  he  might  have  done,  but 
from  what  we  see  of  his  works ;  and  that 
although,  according  to  our  conception,  it 
would  have  been  better  if  higher  degrees  of 
power,  wisdom   and  knowledge   had  been 
given  than  those  which  are  enjoyed  by  any 
of  the  creatures  of  God,  yet  we  feel  that  we 
are  incompetent  to  judge  of  this  matter  ;  and 
we  have  no  right  to  assert  that  the  imperfec- 
tions of  the  creatures  are  inconsistent  with 
the  unbounded  power  and  perfect  wisdom 
and  goodness  of  the  Creator. 


■iattej«1iaiiiUBiiifBartM<a^i«fl 


180 

1 0.  The  considerations  stated  above  lead 
us  into  the  right  mode  of  considering  the 
works  of  God,  with  a  view  to  forming  just 
conceptions  of  his  attributes.     We  can  only 
form  a  judgment  respecting  the  design  of 
the  Deity  in  the  creation  of  sentient  beings 
from  the  tendency  of  things  in  the  universe 
which  he  has  formed  ;  and  if  that  tendency 
appear  to  be  to  produce  good,  we  may  justly 
conclude  that  the  Deity  is  a  benevolent  Be- 
ing ;  though  we  should  find  some  things  in 
his  works  which  may  at  first  appear  incon- 
sistent with  a  benevolent  design,  and  which 
may,  after  the  most  searching  and  diligent 
inquiry,  present   difiiculties  which  we  are 
unable  to  solve.     Now  that  the  design  of 
the  Deitv  in  forming  the  creation  was  bene- 
volent,    may   be  easily  deduced   from    the 
phsenomena  of  nature  ;    and  the  proofs  of 
his  benevolence,  drawn  from    this  source, 
form  the  subjects  of  the  numerous  excellent 
treatises  which  have  appeared  on  Natural 
Theolosv,  and  which  are  so  well  known  and 
so  generally  approved  of  as  to  render  it  un- 


(i 


181 

necessary  to  do  more  than  to  give  a  general 
reference  to  them  in  this  place, 

1 1 .  Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the 
nature  of  human  virtue.     I  say  human  vir- 
tue, because  I  see  no  reason  to  deny  that 
other  forms  of  goodness  may  exist  in  supe- 
rior beings ;  and  we  are  obliged  to  think, 
(as  I  shall  endeavour  presently  to  show,) 
that  the  moral  excellence  of  the  Divine  Be- 
ing is  essentially  different  from  that  of  any 
of  his  creatures.     Human  virtue  then  de- 
pends wholly  on  the  will  choosing  good  and 
refusing  evil ;  and  the  motives  of  a  human 
being  are  universally  held  to  be  good  or  bad 
as  he  wills  to  do  good  or  evil.     It  is  not  the 
good  or  evil  effect  of  the  act  by  which  we 
judge  of  the  character  of  the  agent,  but  the 
motive  by  which  he  is  actuated.     Thus  a 
man  who  hears  and  believes  a  tale  of  dis- 
tress, and  gives  his  money  to  relieve  it, 
acts   virtuously,    though  the   story  should 
prove  to  be  an  imposture,  and  the  money 
should  therefore  confer  a  benefit  on  one  who 


\ 


182 

is  deserving  of  punishment.     So  a  man  in- 
tending  to    injure   another   may   inflict   a 
wound  on  him  in  such  a  manner  as  to  open 
an  abscess  which  required  the  lancet,  and 
that  which  was  intended  to  be  an  injury 
may  thus  turn  out  to  be  a  benefit ;    still, 
the  motive  having  been  bad,  the  inflicting 
of  the  wound  would  be  universally  held  to 
be  an  evil  action.     Virtue  then  consists  in 
the  will  to  do  right,  and  our  actions  are 
merely  indications""  of  the  will.     The  whole 
inquiry,    therefore,   respecting  virtue  ends 
here.      The  question   respecting  what  has 
been  called  the  freedom  of  the  will,  that  is, 
in  what  manner  the  will  is  determined  to 
particular  actions,  is  a  purely  metaphysi- 
cal question,  and  has  in  reality  nothing  to 
do  with  morals.     A  man  is  virtuous  in  the 
degree  in  which  he  wills  to  do  right ;  and 
the  particular  manner  in  which  his  will  is 
decided  in  favor  of  virtue  makes  no  differ- 
ence  in  moraUty.     It   is  not  intended   to 
deny  that  the  abstruse  question  here   re- 


183 

ferred  to  is  a  very  important  question,  but 
merely  to  assert,  that  it  can  only  be  treated 
satisfactorily  or  metaphysical  principles. 

12.  Let  us  now  consider  what,  according 
to  our  conception,  must  be  the  nature  of 
the  benevolence  of  the  Deity.     We  have 
already  seen  that  human  goodness  depends 
on  the  will,  and  that  a  man's  intentions  are 
good  or  bad  as  he  wills  to  do  good  or  evil ; 
which  necessarily  assumes,  that  he  may  de- 
cide one  way  or  the  other,  according  as  he 
wills.     He  is  therefore  liable  to  do  wrong, 
if  it  should  be  his  will  to  do  so.     Now  this 
liabiUty  to  do  wrong  we  cannot  with  pro- 
priety assign  to  the  Deity.     We  have  al- 
ready  shown  that  God  is  a  Being  of  perfect 
benevolence.     Now  it  must  appear  to  us, 
according  to  any  notion  which  we  can  form 
upon  the  subject,  that  the  Deity,  being  per- 
fectly benevolent,  must  have  always  been  so 
from  eternity ;  and  therefore  that  benevo- 
lence must  be  as  essential  to  him  as  self- 
existence,    boundless    power,    and  perfect 
wisdom ;  nor  does  it  seem  impossible,  nor 


184 

indeed  improbable,  that  in  a  future  state 
our  intellect  may  be  so  far  improved  and 
enlarged  as  to  enable  us  to  see  clearly  that 
such  must  be  the  nature  of  the  Deity,  and 
that  to  suppose  otherwise  involves  an  ab- 
surdity.   This,  however,  is  mere  speculation. 
To  return  therefore  to  what  lies  more  within 
the  reach  of  our  minds  ;  either  the  Deity  is 
essentially  benevolent,  or  he  has  acquired  a 
character  of  benevolence  at  some  particular 
period.     Now  it  seems  to  us  impossible  that 
the  character  of  the  Deity  can  have  changed. 
Changes  in  us  are  occasioned  by  the  imper- 
fections of  our  nature,  and  by  external  in- 
fluences.    But  we  can  conceive  no  imper- 
fection to  belong  to  the  character  of  the 
Deity,  and  it  is  equally  impossible  to  sup- 
pose that  an  alteration  in  his  character  can 
have  been  brought  about  by  the  influence  of 
any  of  his  creatures  on  him.     It  may  indeed 
be  very  truly  said,  that  upon  this  subject,  as 
well  as  every  other  respecting  the  Deity, 
our  thoughts   are  very  confused,  and    we 
cannot    but   deeply  feel  the  inadequacy  of 


185 

our  faculties  to  comprehend  the  unfathom- 
able nature  of  God ;  but  this  inadequacy  is 
never  admitted  as  a  sufiicient  reason  to  pre- 
vent us  from  endeavouring  to  acquire  the 
most  correct  notions  we  are  capable  of  re- 
specting the  divine    character;  and  if  it 
were  so,  it  would  put  an  end  to  our  think- 
ing at  all  about  the  Deity,   and  make  us 
practically  atheists.     We  are  indeed  bound 
to  entertain  great  difiidence  of  ourselves, 
and  to  pursue  our  investigations  into  this 
awful  subject  with  great  humility  ;  but  ha- 
ving done  so,  it  seems  to  be  not  only  justi- 
fiable, but  to  be  an  important  part  of  our 
duty,  to  employ  our  best  faculties  in  endea- 
vouring to  understand  as  much  of  the  divine 
character  and  attributes  as  we  are  capable 
of.     It  must  be  useless  to  assert  in  words 
the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God,  but  to 
take  no  pains  to  form  inteUigible  and  con- 
sistent ideas  of  those  attributes. 

13.  The  character  of  the  Deity  then  be- 
ing absolute  goodness,  his  design  in  the 
creation  of  the  universe  must  have  been  be- 


186 

nevolent ;  and  as  his  perfect  wisdom  en- 
abled him  to  perceive  the  best  means  of  at- 
taining the  intended  end,  and  his  boundless 
power  gave  him  full  command  of  those 
means,  we  must  conclude  that  all  the  ar- 
rangements of  his  providence  are  right  and 
good,  and  that  it  extends  to  the  whole  of  his 
works.  This  doctrine  of  a  universal  provi- 
dence regulating  all  events  is  thus  clearly 
deduced  from  the  consideration  of  the  attri- 
butes of  power,  knowledge,  wisdom  and 
goodness  which  belong  to  the  divine  cha- 
racter, and  are  essential  to  it.  If  divine 
providence  extend  to  all  events,  then  no  evil 
can  subsist  in  the  creation  beyond  what  is 
necessary  even  in  a  system  of  perfect  bene- 
volence ;  but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  any 
event  be  permitted  to  take  place  over  which 
the  providence  of  God  has  no  control,  a 
fruitful  source  of  evil  is  introduced  into  the 
works  of  creation,  which  will  tend  to  defeat 
the  intention  of  the  Creator.  We  have  in- 
deed already  admitted,  that  we  have  no 
right,  with  our  Hmited  faculties,  to  assert 


187 


that  the  existence  of  evil  in  the  universe  is 
inconsistent  with  the  perfections  of  the 
Deity  ;  but  we  seem  to  be  justified  in  be- 
lieving, and  reason  seems  to  require  us  to 
believe,  that  the  quantity  of  evil  is  limited 
and  restrained  by  divine  providence,  and 
that  it  is  never  permitted  to  exist  to  an  ex- 
tent which  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
greatest  general  good  of  the  creation. 

14.  The    only   objection    which    can,   I 
think,  be  reasonably  made  to  the  doctrine 
of  universal  providence  may  be  stated  as 
follows.     If  all  the  events  which  take  place 
in  the  world  are  regulated  by  divine  provi- 
dence, and  are  all  parts  of  one  great  plan  of 
perfect  wisdom  and  benevolence,  then  every 
event  has  its  proper  place  in  the  system,  all 
things  work  together  for  good,  and  among 
the  rest,  the  wicked  actions  of  men  ;  and  this 
is  making  God  the  author  of  sin.     The  an- 
swer is,  that,  in  a  metaphysical  sense,  God 
must  be  held  to  be  the  author  of  sin,  though 
in  a  moral  sense  he  is  not ;  at  least  this  must 
appear  to  be  so  to  all  those  who  profess  the 


188 

opinion  that  the  universe  was  formed  by 
one  Creator,  and  that  there  is  no  power  in 
existence  capable  of  h  mi  ting  or  controlling 
him.  This  being  conceded,  it  follows  that 
all  the  actions  of  intellectual  beings  are  de- 
rived from  the  nature  which  God  has  given 
to  them,  or  from  some  influence  emanating 
from  him,  and  operating  either  immediately 
or  by  the  intervention  of  other  beings 
or  circumstances  upon  their  minds.  It 
is  true  that  all  sin  is  to  be  attributed  to 
the  abuse  of  that  moral  nature  which  we 
possess,  but  still  the  liabiUty  to  abuse  is  a 
part  of  our  nature,  and,  as  such,  must  be 
imputed  to  its  Author.  This  abuse,  how- 
ever, of  our  moral  nature  is  a  constant 
source  of  evil ;  and  we  never  commit  sin, 
without  acting,  in  a  moral  sense,  against 
the  will  of  our  Maker.  This  distinction  be- 
tween the  metaphysical  and  the  moral  view 
of  this  difficult  subject  is  no  doubt  extremely 
perplexing  to  our  understandings ;  but  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  all  our  conceptions 
of  the  Deity  are  inadequate,  and  never  fail 


189 

to  make  us  feel  that  he  is  far  beyond  our 
comprehension  ;  and  we  must  be  contented 
with  the  most  satisfactory  views  of  his  charac- 
ter, attributes  and  purposes  which  our  limit- 
ed faculties  can  reach,  confused  as  they  are. 
15.  It  will,  however,  be  desirable  to  look 
at  this  intricate  subject  in  different  lights, 
as  some  minds  may  be  impressed  more  with 
one,  and  others  with  another  view  of  it.    We 
assume  that  it  is  consistent  with  the  divine 
scheme  of  perfect  benevolence,  that  such  a 
being  as  man  should  be  created  ;  a  being 
possessing  a  will   capable  of  being  deter- 
mined to  good  or  to  evil.     We  are  not,  I 
think,  warranted  in  asserting  that  the  ex- 
istence  of  such  a  being  is  inconsistent  with 
that  which  is  contended  to  be  the  object  of 
the  Deity  in  creation,  the  conferring  of  the 
greatest  possible  happiness  on  his  creatures. 
The  determination  of  the  will  to  evil  is  al- 
ways  injurious  to  the  individual,  its  direct 
tendency  being  to  produce  unhappiness  to 
him  sooner  or  later ;  as  it  has  already  been 
shown,  that  virtue  is  the  road  to  happiness 


190 


and  vice  to  misery.  But  the  evil  thus  pro- 
duced by  voluntary  agents  is  not  inconsist- 
ent with  the  perfections  of  the  Deity,  any 
more  than  evil  in  any  other  shape : 

'*  If  plagues  or  earthquakes  break  not  Heaven's  design, 
Why  then  a  Borgia,  or  a  Catiline  ?  " 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  existence 
of  evil  in  the  works  of  a  perfectly  wise  and 
good,  and  uncontrollably  powerful  Being, 
cannot  be  satisfactorily  accounted  for  by  us, 
because  the  subject  lies  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  human  mind ;  but  that  we  have  no 
right  to  conclude  that  it  is  inconsistent  with 
those  attributes  of  the  Deitv  which  have 
been  just  mentioned.  Believing,  however, 
the  benevolence  of  the  Deity  to  be  perfect, 
we  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion,  that  the 
existence  of  evil  is,  in  some  way  or  other, 
though  we  may  not  be  able  fully  to  under- 
stand how,  subservient  to  the  general  good 
of  the  whole  creation. 

16.  Bearing  in  mind  that  human  virtue 
consists  in  choosing  good  rather  than  evil, 
we  must  immediately  see  that  its  very  ex- 


191 


istence  depends  on  the  existence  of  evil  in 
some  shape  or  other.     If  no  evil  existed  in 
the  world,  the  voluntary  power  of  doing  or 
refraining  from  particular  actions  would  be 
useless  ;  for  if  all  be  good,  there  is  no  other 
room  for  choice  than  the  preference  of  the 
greater  to  the  lesser  good,  and  no  place  for 
human  virtue,  which  consists  in  the  volun- 
tary preference  of  good  to  evil.     The  sub- 
servience of  evil  to  good  is  obvious,  and  has 
been  insisted   on  by  many  moral  writers. 
Thus  pain  gives  occasion  for  the  exercise  of 
fortitude  ;  injuries  done  to  us  afford  oppor- 
tunities for  mercy  or  forgiveness  and  gene- 
rosity in  rendering  assistance  to  those  who 
have  been  our  enemies ;  the  oppression  of 
one  man  by  another  gives  opportunity  to  a 
virtuous  man  to  protect  the  oppressed,  and 
to  redress  his  wrongs.     Thus,  throughout 
the  whole  of  human  life,  the  existence  of 
evil  leads  to  the  exercise  of  virtue,  in  the 
only  mode  in  which  it  can  exert  itself  in  the 
human  character. 

17.  A  strong  and  (as  it  seems  to  me) 


y 


192 

an  irresistible  argument,  to  prove  the  doc- 
trine of  the  universahty  of  providence,  may 
be  put  in  this  way.     When  God  made  man 
with  a  will  capable  of  being  determined  to 
good  or  to  evil,  he  must  have  foreseen  that 
the  consequence  would  be,  that  some  moral 
evil  would  be  introduced  into  his  works. 
Now,    as  we    cannot  regard  the  Deity  as 
choosing  evil  for  its  own  sake,  but  can  only 
consider  him  to    have  tolerated  it  for  the 
purpose  of  effecting  the  greater  good  which 
would,  on  the  whole,  accrue  from  its  ex- 
istence, it  appears  impossible  that  he  should 
not  have  assigned  its  just  bounds,  and  pre- 
vented the  existence  of  a  larger  portion  of 
it  than  was  required  for  the  purpose   for 
which  it  was  introduced.     But   this  could 
only  be  accomphshed  by  his  keeping  the 
reins  of  his  moral  government  (if  we  may 
be  allowed  so  to  speak)  in  his  own  hands, 
and  thereby  preventing  the  existence  of  any 
evil  beyond  the  proper  limits.     The  notions 
entertained  by  many  of  free-will  afford  no 
argument  against  this  view  of  the  subject ; 


' 


193 

for  if  it  be  essential  to  those  notions  that 
every  man  should  possess  the  power  of  in- 
troducing evil  indefinitely  into  the  works  of 
the  creation,  this  is,  in  fact,  setting  up  a 
power  in  opposition  to  that  of  the  Deity, 
and  is  a  real  limitation  of  his  power,  and 
of  course  inconsistent  with  his  omnipotence. 
This  is  so  strongly  felt  as  to  occasion  the 
doctrine  of  what  is  called  a  particular  pro- 
vidence to  be  very  generally  adopted  by 
persons  of  a  rehgious  character.  These 
individuals  have  justly  felt,  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  believe  that  the  Deity  should 
have  parted  with  his  sovereignty  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  allow  any  of  his  creatures  to 
introduce  evil  among  his  works  indefinitely 
and  without  control ;  they  have  therefore 
held  that  the  Deity  interferes  to  prevent  the 
more  flagrant  evils  which  would  otherwise 
be  produced  by  the  depraved  wills  of  his 
creatures,  or  by  the  laws  of  the  physical 
world.  No  rule  as  to  the  occasions  when 
this  intervention  takes  place  can,  it  is  obvi- 
ous, be  laid  down;    and  the  consequence 


If 


194 

has  been,  that  every  one  has  brought  in  a 
particular  providence  just  at  those  times, 
and  for  those  purposes,  which,  according  to 
his  mode  of  thinking  and  feehng,  require  it. 
Rationally  considered,  this  doctrine  must 
appear  extremely  defective.  If  the  inter- 
ference of  the  Deity  be  necessary  to  prevent 
some  evils  which  would  arise  but  for  such 
interference,  what  reason  can  be  given  why 
it  should  not  be  exercised  to  prevent  the 
existence  of  all  unnecessary  evil  ?  But  if  it 
be  so  exerted,  that  is  the  universal  provi- 
dence for  which  we  have  been  contending. 

18.  We  consider,  then,  that  the  follow- 
ing points  have  been  established  : — 1.  That 
the  design  of  the  Deity  is  to  confer  happi- 
ness on  his  creatures  to  the  greatest  extent 
possible.  2.  That  virtue  is  the  only  means 
by  which  human  beings  can  attain  happi- 
ness. 3.  That  human  virtue  consists  in  the 
will  choosing  that  which  is  good,  and  reject- 
ing what  is  evil,  and  therefore  assumes  the 
existence  of  evil.  4.  That  it  is  impossible  to 
beUeve  that  God,  who  is  perfectly  wise  and 


195 

good,  and  possessed  of  uncontrollable  pow^r, 
can  allow  the  existence  of  evil  for  its  own 
sake  ;  and  that  therefore  w^e  must  admit,  that 
all  the  evil  which  exists  is,  in  some  way, 
necessary  in  a  perfect  system  of  benevo- 
lence. 5.  That  no  more  evil  than  is  consist- 
ent with  a  scheme  of  universal  benevolence 
is  allowed  to  exist,  and  therefore  that  the 
providence  of  God  is  universal,  extending  as 
well  to  intellectual  and  moral  beings  as  to 
the  physical  world,  and  preventing  the  in- 
troduction of  unnecessary  evil  into  either. 

19.  These  matters  having  been  premised, 
let  us  now  consider  the  theory  of  morals 
contended  for  in  this  essay  in  relation  to  the 
doctrine  of  a  future  state.  The  tendency  of 
virtue,  we  have  seen,  is  to  produce  happi- 
ness, as  well  that  of  the  agent  as  of  others  ; 
and  when  it  fails  to  make  us  happy,  the 
failure  is  occasioned  by  some  moral  or  some 
physical  evil  to  which  our  situation  exposes 
us.  But  we  have  already  seen  that  physical 
and  moral  evil  are  not  only  permitted  to 
exist,  but  are  essential,  in  a  way  which  we 

k2 


196 

can  partially,  but  not  fully  comprehend,  to 
the  general  good  of  the  creation ;  and  that 
they  are  regulated  by  the  universal  provi- 
dence of  God,  and  can  therefore  never  ex- 
ceed in  amount  their  just  limits.  Now  all 
notions  which  have  been  formed  of  a  future 
state  agree  in  one  thing  (however  they  may 
vary  in  other  particulars),  that  our  condi- 
tion in  the  unseen  state  will  depend  on  what 
our  characters  and  conduct  have  been  here. 
This  assertion  may  indeed  require  to  be 
qualified,  as  it  is  applied  to  those  who  deny 
the  value  of  all  moral  actions,  and  admit  of 
faith  alone  as  that  by  which  we  are  admitted 
to  partake  of  eternal  felicity  in  the  world  to 
come.  This  however,  in  truth,  comes  to 
the  same  thing;  the  doctrine  adverted  to 
being,  that  we  shall  become  recipients  of 
eternal  happiness  if  we  have  saving  faith ; 
and  the  great  majority  of  those  who  support 
this  opinion  also  holding  that  saving  faith 
universally  leads  to  virtuous  practice.  The 
universal  opinion  then  is,  that  we  shall  be 
happy  or  miserable  in  the  world  to  come 


197 

according  to  our  characters  and  conduct  in 

this  world. 

20.  This  view  of  a  future  state  being  ad- 
mitted,  we  ask,  which  is  the  more  probable 
opinion;   that  mankind  should  possess   a 
moral  nature,  by  the   due   cultivation    of 
which  they  would  be  led  to  pursue  that 
course  of  conduct  which  would  lead  to  their 
future  felicity,  or  that  they  should  be  left  to 
their  rational  faculties  alone  to  discover  what 
would  prove  conducive  to  their  greatest  hap- 
piness,  without  having  any  natural  sense  of 
the  preference  due  to  a  virtuous  rather  than 
to  a  vicious  course  of  life ;  placed  as  they 
are  in  a  world  abounding  with  temptations 
calculated  to  seduce  them  from  the  paths  of 
virtue.    The  mere  statement  of  the  ques- 
tion seems  to  suggest  the  answer ;  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  moral  nature  of  man,  taken 
in  connexion  with  that  of  a  future  state,  is  a 
much  more  probable  opinion  than  that  which 

denies  it. 

21.  I  feel  deeply  sensible  of  having,  in 
this  chapter,  ventured  to  discuss  the  sub- 


198 

jects  of  the  nature,  character,  and  attri- 
butes of  the  Deity,  with  a  freedom  which 
there  is  reason  to  fear  may  give  offence  to 
some.  No  words  can  adequately  express 
my  sense  of  the  extreme  difficulty  of  these 
subjects,  of  the  inadequacy  of  all  our  ideas 
of  the  Deity,  and  of  the  perplexity  and 
confusion  w^hich  must  necessarily  be  found 
in  our  most  deeply-considered  and  most 
cautiously-conducted  speculations  in  mat- 
ters so  much  beyond  our  faculties.  Never- 
theless, when  these  inquiries  are  carried  on 
with  a  deep  sense  of  the  narrowness  and 
imperfection  of  our  minds,  and  of  our  in- 
capacity to  form  any  other  than  dark  and 
confused  ideas  of  all  that  pertains  to  the 
Deity  ;  when  they  are  conducted  with  hu- 
mility, and  are  prompted  by  a  sincere 
desire  to  understand  all  that  our  nature  will 
permit  of  the  perfections  of  the  Deity,  for 
the  purpose  of  correcting,  purifying,  and 
enlarging  our  conceptions  of  him,  of  awaken- 
ing and  enlivening  pious  dispositions  towards 
him,  of  coming  to  a  better  understanding  of 


199 

his  will,  and  being  thereby  better  prepared 
for  fulfilling  the  duties  of  life,  these  re- 
searches seem  to  be  most  worthy  of  our 
best  attention,  and  of  the  most  strenuous 
exertion  of  our  faculties ;  and  it  appears  to 
be  the  bounden  duty  of  all  who  are  capable 
of  such  studies,  to  apply  their  minds  to 
them  so  far  as  they  enjoy  opportunities  of 
so  doing. 


200 


CHAPTER  VII. 


OF  RELIGION. 


1.  Man  is  made  for  religion.     This  truth 
can  be  denied  by  none  who  acknowledge 
the  being  of  a  God,  and  admit  any  moral 
distinction  in  the  actions  of  men.     Even 
the   selfish   system,  which   confines    all    a 
man's  regard  to  himself,  and  considers  him 
to  be  altogether  indifferent  to  the  welfare  of 
others,  except  as  their  well-being  may  con- 
duce  to  his  own,  which  rejects  all  the  noble 
sentiments   of   gratitude    for    benefits    re- 
ceived, and  love  for  all  that  is  great  and 
good  and  exalted;   even  the  followers  of 
this  wretched  system,  though  they  render 
no  gratitude  to  God  for  benefits  received, 
feel  it  their  interest,  and  therefore  admit  it 


201 

to  be  their  duty,  to  secure  his  favor  for  the 
reward  to  come ;  "  to  do  good  for  the  sake 
of  eternal  happiness*." 

2.  If  the  theory  laid  down  in  this  work 
be  admitted,  all  its  parts  point  to  religion. 
We  have  considered  the  leading  principles 
of  morality  to  be  of  three  kinds  : — 1.  That 
which  has  for  its  object  our  own  greatest 
happiness.  2.  That  which  seeks  the  happi- 
ness of  others.  3.  Moral  sentiments,  which 
are  excellent  in  themselves,  without  regard 
to  any  consequences,  immediate  or  remote. 
That  the  first  principle  points  to  religion 
has  been  already  shown,  as  in  fact  it  is 
identically  that  which  is  the  sole  principle 
of  the  selfish  system.  The  second  moral 
principle  also  leads  to  religion ;  for  if  we 
will  the  happiness  of  others,  we  cannot  fail 
to  desire  that  they  shall  enjoy  the  favour  of 
Him  in  whose  power  they  are,  for  weal  or 
for  woe.  Our  moral  sentiments  find  their 
great  and  ultimate  object  in  the  Deity  alone. 
To  him  our  highest  gratitude  is  due,  for  he 

*  Paley*s  Definition  of  Virtue. 

k5 


202 


203 


alone  is  the  primary  cause  of  our  happiness. 
All  the  good  which  we  receive  from  any 
other  beings  is  only  the  result  of  good  prin- 
ciples and  feelings  implanted  in  their  minds 
by  him.  He  is  the  fountain  of  benevo- 
lence, from  which  it  flows  in  all  its  cur- 
rents. The  benevolence  of  creatures,  in  its 
highest  state,  is  but  the  image  of  that  of 
the  Creator.  In  like  manner,  all  our  senti- 
ments of  moral  purity  are  derived  from  him 
who  is  the  source  of  all  purity. 

3.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  appears 
that  we  must  either  deny  altogether  the 
moral  nature  of  man,  or  admit  that  he  is 
also,  by  nature,  a  religious  being.  The 
foundation  of  natural  religion  is  thus  laid 
deep  in  human  nature,  and  our  minds  are 
thereby  the  better  fitted  for  the  reception  of 
revealed  truth.  It  will  then  be  proper  to 
direct  our  attention  to  the  subject  of  natural 
religion,  as  arising  out  of  the  theory  which 
we  have  endeavoured  to  establish. 

4.  It  would  require  a  very  long  and  labo- 
rious investigation,  and  might  indeed  be  the 


employment  of  many  years,  to  trace  the 
history  of  natural  religion,  as  it  is  to  be 
found  in  the  works  of  the  ancient  philoso- 
phers ;  but  happily  one  small  work  exists, 
which  may  properly  be  regarded  as  a  sum- 
mary of  the  whole,  to  the  extent  to  which 
it  will  be  necessary  to  refer  to  it  in  this 
Essay.  The  summary  alluded  to  is  Cicero's 
treatise  *DeNaturaDeorum.'  The  conclusion 
at  which  the  mind  arises  from  an  attentive 
perusal  of  this  work  is,  that  the  ancients 
had  universally  some  idea  of  the  existence 
of  beings  superior  to  man ;  that  their  con- 
ceptions of  the  gods  varied  greatly,  those 
held  by  the  great  majority  being  extremely 
low  and  gross,  while  far  more  enlightened 
and  rational  sentiments  were  found  among 
the  philosophers  and  their  disciples;  but 
that  not  even  the  most  enlightened  of  the 
philosophers  acquired  a  clear  and  distinct 
conception  of  the  unity  of  God.  The  high- 
est state  of  the  theory  of  natural  religion 
among  the  ancients  seems  to  have  been  a 
sort  of  pantheism,  a  notion  of  inteUigence 


'"■  fi 


204 

diffused  in  some  way  or  other  through  the 
universe ;  but  it  fell  far  short  of  the  sublime 
idea  of  one  great,  self-existent  First  Cause, 
*'  from  whom,  and  by  whom,  and  in  whom 
are  all  things.'' 

5.  Such  being  the  state  of  natural  reli- 
gion, it  is  evident  that  it  could  only  exert  a 
very  hmited  influence  either  on  the  theory 
or  on  the  practice  of  morality,  and  conse- 
quently w^e  find  that,  among  the  Greeks 
and  Romans,  religion  and  morality  had  but 
a  very  shght  connexion  with  each  other; 
the  former  consisting  of  sacrifices,  cere- 
monial observances,  &c.,  and  being  taught 
by  the  priests,  while  instruction  in  morals 
was  sought  in  the  schools  of  the  philoso- 
phers. 

6.  Nothing  can  be  more  striking  than  the 
diflference  between  the  speculations  of  the 
ancients  and  those  of  the  moderns  respect- 
ing  the  theory  of  natural  rehgion,  the  latter 
uniformly  laying  the  foundation  of  the 
whole  in  the  existence  and  attributes  of 
the  one  God,  who  made  and  who  governs 


205 

all  things.  Whence  then  arises  this  differ- 
ence? The  believer  in  revealed  rehgion  finds 
no  difiiculty  in  giving  the  answer.  What 
account  can  be  given  of  it  by  those  who 
reject  divine  revelation  I  cannot  pretend  to 
say,  as  I  am  not  aware  that  they  have  ever 
suggested  any  plausible  cause  of  this  dif- 
ference. 

7.  Those  who  do  not  admit  the  truth  of 
divine  revelation,  cannot,  if  they  have  made 
themselves  acquainted  with  the  subject,  in 
candour  deny,  that  while  the  greatest  minds 
of  Greece  and  Rome  reasoned  and  doubted 
on  the  subject  of  reUgion,  without  coming 
to  any  satisfactory  conclusion,  an  obscure 
nation,  greatly  their  inferiors  in  intellectual 
acquirements,  professed,  with  unhesitating 
conviction,  to  beheve  in  the  existence  of 
one  God,  the  Maker  and  Governor  of  all 
things;  and  by  a  revelation,  from  which 
they  claimed  to  have  been  taught  and  en- 
lightened on  the  subject  of  rehgion.  How 
superior  their  views  respecting  the  Deity 


206 

were  to  those  of  the  most  illustrious  of  the 
ancient  philosophers,  has  been  shown,  with 
great  learning  and  ability,  by  a  prelate  of 
the  church  of  England,  in  a  work  which 
will  well  repay  the  closest  attention  of  the 
reader*. 

8.  It  appears  then  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  unity  of  God  has  never  been  attained 
by  mere  reason,  but  that  we  are  indebted 
for  it  to  the  Jewish  and  Christian  revela- 
tions. When  once  discovered,  indeed,  it  is 
so  conformable  to  all  which  our  reason  can 
suggest  on  the  subjects  of  religion  and  mo- 
rality, that  no  one  can  possibly  reject  it ; 
but  for  the  discovery  we  are  entirely  in- 
debted to  revelation. 

9.  Supposing,  however,  some  should  still 
think  that  they  can  find  in  the  writings 
of  the  ancient  philosophers  the  doctrine  of 
the  Divine  unity  clearly  expressed,  or  that 
though  the  ancients  failed  to  establish  this 
doctrine,  the  progress  of  the  human  mind 

*  Bishop  Sumner  on  the  Records  of  the  Creation. 


\\ 


I 


207 

would  in  time  have  led  to  the  discovery  of 
it ;  still  there  remain  moral  problems,  which 
no  one  can  pretend  to  say  that  reason  is 
capable  of  solving.  All  admit  a  moral 
distinction  in  the  actions  of  men,  though 
men  differ  respecting  the  foundation  of  that 
distinction.  All  too  must  admit,  that  the 
actions  of  at  least  a  very  great  majority  of 
mankind  are  often  inconsistent  with  the 
rules  of  morality;  and  few  (if  any)  will 
deny,  that  even  the  best  men  sometimes 
swerve  from  its  precepts.  Few  too,  it  is 
presumed,  will  assert  that  a  future  state  of 
existence  can  be  satisfactorily  proved  by 
reason  alone.  The  arguments  advanced  in 
proof  of  a  future  state  appear  to  have  more 
or  less  weight  in  the  minds  of  different  in- 
dividuals, but  can  any  one  venture  to  say 
that  they  produce  unhesitating  conviction  ? 
Those  on  whose  minds  they  operate  most 
forcibly  can  hardly  go  beyond  a  persuasion, 
that  the  arguments  for  a  future  existence 
preponderate  over  those  on  the  other  side ; 
but  they  can  never  reach  the  assured  and 


208 

unhesitating  conviction  of  those  who  ac- 
knowledge the  authority  of  the  Christian 
revelation. 

10.  Assuming,  then,  that  the  great  mass 
of  mankind  (not  to  say  all  men)  have  of- 
fended against  the  moral  law,  and  that  the 
natural  arguments  for  a  future  state  are  (to 
say  the  best)  not  so  conclusive  as  to  remove 
all  doubt  from  the  inquiring  mind,  two  im- 
portant questions  arise,  which  our  reason 
and  our  moral  nature  are  incompetent  to 
enable   us  to   answer :  —  1 .  Shall   we   live 
again  in  a  future  state  ?  and  if  that  ques- 
tion should  be  answered  in  the  affirmative, 
2.  Will  our  condition  in  the  world  to  come 
depend  on  our  conduct  here  ?    It  is  obvious 
that  these  are  questions  of  the  deepest  in- 
terest.    Christianity  undertakes  to  answer 
both  in  the  affirmative ;  it  brings  forward , 
in  support  of  its  claims,  arguments  which 
have  fully  satisfied  the  minds  of  many  of 
the  wisest  and  best  of  men.     I  am  far  from 
presuming  to  say,  that  serious  and  honest 
inquirers  have  never  rejected  them,  and  I 


209 

feel  myself  quite  incompetent  to  form  a 
judgment  on  this  subject;  but  considering 
the  shape  in  which  they  are  presented  to 
our  consideration,  and  their  very  general 
acceptation  by  the  wise  and  good,  it  cer- 
tainly does  seem  unpardonable  to  refuse 
diligently  to  consider  the  evidence  on  which 
the  belief  of  the  Christian  religion  is 
founded. 

11.  At  all  events,  whether  men  believe 
in  revealed  religion  or  not,  if  they  admit 
the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Intelligence  who 
formed  them  and  all  the  world,  from  whom 
they  have  derived  all  the  past  and  present 
good  which  they  have  enjoyed,  and  to  whom 
they  must  look  for  happiness  in  future,  it 
follows  that  their  highest  regards  of  grati- 
tude, veneration  and  love  are  due  to  the 
Author  of  their  being.  Nothing,  indeed, 
seems  more  strange  and  unnatural  than  the 
existence  of  those  feelings  towards  an  earthly 
benefactor,  unaccompanied  with  similar  sen- 
timents towards  Him  who  is  the  great  ori- 
ginal bestower  of  all  good,  and  in  whose 


210 

hands  all  from  whom  we  have  received  any 
benefits  are  but  humble  instruments. 

12.  Piety  towards  our  Maker,  having  its 
foundation  laid  thus  deep  in  the  nature  of 
man,  should  be  assiduously  cultivated  and 
enforced  by  ail  who  wish  to  act  in  con- 
formity  with  the  highest  principles  of  our 
nature.  Respecting  the  proper  means  of 
exciting  pious  sentiments  and  forming  pious 
habits,  instruction  is  to  be  sought  in  the 
sacred  volume,  and  in  the  works  of  prac- 
tical divines  and  moralists.  The  subject 
will  here  be  treated,  in  consistency  with 
the  mode  hitherto  adopted,  very  generally ; 
and  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  advance 
such  general  views  and  principles  as  may 
appear  fitted  to  assist  the  mind  in  forming 
just  sentiments,  and  correcting  erroneous 
ones,  on  this  subject. 

13.  It  is,  in  the  first  place,  obvious  that 
our  sentiments  respecting  the  Deity,  and 
the  eflfects  which  they  will  produce  on  our 
characters  and  conduct,  must,  in  a  great 
degree,  depend  on  the  notion  we  form  of 


i 


211 

his  attributes.  If,  like  Hobbes,  we  see  no- 
thing in  the  Deity  but  uncontrollable  power, 
or,  if  we  admit  any  other  attributes,  allow 
to  them  no  weight  or  importance,  it  seems 
plain  that  the  only  sentiment  which  we  can 
feel  towards  God  will  be  that  of  fear.  A 
being  who  has  no  moral  qualities,  or,  what 
amounts  to  the  same  thing,  w^hose  moral 
qualities  we  consider  of  no  importance,  can 
be  the  object  of  no  feelings  of  complacency 
on  our  part,  of  no  real  gratitude  or  love. 
All  our  feelings,  excepting  those  of  imme- 
diate pleasure  or  pain,  must  derive  their 
existence  from  some  view  to  pleasure  or 
happiness.  There  is  really  no  possibility  of 
conceiving  anything  else  which  can  influ- 
ence or  interest  us.  The  passions  look  to 
immediate  gratification  ;  reason  points  to 
future  enjoyment;  gratitude  is  a  pleasing 
affection,  arising  from  the  contemplation  of 
benefits  already  received ;  and  sympathy 
with  our  fellow-creatures  interests  our  feel- 
ings in  the  same  manner  for  them  as  for 
ourselves.     All  this  is  intelligible  ;   but  a 


'iSSM 


■Mumsums^im 


212 

sentiment  or  an  action  which  is  not  derived 
from  a  consideration  of  benefits  already  re- 
ceived, and  which  neither  procures  present 
pleasure  nor  is  expected  to  lead  to  future 
enjoyment,  to  ourselves  or  others,  is  entirely 
void  of  all  moral  quality,  and  never  can  be 
otherwise  than  indifferent  to  a  rational  and 
moral  being.  If,  rejecting  the  system  of 
Hobbes,  and  all  similar  theories,  we  behold 
the  moral  attributes  of  God  as  essential 
parts  of  his  divine  nature,  a  foundation  is 
laid  for  the  strongest  sentiments  of  grati- 
tude, love,  veneration,  hope,  trust,  and 
resignation,  of  which  the  human  mind  is 
capable.  When  these  sentiments  have  at- 
tained their  full  strength,  they  are  a  cure 
for  every  sorrow,  a  balm  for  every  wound. 
The  mind  is  raised  above  the  world  and  its 
concerns  ;  it  sees  around  it  a  plan  of  per- 
fect benevolence ;  the  universe  is  in  the 
hands  of  its  Maker,  who  conducts  all  things 
by  his  providence,  makes  **  the  wrath  of 
man  to  praise  him,  and  restrains  the  re- 
mainder of  wrath." 


213 


"  . .  . .  from  seeming  evil  still  educing  good. 
And  better  thence  again,  and  better  still. 
In  infinite  progression*.'* 

This  is  the  most  exalted  state  of  man.  It 
is  that  for  which  he  was  made,  and  in 
which  alone  he  can  find  rest  for  his  soul. 
All  finite  existences  partake  of  imperfection ; 
and  nothing  can  satisfy  the  vast  cravings  of 
the  human  mind  but  the  contemplation  of 
the  inconceivably  great  and  good  Being 
from  whom  proceeds  all  that  is  beautiful 
and  wise  and  great  and  good,  and  to  whom 
all  creatures  owe  their  existence  and  all 
the  happiness  which  they  do  or  can  enjoy. 
Happy,  beyond  all  that  words  can  express, 
happy  is  the  mind  which  is  fully  possessed 
by  this  deep  and  fervent,  but  sober  and  ra- 
tional spirit  of  piety,  and  which  the  divine 
flame  has  purified  from  all  that  is  low  and 
sordid,  and  impure  and  selfish.  This  state 
of  mind  is  heaven  begun  on  earth  ;  it  is  the 
perfection  of  human  nature,  to  obtain  which 

*  Thomson. 


214 


should  be  the  earnest  endeavour  of  every 
rational  being. 

14.  Widely  different,  and  exceedingly  in- 
consistent with  these  views,  are  the  senti- 
ments entertained  by  many  of  the  character 
of  the  Deity,  and  that  even  by  those  who 
are  justly  esteemed  persons  of  great  piety. 
So  clearly,  however,  is  the  character  of  be- 
nevolence impressed  on  the  works  of  God, 
so  natural  is  it  for  the  human  mind  to  re- 
gard its  Maker  as  a  protector  and  benefac- 
tor, as  to  make  it  impossible  for  the  harsh- 
est representations  of  the  Divine  character 
entirely  to  overcome  these  natural  feelings. 
Those  who  hold  the  most  dreadful  and  ap- 
palling doctrines  respecting  the  ways  of  God 
to  man,  admit,  nevertheless,  in  some  part  of 
their  systems,  such  views  of  Deity  as  may  be 
contemplated,  and  constantly  are  contem- 
plated, with  feehngs  of  gratitude,  dehght, 
and  confidence.  Theories  of  religion  sel- 
dom affect  the  mind  equally  in  all  their 
parts  ;  and  the  kind  and  good  of  all  religious 


215 


sects  and  parties  find  the  means  of  keeping 
out  of  sight  the  harsher  parts  of  their  creeds 
and  systems,  and  direct  their  chief  regard  to 
what  it  contains  of  mildness,  tenderness, 
and  benevolence. 

15.  Still  it  must  be  confessed,  that  all  re- 
presentations of  the  character  of  the  Deity 
which  appear  inconsistent  with  benevolence 
must  (so  far  as  they  operate)  produce  evil 
consequences.  In  theory,  atheism  itself  is 
better  than  views  of  the  divine  character 
w^hich  have  often  extensively  prevailed  in 
the  world.  '*  It  were  better,"  says  Bacon'*, 
*'  to  have  no  opinion  of  God  at  all,  than 
such  an  opinion  as  is  unworthy  of  him ;  for 
the  one  is  unbelief,  the  other  is  contumely, 
and  certainly  superstition  is  the  reproach  of 
the  Deity.  Plutarch  saith  well  to  that  pur- 
pose :  '  Surely,'  saith  he,  *  I  had  rather,  a 
great  deal,  men  should  say  there  was  no 
such  man  at  all  as  Plutarch,  than  that  they 
should  say,  that  there  was  one  Plutarch  that 
would  eat  his  children  as  soon  as  they  were 

*  Essay  on  Superstition. 


216 

born,'  as  the  poets  spoke  of  Saturn  ;  and 
as  the  contumely  is  greater  towards  God,  so 
the  danger  is  greater  towards  man.     Athe- 
ism leaves  a  man  to  sense,  to  philosophy, 
to  natural  piety,  to  love,  to  reputation  ;  all 
which  may  be  guides  to  an  outward  moral 
virtue,  though  religion  were  not ;  but  super- 
stition dismounts  all  these,  and  erecteth  an 
absolute  monarchy  in  the  minds  of  men." 
The   history   of  rehgion,   however,    seems 
clearly  to  show,  that  these  remarks  require 
to  be  considerably  restricted ;  and  that  re- 
ligious systems  in  which  the  character  of 
the  Deity  is  represented  in  such  a  way  as 
no  conception  of  ours  can  possibly  make 
consistent  with  benevolence,  have  neverthe- 
less, by  the  operation  of  certain  other  parts 
of  the   same  system,  produced   extremely 
beneficial  effects  on  the  mind  and  conduct ; 
and  this  seems  to  be  fairly  attributable  to 
those  moral  principles  and  feelings  of  our 
nature,  which,   in   spite   of  our  erroneous 
opinions,  occasion  those  parts  of  religious 
systems  which  are  the  most  just  and  rational, 


217 

and  therefore  best  accommodated  to  our 
nature  to  operate  most  powerfully  on  our 
minds.  We  feel,  and  we  cannot  help  '  .^el- 
ing,  that  the  love  of  God  can  be  forided 
alone  on  a  belief  in  his  moral  excellences ; 
and  that  belief  practically  excludes  those 
representations  of  the  Deity  which  fix  upon 
him  a  character  of  injustice,  vindictiveness 
and  cruelty,  and  which  system  may  require  us 
to  assent  to  in  words.  ''  II  faut  aimer  TEtre 
infiniment  parfait,  et  non  pas  un  fantome 
epouvantable,  un  Dieu  injuste,  absolu,  puis- 
sant, mais  sans  bonte  et  sans  sagesse.  S'il 
y  avait  un  tel  Dieu,  le  vrai  Dieu  nous  defen- 
droit  de  I'adorer  et  de  Taimer.  II  y  a  peut- 
etre  plus  de  danger  d'oflFenser  Dieu  lorsqu'on 
lui  donne  une  forme  si  horrible,  que  de  me- 
priser  ce  fantome^." 

16.  Our  religious  as  well  as  our  other 
sentiments  require  to  be  restrained  and  di- 
rected by  reason,  to  prevent  their  running 
into  endless  varieties  of  folly  and  fanaticism. 

*  Malebranche,  quoted  by  Mackintosh,  '  Dissertation 
on  Ethical  Philosophy,'  181,  n. 


i 


218 

Reason  and  true  religion  can  never  be  in- 
consistent, for  both  proceed  alike  from  the 
great  Author  of  all.  It  is  by  their  union 
alone  that  the  human  mind  can  attain  its 
highest  and  best  state.  Great  errors  have 
prevailed  in  all  ages  and  among  all  nations 
on  this  subject,  which  appear  to  have  flowed 
mainly  from  not  discriminating  accurately 
the  distinct  provinces  of  reason  and  revela- 
tion. Two  most  important  points  have  been 
already  adverted  to,  concerning  which  rea- 
son can  give  us  no  satisfactory  information, 
— a  future  state,  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins. 
Here  then  we  must  revert  to  revelation,  or 
remain  in  the  dark.  I  am  far  from  pre- 
suming to  assert,  that  there  are  not  a  great 
number  of  subjects  besides  these  beyond 
reason,  respecting  which  revelation  gives  us 
information  ;  but  it  is  quite  clear  that  no 
other  inquiry  can  equal  in  importance  these 
two — shall  we  live  again  after  death  ?  and, 
are  any  means  afibrded  us  by  which  we  can 
obtain  forgiveness  of  our  sins  ?  There  cannot 
be  a  more  unhappy  error  than  that  which 


219 

represents  reason  and  revelation  as  in  any 
way  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and  re- 
quires us  to  sacrifice  our  reason  on  embracins: 
revelation.  ''  I  express  myself,"  says  Bishop 
Butler,  '*  with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mis- 
taken to  vilify  reason,  which  is  indeed  the 
only  faculty  we  have  wherewith  to  judge  con- 
cerning anything,  even  revelation  itself." 

17.  The  remark   made  above,  that  reh- 
gious   systems   seldom    impress   the   mind 
equally  in   all  their  parts,    and  that  well- 
disposed  persons  usually  contrive  to  direct 
their  attention  principally  to  those  parts  of 
a  system  which  produce  the  most  beneficial 
eflfects  on  the  mind,  seems  to  have  been 
little  adverted  to ;  yet  it  is  of  great  import- 
ance, and  to  the  neglect  of  considering  it, 
the  extensive  prevalence  and  long  continu- 
ance of  absurd  opinions  in  reUgion  is  per- 
haps more  to  be  attributed  than  to  any  other 
cause.     Various   other  circumstances  mav 
indeed  have  often  combined  to  the  same  end ; 
but  the  real  good  eflfected,  which  ought  to 
be  attributed  to  the  more  rational  and  amia- 

l2 


220 

ble  parts  of  the  system,  has  too  frequently 
been  considered  to  flow  from  the  whole, 
taken  collectively.  Nothing  indeed  seems 
clearer,  than  that  all  representations  of  the 
Deity  which  impute  to  him  injustice  and 
cruelty,  must,  in  some  degree,  produce  un- 
happy effects  on  the  minds  of  those  who 
embrace  such  opinions.  It  is  however  cer- 
tain that  many  individuals  holding  such 
opinions  have  been  pious  and  exemplary 
characters ;  and  when  the  system  has  been 
attacked,  the  answer  has  been — see  the 
practical  effects  of  it.  Now  that  which  pro- 
duces a  preponderance  of  good  is  practically 
good.  It  becomes  then  of  importance  to 
ascertain  whether  the  good  effects  which 
appear  to  flow  from  a  given  system  of  reli- 
gion are  derived  from  the  whole  system,  or 
from  some  parts  of  it  which  are  of  a  different 
character  from  the  rest,  and  are  in  their 
own  nature  calculated  to  interest  the  heart 
and  improve  the  character.  Now  what  is  it 
(that  we  can  love  in  the  moral  character  of 
jany  being  whatever  but  goodness  ?    No  man 


221 

ever  professed  to  love  another  because  he 
was  envious,  revengeful,  or  cruel,  even 
though  his  own  character  was  marked  by 
these  hateful  qualities.  ''  Epicurus  vero  ex 
animis  hominum  extraxit  radicitus  religio- 
nem,  cum  Diis  immortalibus  etopemet  gra- 
tiam  sustulit.  Cam  enim  optimam  et  prae- 
stantissimam  naturam  Dei  dicat  esse,  negat 
idem  esse  in  Deo  gratiam ;  toUit  id,  quod 
maxime  proprium  est  optimae  praestantissi- 
maeque  naturae.  Quid  enim  est  melius,  aut 
quid  praestantius  bonitate  et  beneficentia? 
qua  cum  carere  Deum  vultis,  neminem  Deo 
nee  Deum  nee  hominem  carum,  neminem,  ab 
eo  amari,  neminem  diligi  vultis. "^'^ 

18.  Such  considerations  as  have  been 
lately  suggested,  are  calculated  to  reconcile 
the  mind  to  what  must  have  often  given 
great  uneasiness  to  serious  and  reflecting 
persons,  and  probably  has  not  unfrequently 
led  such  individuals  to  entertain  sceptical 
views  of  religion ;  I  mean  the  great  diver- 
sity of  religious   systems  which   has   pre- 

*  Cic.  de  Nat.  Deorum,  i.  43. 


222 

vailed  in  the  Christian  world,  and  the  su- 
perstition, fanaticism  and  absurdity  which 
have  existed  in  principle  and  practice  in 
different  churches  and  among  different  sects 
of  Christians.  The  history  of  the  world  and 
of  Christianity  seems  to  show  clearly  that  it 
is  extremely  difficult  for  the  human  mind 
to  attain  exalted  and  spiritual  ideas  of  the 
Deity,  and  especially  of  his  moral  attributes. 
The  indications  of  his  power  are  so  stri- 
kingly displayed  in  all  around  us,  as  to  im- 
press deeply  every  mind  of  ordinary  obser- 
vation and  reflection ;  but  it  requires  some 
effort  of  thought  and  some  moral  feeling 
to  carry  the  mind  beyond  this  conception, 
and  to  entertain  just  ideas  of  the  moral  ex- 
cellences of  the  Deity.  The  sentiment  re- 
specting him  which  the  mind  seems  to  form 
with  the  greatest  difficulty,  is  that  of  his 
goodness ;  nor  can  this  be  wondered  at, 
when  we  consider  the  difficulty  of  recon- 
ciling the  perfect  benevolence  of  God  with 
the  great  quantity  of  evil  which  we  must 
admit  to  exist  in  the  world.     I  have  already 


223 

adduced  arguments,  which  are,  I  think,  of 
sufficient  force  to   remove  this  difficulty. 
The  indications  of  the  perfect  goodness  of 
the  Deity  seem  to  me  as  clearly  impressed 
on  the  works  of  his  hands  as  those  of  his 
unbounded  power.     As  long  then  as  see  no- 
thing in  the  Deity  but  uncontrollable  power, 
he  can  be  only  an  object  of  terror,  and  the 
mind  naturally  looks  for  some  other  being 
to  mediate  and  intercede  between  the  Deity 
and  itself,  to  turn  away  his  wrath,  and  to 
conciliate  his   favour.     Hence  the  host  of 
saints  who  made  their  appearance  in  the 
early  and  middle  ages  of  Christianity,  and 
who  still  keep  their  station  in  the  Romish 
calendar.  The  idea,  having  once  arisen,  of  con- 
ferring this  mediatorial  character  on  an  amia- 
ble female,  was  so  pleasing  and  congenial  to 
human  feelings,  as  easily  to  place  the  Virgin 
Mary  in  a  pre-eminent  mediatorial  station. 
She  became,  and  still  continues  in  the  Ro- 
man Catholic  Church,  the  favorite  mediatrix 
between  God  and  man.    Those  whose  minds 
are  sufficiently  enlightened  on  the  subject  of 


224 

religion  to  feel  the  absurdity  of  supposing 
that  the  great  Being  who  formed  and  who 
governs  the  universe  can  stand  in  need  of 
any  prompting   to   confer   benefits  on  the 
creatures  whom  he  has  formed,  and  that  the 
benevolence  of  the  creature  can  exceed  that 
of  the  Creator,  are  apt  to  be  shocked  at  the 
adoration  paid  to  the  Virgin  and  the  saints ; 
and  the  feeling  is  proper  when  it  only  ope- 
rates to  deter  individuals  from  such  unauthor- 
ized practices ;   but,  considering  how  long 
this  worship  has  prevailed  in  the  Christian 
church,  and   that   for   many   ages   it   was 
universal  among  all  who  called  themselves 
Christians,  it  seems  to  follow  that  it  answer- 
ed some  good  purpose ;    and  that  purpose 
we  have  been  endeavouring  to  point  out. 
When  our  minds  have  once  arrived  at  the 
just  and  happy  conclusion,  that  the  Deity 
possesses  a  character  of  perfect  benevolence ; 
and,  consequently,  that  all  the  arrangements 
of  his  providence  must  be  intended  and  fit- 
ted, in  some  way  or  other,  to  advance  the 
happiness  of  his  creatures;  and  that  it  is 


/ 


i 


^ 


^ 


I 


J 


225 

impossible  to  suppose,  as  being  obviously 
inconsistent  with  any  notion  which  we  can 
form  of  benevolence,  that  pain  or  evil  of 
any  kind  is  his  ultimate  object,  we  are  ne- 
cessarily led  to  trust  in  him  at  all  times  and 
under  all  circumstances  ;  but  till  we  have 
attained  this  state,  we  feel  a  need  of  some 
sort  of  mediation,  by  which  we  may  reach 
the  Deity,  and  become  assured  of  his  favor 
to  ourselves. 

19.  It  is  hoped  that  the  observations 
w^hich  have  been  just  made  will  not  be  un- 
derstood in  such  a  sense  as  will  lead  to  an 
expectation  that  sin,  or  a  transgression  of 
the  laws  of  God,  can  be  committed  with 
impunity.  The  voice  of  reason  and  the 
volume  of  revealed  truth  show  alike  that 
sin  is  the  road  to  miserv  ;  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  believe  that  happiness  can  be  at- 
tained by  any  other  means  than  by  virtuous 
principles  and  conduct.  Virtue,  i^4ia«"beee 
already  shown,  tends  to  produce  happiness 
in  this  w^orld,  and  vice  has  the  opposite 
tendency  ;   but   many  circumstances   arise 

L  5 


\ 


226 

here  to  check  their  natural  tendencies,  and 
to  prevent  their  producing  their  full  effects. 
It  seems  only  to  be  required  that  these 
counteracting  circumstances  should  be  re- 
moved, and  virtuous  and  vicious  principles 
have,  as  we  may  say,  fair  play,  and  their 
natural  tendencies  would  uniformly  operate 
in  producing  the  natural  results.  Now  we 
cannot  imagine  that,  in  a  future  state,  of 
what  is  commonlv  called  retribution,  the 
wicked  will  have  any  power  to  oppress 
and  injure  the  virtuous,  or  to  procure  for 
themselves  any  gratification  at  the  expense 
of  others ;  but,  setting  these  things  aside, 
miserv  will  be  as  certainlv  the  effect  of  vice 
as  happiness  of  virtue.  The  idea  of  a  future 
state  brings  with  it,  to  every  mind  not  com- 
pletely sophisticated  by  system,  the  expecta- 
tion  that  the  state  of  being  in  the  unknown 
world  will  bear  a  relation  to  the  character 
of  the  individual,  and  that  independently  of 
any  notion  of  positive  punishment.  Does 
or  can  any  man  (with  the  exception  made 
above)   think  that   the  condition  of  Nero 


227 


and  of  Alfred  will  be  the  same  in  the  future 
World  ?  Surely  no  reflecting  person  can  help 
seeing,  that,  if  left  to  themselves,  the  noble 
dispositions  of  the  latter  would  produce  to 
himself  a  high  degree  of  happiness,  while 
the  hateful  character  of  the  former  could 
not  fail  to  make  him  his  own  tormentor. 

20.  Misery,  then,  in  a  future  state,  we 
conceive  to  be  the  natural  consequence  of  a 
wicked  life  in  this  world,  and  that  by  the 
very  nature  of  things,  which  we  have  no 
more  reason  to  expect  w^ill  be  departed  from 
than  the  laws  of  the  physical  world.  This 
is  surely  a  most  awful  consideration,  and 
far  more  calculated  deeply  to  affect  a  re- 
flecting mind  than  the  views  which  are 
generally  entertained  on  this  subject.  Paley 
commences  the  9th  chapter  of  the  6th  book 
of  his  '  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy '  as 
follows: — **The  proper  end  of  human  pu- 
nishment is  not  the  satisfaction  of  justice, 
but  the  prevention  of  crimes.  By  the  satis- 
faction of  justice,  I  mean  the  retribution  of 
so  much  pain  for  so  much  guilt ;  which  is 


228 

the  dispensation  we  expect  at  the  hand  of 
God,  and  which  we  are  accustomed  to  con- 
sider as  the  order  of  things  that  perfect 
justice  dictates  and  requires.    In  what  sense, 
or  whether  with  truth  in  any  sense,  justice 
may  be  said  to  demand  the  punishment  of 
offenders,  I  do  not  now  inquire ;   but  I  as- 
sert, that  this  demand  is  not  the  motive 
or  occasion  of  human  punishment.     What 
would  it  be  to  the  magistrate  that  offences 
went  altogether  unpunished,  if  the  impunity 
of  the  offenders  were  followed  by  no  danger 
or  prejudice  to  the  commonwealth?     The 
fear  lest  the  escape  of  the  criminal  should 
encourage  him,  or  others  by  his  example, 
to  repeat  the   same  crime,  or  to  commit 
different  crimes,  is  the  sole  consideration 
which    authorizes    punishment   by    human 
laws."     The   whole   drift   of  this   passage 
shows  that  the  author  could  have  but  little 
confidence  in  the  soundness  of  the  views 
contained  in  the  first  part  of  it.     Nothing 
can  be  clearer  than  that  a  negative  answer 
ought  to  be  given  to  his  question,  '*  whether. 


229 


in  any  sense,  justice  may  be  said  to  demand 
the  punishment  of  offenders."  Certainly 
the  granting  of  a  pardon  to  a  criminal  is 
not  inconsistent  with  justice.  Any  one 
would  be  laughed  at  who  talked  of  a  sove- 
reign having  committed  an  act  of  injustice 
in  pardoning  an  offender ;  and  no  one  would 
be  bold  enough  to  assert,  that  the  sovereign 
was  bound  to  punish  the  criminal  for  the 
satisfaction  of  his  justice.  Justice  consists 
in  giving  every  one  his  due,  and  treating 
every  one  as  well  as  he  deserves  to  be 
treated  ;  but  it  does  not  prohibit  any  one 
from  giving  another  more  than  his  due,  or 
giving  him  more  than  he  deserves :  if  it 
did,  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  gene- 
rosity and  mercy.  If  any  one  doubt  this, 
let  him  tell  me  what  he  would  think  of  such 
language  as  this :  *'  S.  is  an  extremely  un- 
just man,  for  he  has  given  his  servant  10/. 
more  than  his  wages ;  and  has  freely  for- 
given a  man  from- whom  he  had  received  an 
injury."  The  absurdity  of  such  language 
would  be  felt  universally.     Now  we  have 


230 

abundant  reason  to  form  the  most  exalted 
idea  of  the  moral  perfection  of  the  Deity ; 
and  it  is  quite  inconsistent  with  that  idea, 
that  he  should  punish  any  of  his  creatures 
from  mere  vengeance.  All  that  we  see  and 
know,  however,  of  the  physical,  moral,  and 
intellectual  world,  leads  us  to  the  conclu- 
sion, that  the  whole  is  regulated  by  fixed 
laws ;  that  there  is  an  order  of  things  con- 
stantly preserved,  from  which  we  have  no 
right  to  expect  any  deviation.  Observe  the 
assertion  is,  that  we  have  no  right  to  expect 
a  deviation.  That  deviations  have  taken 
place  in  the  physical  and  intellectual  world, 
all  who  believe  in  miracles  and  inspiration 
must  admit ;  but  the  great  truth  of  a  nature 
of  things,  and  a  general  system  of  physical, 
moral,  and  intellectual  laws,  is  in  no  degree 
invalidated  by  those  occasional  deviations. 

21.  It  may  perhaps  be  objected,  that 
these  representations  of  the  nature  of  future 
punishments  are  inconsistent  with  the  ac- 
count given  of  them  in  the  New  Testament, 
where,  it  will  be  said,  they  are  spoken  of  in 


231 


the  light  mentioned  by  Paley,  as  the  retri- 
bution of  so  much  pain  for  so  much  sin, 
and  are  also  described  as  of  a  positive 
nature. 

22.  In  the  first  place,  I  have  to  remark, 
that  I  am  not  presuming  to  make  any  asser- 
tion on  the  nature  of  future  punishment, 
nor  to  deny  that  the  punishment  of  the 
wicked  may  be  of  a  positive  nature,  beyond 
the  natural  tendency  of  their  evil  deeds; 
but  that  I  am  merely  stating  what  appears 
to  me  to  be  the  most  probable  account  to 
be  given  of  it.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  the 
view  here  taken  of  this  subject  is,  in  any 
manner,  inconsistent  with  what  is  contained 
in  the  Scriptures,  I  am  ready  to  bow  with 
submission  to  their  authority,  and  to  retract 
what  has  been  written  ;  but,  for  the  reasons 
now  to  be  given,  I  do  not  think  that  there 
is  any  such  inconsistency.  No  reflecting 
person,  I  presume,  thinks  himself  bound  to 
a  strictly  literal  construction  of  the  ac- 
counts given  in  the  New  Testament  of  the 
general  judgment,  and  of  the  condition  of 


232 

the  righteous  and  of  the  wicked  in  a  future 
state.  Both  the  Old  and  the  New  Testament 
are  written  in  the  highly  figurative  manner 
usually  adopted  by  the  Asiatic  nations, 
which  differs  very  widely  from  the  more 
unadorned  and  literal  style  in  use  among 
the  Europeans.  No  one  could  have  ex- 
pected that  our  Saviour  and  his  disciples, 
who  were  all  Jews,  and  who  lived  among 
Jews,  w^ould  address  their  countrymen  in 
any  other  way  than  that  to  which  they  had 
been  accustomed.  Tlie  plain,  didactic,  phi- 
losophical style  of  the  western  nations 
w^ould  have  been  quite  unfit  for  the  in- 
habitants of  Judea  and  Galilee,  who  had 
always  been  used  to  a  very  different  and  far 
more  poetical  manner  in  the  writings  of  their 
prophets.  Our  Saviour's  discourses,  there- 
fore, are  full  of  figures ;  and  he  often  con- 
veys instruction  in  the  form  of  parables,  a 
mode  of  composition  which  could  not  fail 
of  being  very  agreeable  to  those  whom  he 
w^as  addressing.  Another  reason  for  adopt- 
ing this  style  is,   that  our  Saviour's  dis- 


233 

courses  were  not  given  as  dry  moral  lectures, 
but  were  direct  and  most  powerful  appeals 
to  the  best  feelings  and  sentiments  of  the 
human  heart.     He  never  addresses  his  au- 
ditors as  persons   to  whom  moral  truths 
w^ere  unknown,  though  he  sometimes  am- 
plifies   and    improves    sentiments    already 
acknowledged  and  admitted.      No  one,  it 
is  supposed,  really  believes  that  the  great 
judgment-day  will   resemble  a  sessions  at 
the  Old  Bailey,  and  that  all  the  actions  of 
every  man's  life  will  be  minutely  set  forth 
in  the  presence  of  the  assembled  millions 
who  have  inhabited  the  world  from  its  com- 
mencement till  its   end,  a  process  which 
must  (as  far  as  we  can  comprehend)  make 
the  judgment  last  for  ages,  and  which  would 
be  obviously  useless.      Surely  it  must  be 
sufficient  to   satisfy  any  reasonable  mind, 
that  every  one  should  feel  the  justice  of  the 
sentence  passed  upon  him  (if  we  must  still 
resort  to  judicial  language),  or,  to  speak  as 
it   seems   more   correctly,  each   individual 
will  find  himself  placed   in   that  state  to 


234 

which  he  will  then  plainly  see  that  his  con- 
duct has  naturally  led.  This  is  all  that  is 
necessary;  and  I  will  endeavour  to  show 
that  it  is  all  that  the  case  requires. 

23.  But  it  will  be  asked,  if  these  views 
of  the  general  judgment  and  of  a  future 
state  be  correct,  how  does  it  come  to  pass 
that  such  representations  as  those  which 
are  contained  in  the  25th  chapter  of  St. 
Matthew's  Gospel  have  been  resorted  to, 
w^hich  are  calculated  to  give  an  impression 
of  a  state  of  things  extremely  different  from 
that  which  has  been  just  described.  This 
difficulty  will,  I  am  aware,  appear  to  those 
who  have  not  been  in  the  habit  of  studv- 
ing  the  Scriptures  a  very  formidable  one. 
Those  who  have  really  studied  the  sacred 
volume,  will,  I  believe,  see  much  less  force 
in  it.  The  desultory  way  in  which  the 
Bible  is  usually  read,  a  chapter  here  and 
a  chapter  there,  the  lesson  for  the  day, 
some  favourite  chapter  read  again  and 
again,  while  what  goes  before  and  what 
follows  after  is  scarcely  ever  (if  ever)  read 


> 


235 

and  considered ;  the  long  interval  which  is 
allowed  to  take  place  between  one  reading 
of  the  Scriptures  and  another,  an  interval 
in  thousands  of  instances  of  six  days,  from 
Sunday  to  Sunday ;  and  the  unhappy  divi- 
sion of  the  Bible  into  short  texts,  which 
are  often  read  as  so  many  aphorisms,  with- 
out regard  to  the  connexion  in  which  they 
stand ; — lead  to  such  a  general  ignorance 
of  the  contents  of  the  Bible  as  a  whole, 
the  parts  of  which  have  a  connexion 
with  each  other,  as  is  sincerely  to  be  la- 
mented by  every  real  friend  of  Christi- 
anity. Those  who  have  really  studied  the 
Scriptures  well  know  that  there  is  a  much 
larger  portion  than  is  generally  supposed, 
which  cannot  be  understood  in  a  Uteral 
sense.  No  tolerably  well-informed  person, 
I  presume,  believes  that  God  Hterally  walked 
in  the  Garden  of  Eden  in  the  cool  of  the 
day''^,  or  that  he  literally  showed  his  back 
parts  to  Moses  t;  no  one  believes  that  the 
great  Author  and  Ruler  of  the  universe  is 

*  Genesis  iii.  8.  f  Exodus  xxxiii.  23. 


236 

subject  to  anger  and  jealousy,  though  he  is 
often  declared  in  the  Old  Testament  to  be 
angry  and  jealous.  No  man  having  any 
rational  conception  of  the  Deity  can  think 
that  the  following  text  is  to  be  taken  lite- 
rally: *' and  it  repented  the  Lord  that  he 
had  made  man  on  the  earth,  and  it  grieved 
him  at  his  heart''^."  The  explanation  of 
such  passages  as  these  by  the  most  judicious 
writers  is,  that  as  all  our  ideas  of  God  must, 
from  the  limited  extent  of  our  faculties,  be 
very  imperfect,  the  representation  w^hich  he 
makes  of  himself  to  his  creatures  must  be 
accommodated  to  the  state  of  their  minds, 
and  to  the  notions  of  him  w^hich  they  are 
capable  of  forming.  Attentive  readers  of 
the  Old  Testament  cannot  fail  to  perceive, 
that  the  ideas  entertained  of  the  Deity  by 
the  Israelites  became  more  and  more  spirit- 
ual by  slow  degrees ;  and  it  will  be  no  un- 
interesting employment  for  the  mind  to 
trace  this  development  of  theistical  con- 
ceptions from  the  famihar  and   anthropo- 

*  Genesis  vi.  6. 


237 

morphitical  representations  of  the  Deity  in 
the  book  of  Genesis  to  the  spiritual  and 
sublime  sentiments  contained  in  the  Psalms, 
and  in  the  speech  of  Solomon  at  the  dedi- 
cation of  the  Temple*. 

24.  If  the  views  which  have  been  just 
given  be  admitted,  they  seem  to  me  suf- 
ficient to  remove  the  difficulty  which  had 
been  previously  stated.  But  even  if  they 
should  not  be  allowed,  let  us  see  whether 
other  views  of  the  subject  may  not  be  taken, 
which  will  show  satisfactorily  that  the  ac- 
count which  has  been  given  of  the  divine 
government  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  re- 
presentations of  the  future  punishment  of 
the  wicked  which  are  found  in  the  New 
Testament. 

25.  No  reflecting  person  can,  I  think, 
deny  the  possibility  of  the  Deity  having 
created  the  human  race  with  such  moral 
faculties,  and  liable  to  such  results  from  the 

*  1  Kings,  viii.  27.  See  on  the  subject  of  this  section 
Bishop  Law's  '  Theory  of  Religion' ;  an  excellent  work, 
but  little  known,  I  fear,  at  the  present  day. 


238 

abuse  of  them,  as  I  have  described.     As- 
suming, then,  for  the  present,  this  to  be  the 
actual  state  of  things,  how,  I  ask,  could  the 
human  race  be  made  acquainted  with  the 
most  important  and  most  deeply  interesting 
fact,  that  they  were  destined  for  a  future 
state,  and  with  that  of  their  responsibility 
in  that  state  for  their  conduct  in  this  world, 
but  in  some  such  way  as  that  contained  in 
the  New  Testament  ?   It  is  evident  that  the 
views  which  I  have  been  endeavouring  to 
support  can  be  understood  and  received  by 
those  only  who  have  been  prepared  for  them 
by  study  and   reflection,   though   to  such 
persons  they  seem   to   me  far  more  con- 
vincing,  and   far   more   likely   to   have   a 
happy  effect  on    the   character,  than  such 
notions  as  are  ordinarily  entertained  on  the 
subject.    The  substance  of  what  is  contained 
in  the  New  Testament  respecting  a  future 
state,  that  men  will  be  happy  or  miserable 
in  another  world  according  to  their  conduct 
in  this,   is  strictly  true,  according  to  the 
theorj'  contended  for ;  and  the  manner  in 


239 

which  this  great  truth  is  announced  is  cal- 
culated to  make  a  deep  and  just  impression 
on  the  minds  of  the  mass  of  mankind. 
These  considerations  are,  to  my  mind,  quite 
sufficient  to  justify  the  use  of  such  repre- 
sentations. 

26.  Some  persons  of  a  rehgious  character 
may  perhaps  be  disposed  to  think  that  the 
Christian  revelation,  by  setting  forth  the 
doctrine  of  a  future  Ufe,  where  the  righteous 
and  the  wicked  will  be  treated  according  to 
their  characters,  has  left  no  room  for  other 
motives  than  those  which  directly  relate  to 
the  future  state.  A  man's  eternal  interests, 
it  may  be  justly  said,  are  of  such  paramount 
importance,  as  to  make  it  quite  idle  to  put 
any  good  we  can  do  to  our  fellow-creatures 
in  competition  with  them.  Is  it  not  then 
enough,  that,  in  all  our  actions,  we  have 
regard  to  our  own  greatest  happiness,  and 
is  not  that  the  only  legitimate  motive  which 
ought  to  influence  us  ? 

27.  It  must  be  conceded  to  this  argu- 
ment, that  if  any  act  which  flows  from  a 


240 

regard  to  the  good  of  others,  or  from  those 
moral  sentiments  of  which  we  have  already 
said  so  much,  can  be  proved  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  a  regard  to  our  own  eternal 
happiness,  no  rational  argument  could  be 
advanced  w^hich  ought  to  induce  us  to  prac- 
tise such  an  action.  The  principles  already 
laid  down  w^ould  prevent  us  from  consider- 
ing such  an  act  to  be  any  part  of  our  duty. 
Benevolence  to  our  fellow-creatures  can 
never  require  us  to  sacrifice  an  incom- 
parably greater  good  to  ourselves  for  a 
lesser  one  to  them.  Even  the  exalted  mo- 
rality of  the  New  Testament  only  requires 
us  to  love  our  neighbours  as  ourselves. 
Neither  is  there  any  ground  for  considering 
our  moral  sentiments  at  all  inconsistent 
with  our  greatest  happiness.  It  has  already 
been  endeavoured  to  be  shown,  that  virtue, 
in  all  its  forms,  is  calculated  to  advance  our 
well-being,  and  indeed  that  it  is  the  only 
road  to  happiness.  This  being  admitted, 
the  only  question  remaining  is,  whether  we 
are  bound  always  to  keep  this  our  greatest 


241 

happiness  in  view,  or  at  least  so  to  shape 
our  conduct  as  that  it  should  always  be  our 
real  and  only  ultimate  object,  and  conse- 
quently that  we  should  entertain  no  bene- 
volent affections  towards  another  except 
w^ith  a  view  to  procure  our  own  greatest 
happiness.  Now  this  is  the  identical  ques- 
tion which  has  been  already  discussed  in 
the  first  chapter  of  this  essay. 

28.  It  is  remarkable  how  little  use  is 
made  in  the  New  Testament  of  the  argu- 
ments derived  from  a  consideration  of  the 
future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
as  it  is  generally,  but  most  erroneously, 
called ;  for  how  can  a  creature  deserve  any 
reward  from  his  Creator,  even  though  he 
should  always  act  in  obedience  to  his  laws  ? 
The  25th  chapter  of  St.  Matthew's  Gospel 
contains  a  most  awful  description  of  the 
day  of  judgment,  and  of  the  ultimate  desti- 
nation of  the  righteous  and  of  the  wicked  ; 
and  in  a  few  other  parts  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment the  same  great  events  are  referred  to ; 
but  the  higher  and  nobler  motives  of  love 

M 


i 


i 


i 


i 


242 

of  God  and  of  our  fellow-creatures  are  far 
more  frequently  insisted  on.  The  moral 
doctrines  of  the  New  Testament  are  then 
in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the  ethical 
principles  which  it  is  the  object  of  this  work 
to  establish. 


THE  END. 


Printed  by  R.  and  J.  E.  Taylor,  Red  Lion  Court,  Fleet  Street. 


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